The eve of the New Year of 2026 in Japan was marked by a series of notable publications from leading media outlets, focusing both on evaluating 2025 and making forecasts for the future trajectory of certain aspects of the country’s political line.
What was also curious and attracted attention was the outcomes of a public survey conducted by one of Japan’s leading newspapers, Yomiuri Shimbun. It found out what events of the past year covered by the newspaper were considered particularly significant by its readers. It goes without saying that these results were influenced by the “hype-and-clip” perception of the surrounding world, typical of an average citizen in any country and shaped by the very same media. Yet, even taking this factor into account, the top three places were quite deservedly occupied by Tokyo’s genuinely primary foreign policy challenges. Notably, the first and the third places were taken by issues pertaining to the relations with the country’s key ally, while sharply deteriorating ties with its principal adversary came second.
Issues in Relations with China
First and foremost, let us pinpoint the hardly eliminable factor of competitive positioning between two of the leading players in the Indo-Pacific region—China and Japan. Over time, this particular factor has only become more evident. However, the current phase of sharply escalating bilateral relations is unprecedented, and the reason for this is quite clear. It stems from a recent high-profile remark by Japan’s new prime minister, Sanae Takaichi, regarding the Taiwan issue. The problem is one of the most sensitive for the PRC, whilst Japan’s involvement in it has only been building up.
The response to this remark came in the form of two People’s Liberation Army military exercises held in December, involving units from different branches of China’s armed forces, including aircraft carrier strike groups. During the first of this series of drills, a hazardous incident involving fighter jets from both countries occurred. As for the second exercise, conducted on the eve of the New Year, it prompted diplomatic demarches toward Beijing not only from Japan’s foreign ministry but also from those of Australia and several European countries.
In turn, China reacts with concern to yet another increase (by nearly 10%) in defense expenses in Japan’s draft budget for fiscal year 2026, as well as to the appearance in the media of discussions about the possibility of Japan possessing its own nuclear weapons. It should be noted that formally the Japanese government has no direct involvement in the periodic revival of this latter topic, which dates back to the 2000s. However, the very fact that it has been kept “suspended” for many years is often described by experts as a fully deliberate “strategy of latent nuclear deterrence.”
As a consequence of the sharp deterioration in relations between Japan and China, the conditions in trade and the economy, critically important for both countries, have expectedly worsened. In particular, there came a postponement of a previously scheduled visit to the PRC by a delegation of Japanese business representatives, led by the leadership of the highly influential Japan Business Federation Keidanren.
Strains in Relations with the Key Ally
With Donald Trump’s return to the levers of power in the United States, the relations between the two principal allies in the Indo-Pacific region have gained problematic character. In fact, certain problems had already emerged during Trump’s first presidency, when he had already assigned a special role to the notion of “America being robbed by freeloading allies.” As for the annual volume of such “robbery” by Japan, in the realms of entirely legal bilateral trade, it has amounted to approximately USD 70 billion in recent years. The trade and economic dimension of US–Japan relations, which ranked third in the aforementioned Yomiuri Shimbun survey, remains one of the main “pains in the neck” for the countries in their relationship. It will also wind up on top of the agenda of Prime Minister S. Takaichi’s upcoming visit to the United States.
The state of the alliance in general will also undoubtedly be indicated among the key topics, since noticeable divergences in approaches of Tokyo and Washington to their alliance per se are now beginning to take shape. This is because Donald Trump personally holds his own view of relations with the PRC—once again, Japan’s main foreign policy adversary. In particular, attention was drawn to the US president’s remark that there was “no need to be afraid” of the PLA military exercises mentioned above.
In this regard, it is worth noting that the United States was not included in the list of the countries Taiwan’s foreign ministry thanked for their solidarity on this issue. It may well be the exact reason why the US finally called on the PRC to “exercise restraint and cease military pressure on Taiwan.” But it was the US State Department that did this, not the president’s office.
On the Prospects of Japan–Russia Relations
In the Yomiuri Shimbun reader survey mentioned above, Russia appears in seventh place and rather indirectly—specifically, in connection with the “aggression against Ukraine.” In the author’s view, the relative indifference of the average Japanese citizen to the very topic of relations with Moscow allows Japan’s leadership considerable freedom of maneuver on the Russian track. In particular, in S. Takaichi’s first programmatic address to the Japanese parliament, alongside the “aggression against Ukraine” message, it is possible to discern hints of interest in restoring relations with Russia and bringing them to the level they had reached during the premiership of Shinzo Abe. S. Takaichi positions herself as a successor to his political course in general.
However, there will be no success in this hypothetical process, should the parties present each other with deliberately unacceptable “preconditions.” On Tokyo’s side, this could take the form of the necessity to resolve the so-called “Northern Territories” issue; for Moscow, an official renunciation by Japan’s leadership of the very existence of this issue might serve as such. It is worth reminding those enthusiastic about the latter formula that Japan is a sovereign state and has the right to its own (distinct from ours) interpretation of complex periods in relations with Russia.
As for the public space, it would be useful to avoid familiar propagandistic clichés, such as claims about the “militarization of Japan.” The aforementioned increase in defense spending in 2026 will bring it to USD 58 billion, which is below 1.5 percent of annual GDP and significantly lower (often by multiples) than the share of defense expenditures in GDP in most countries around the world. This is because Japan’s leadership must focus on addressing far more serious domestic problems, above all the threat of depopulation. It is precisely internal challenges that S. Takaichi, who has welcomed the New Year in her office, has focused her attention on.
Russia, for its part, should proceed from the understanding that there are no problem-free interstate relations anywhere in the world. This should not, however, prevent them from being built in a constructive format—especially with a neighbour that not without reason claims the role of an influential participant in today’s global political games.
Naturally, the revival of contacts with Japan should not come at the expense of relations with other important partners of the Russian Federation, first and foremost the PRC. It is also necessary to take into account the objective foreign policy constraints within which Japan’s leadership operates. In particular, maintaining allied relations with the United States and a number of other countries remains of paramount importance for Tokyo.
In 2026, we express our hope for positive momentum in Russian-Japanese relations, which, for a number of reasons, have found themselves in a challenging situation. At the same time, we expect the international situation to stabilize, striving to avoid further escalation of tensions.
Vladimir Terekhov, expert on Asia-Pacific issues
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