The change of government in Japan at the end of October this year raises the question of continuity regarding the process that began two decades ago and was termed “normalization” in expert circles.
Takaichi’s government will continue Japan’s “normalization” process.
The trend towards positioning Japan and Germany as “perfectly ordinary countries” became an inevitable consequence of the self-assessment by the current generation of Germans and Japanese as nations owing nothing to anyone. Nations that have the right to act in the spheres of foreign policy, national security, and military development as they see necessary. Of course, it would be highly desirable for this process to take into account the concerns of other countries, including those of a historical nature. But this is a common problem for all participants in world political games without exception.
As for Japan, it is necessary, we repeat, to proceed from the inevitability of its abandonment of all post-war (self-)restrictions in the field of security, which, however, already today are largely symbolic. Public opinion polls in recent years consistently indicate the mood of the Japanese is in favor of abandoning even the “symbolism.” In this regard, the view that the positive role of the post-war (“anti-war”) Constitution in the process of recovery, rapid economic development, and the acquisition of undoubted authority on the international stage by modern Japan has now been exhausted is noteworthy.
Within the comprehensive process of the country’s “normalization,” let us note two of its aspects that have been at the center of discussions in recent years. First and foremost, the prospect of Tokyo possessing its own nuclear weapons is being discussed particularly sharply. Recall that since the late 1960s, Japan has adhered to the so-called “Three Non-Nuclear Principles” (not to possess, not to produce, and not to permit the introduction of nuclear weapons), which, however, do not have a legally binding character. In particular, incidents involving US ships carrying nuclear weapons calling at Japanese ports have been the subject of scandals in the press. Tokyo preferred to turn a blind eye to this, guided by its own interests, in no way conditioned by the notorious “American occupation.”
Regarding the future fate of the mentioned principles, the current Prime Minister S. Takaichi so far avoids any certainty on this issue. It will be decided depending on a whole range of factors, the transformation of which, both collectively and individually, is difficult to predict. The most important factor remains, for now, the preservation of the alliance with the US in general and the so-called “American nuclear umbrella” in particular. Let us also mention long-standing expert assessments that the temporal distance between the moment of a corresponding decision and Japan having nuclear weapons at its disposal would be measured in mere months.
The second extremely important aspect of the country’s “normalization” process stems from the problem of developing its own defense-industrial complex, the main obstacle to which is the regime of (self-)restriction limiting the market for its products to national borders. This increases its cost several times over compared to, for example, similar products from US companies that do not face such restrictions. The frequent unprofitability of Japanese defense industry companies provokes an outflow of private capital from them, so speaking of their “development” itself is currently a stretch.
And although the “creeping” disregard for post-war self-restrictions in general, and particularly in the field of defense industry activity over the last year or two, has long been characteristic of Japan’s “normalization” process, formally, these restrictions still exist. The issue of their revision is now among the top priorities concerning the current cabinet of ministers.
Let us note two points in this regard. First, the process of such revision should proceed noticeably easier for the S. Takaichi government than for its predecessors, since the ruling Liberal Democratic Party is now in a coalition with the politically close Innovation Party. Previously, complex negotiations on such matters had to be conducted with the “pacifist” Komeito party, representing the interests of Japanese Buddhists. Second, this component of the general process of Japan’s “normalization” directly leads to the sphere of its political activation in extremely important regions of the world.
Activation of Japan in the Southern Direction
The increasing presence of the theme of defense in general and the factor of Japanese defense industry product supplies, in particular, is becoming increasingly noticeable in its policy towards the southern direction. In this regard, the recently discussed set of measures in NEO for rearming frigate fleets, both of its own Navy and all three regional (quasi-)allies of Japan—which, from north to south, are the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand—had a breakthrough character. In early November this year, Defense Minister S. Koizumi agreed with his Australian counterpart, R. Marles, to accelerate the implementation of the program for introducing the latest Japanese Mogami-class frigates into the Australian Navy.
The replaced Japanese Abukuma-class frigates will be sold to the Philippines “at residual value.” However, not only is “old stuff being dumped” into this country, but plans also include supplying a modern Command and Control System. The resumption of the “2+2 Format” with Indonesia after a four-and-a-half-year hiatus drew attention, as Indonesia is the leading country of the entire Southeast Asian subregion. Following the meeting of this platform in Tokyo on November 17, a notable Joint Statement was adopted.
We note that in the course of Japan’s strategic movement “to the South,” its competitive positioning relative to the PRC seems almost inevitable. We can only hope that the leadership of both leading regional powers will manage to keep bilateral relations within controlled bounds.
On Russia’s Attitude to the Process of Japanese-German “Normalization”
At the level of interstate relations, Russia must proceed, let us emphasize again, from the position of the objectively inevitable nature of Japanese-German “normalization.” In the public-informational space, there should be no place for the thesis of “forgiveness-punishment” of anyone, which propaganda paranoids are concerned with. If only because a sea of blood was shed for the survival of a fundamentally different country—the predecessor of the Russian Federation—and almost a century ago, that is, primarily, not by us. Especially since there is no more vile “business” than that associated with political trade involving not one’s own blood.
If there is an urge to “settle scores” with someone, the most suitable object for this could be present-day Iraq. Since it is on its territory, it is claimed, that an event occurred approximately 7,000 years ago, which served as the root cause of all subsequent troubles in human history. In particular, WWII happened.
Speaking seriously, it is finally necessary to move away from the position of capricious children with inflated self-esteem who are constantly being “deceived.” We need to become adults who adequately assess both themselves and the extremely complex picture on the global table of the current stage of the “Great World Game.” We need to become people who owe nothing to anyone and do not put forward “historical” claims to other countries, including those with whom our ancestors, that is, quite a long time ago and not us, had, to put it mildly, considerable problems.
Vladimir Terekhov, expert on Asia-Pacific region issues.
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