Driven by escalating Houthi threats and allied military restraint, Saudi Arabia and Israel might be inching towards a pragmatic “marriage of convenience” to safeguard their mutual survival. However, deep-seated public hostility and the unresolved Palestine issue will likely keep this strategic convergence tightly under wraps as an implicit, tactical arrangement rather than formal normalisation.
The Paradox of Strategic Convergence
Saudi Arabia and Israel are currently facing such a situation. Any overt Saudi-Israeli security partnership would create significant political ripples across the Muslim world, particularly given Saudi Arabia’s role as the custodians of the Holy Mosques, the continued centrality of the Palestinian genocide, and Israel’s obvious stance against major Muslim countries (and Saudi allies) including Pakistan and Turkey.
Houthis from Yemen have escalated their campaign against the Saudis, leaving the Kingdom in the lurch. During these dire circumstances, where the Kingdom is under attack, Israeli PM Netanyahu has allegedly offered military and intelligence assistance to the Kingdom. Although the Saudi authorities have apparently denied such assistance, would the ever-increasing Houthi attacks and the seeming ineffectiveness of the Mecca Defence Pact create a situation of a drowning man catching a straw for the Saudis?
Levels of Cooperation
Before critically assessing any prospects, one should understand the possible nature of cooperation between two historical rivals in the event of a shared threat assessment. There can be three levels of cooperation, which are given below, but remember that these levels are just analytical categories, not an inevitable sequence.
A. Implicit/Covert Cooperation
When states act in pursuit of common interests without making any public statement, it is referred to as implicit/covert cooperation. It could be done through secret exchange of information, use of intermediary channels of communication, or even through secret security arrangements.
B. Open/Limited Cooperation
This involves the existence of mutual interests among the states or cooperation without the creation of diplomatic relationships between them. This may be done via mediation by other parties.
C. Formal Normalization
This involves the establishment of diplomatic relationships between states based on some formal understanding between them. This may involve the exchange of ambassadors or even the signing of strategic treaties.
Historical Precedent: Cooperation without Recognition
Before evaluating whether a Saudi-Israel rapprochement is possible, it is interesting to note that events like these have happened before. In the 1960s, Saudi Arabia and Israel covertly supported Yemeni royalist forces fighting the republican government, which received substantial Egyptian military backing and Soviet support. Their coordination included Israeli arms airdrops carried out with Saudi knowledge and approval. Despite zero diplomatic contact, they both collaborated against their common enemy.
Another similar case was the strategic cooperation that was undertaken secretly between Israel and Jordan in response to the Syrian incursions before the signing of the peace agreement. As reported by the Washington Institute, King Hussein met in secrecy on numerous occasions with Israeli officials, sharing intelligence. One particularly revealing episode occurred in 1970, when Israel’s actions helped deter Syrian forces that had entered Jordan during the conflict known as Black September. These historical precedents show how states can cooperate through a shared proxy or theatre of conflict without resolving their bilateral disputes.
Determinants of the Saudi-Israel Rapprochement
One of the major and most prominent factors that could push both states towards cooperation would be the common threat perception. Now, this cooperation would depend upon the severity and immediacy of the threat or whether the threat is greater than the political cost of cooperating with an adversary. The Houthis have become a common threat for Saudi Arabia and Israel, albeit from different lenses. Riyadh’s priorities currently centre on protecting its territory, energy infrastructure, and regional security, while Israel is concerned with missile and drone attacks, maritime disruptions, and the broader Iranian regional network.
Despite the activation of the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, Pakistan and Türkiye have so far emphasised collective defence and deterrence rather than committing to a sustained offensive campaign against the Houthis. The extent of their military involvement, particularly if the conflict escalates further, remains an important uncertainty. In a recent interview with Arab Journalists, Pakistan Army’s DG ISPR, Ahmed Shareef, explicitly stated, “This trilateral military alliance is a purely defensive alliance without any doubt.”
Meanwhile, Israel really does seem to want to fill in these gaps. On October 16, 2026, US President Donald Trump publicly urged Saudi Arabia to accept Israeli assistance against the Houthis. When asked by reporters whether Riyadh should accept Israel’s offer, Trump replied, “I do, I think they will,” adding that Israel had been “very helpful to Saudi Arabia.” He also suggested that Saudi-Israeli normalisation under the Abraham Accords could return to the agenda, saying it might be possible “maybe more than ever.” These remarks indicate Washington’s support for closer Saudi-Israeli ties, which has been on Trump’s agenda for a while now. Even Netanyahu implied that the Saudi cooperation might be imminent. In an interview on 13th October 2026, when asked if Saudi Arabia had asked Israel for help, he stated, “There are barely any Middle Eastern states that aren’t asking us for help.”
The second most important thing that could determine whether the two will move towards any kind of tactical rapprochement depends on whether both have compatible long-term interests beyond confronting their common adversary. Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 and US-backed proposals for regional economic integration could create areas of overlapping economic interest and may even converge on Trump and Netanyahu’s dream of ‘making Gaza the Riviera of the Middle East’. Moreover, both states have a common direct threat in the form of the Houthis. Both Saudi Arabia and Israel have significant concerns about Iranian regional influence and the military capabilities of Iran-aligned groups.
The third factor revolves around the question: Can the states benefit each other?
The answer is a resounding yes. Israel could provide high-tech defensive as well as offensive equipment to Saudis against the Houthis, and Saudis could share intelligence that might be vital to Israel.
However, several factors could hinder this rapprochement, including public opposition to normalisation, Saudi Arabia’s religious and political standing in the Muslim world, and the unresolved Palestinian question. These considerations could make overt cooperation politically costly even if the two governments identify shared security interests. In Saudi Arabia’s case, research published in 2025–2026 documents strong public opposition to normalisation, particularly following the Gaza war. Saudi Arabia has made Palestinian statehood a central condition for formal diplomatic relations with Israel. In February 2025, the Saudi Foreign Ministry reiterated that the kingdom would not establish diplomatic ties with Israel without an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital.
Prospects — What Form Could Rapprochement Take?
It is an obvious conclusion that US presence in Saudi Arabia — which has been there for decades — means an Israeli presence in the country. That means, in one way or another, Saudis have been in contact with Israelis unofficially. After analysing the pros and cons, it seems that the rapprochement is not only possible but just a matter of time. When a situation raises questions of sovereignty and territorial integrity, states can do anything for their survival. In this case, one of the few viable options for Saudis to get full support from the US could be an implicit level of enhanced cooperation with Israel.
It is also interesting to note that in recent months, Saudi authorities have taken several implicit steps that could pave the way for some kind of tactical rapprochement with Israel. According to some reports, the Saudi education ministry has ordered the removal of any kind of anti-Semitic phrases from its national curriculum. Secondly, Saudi Arabia has apparently also incorporated a new version of the Conquest of Khyber into their textbooks, presenting it as a peace treaty between Muslims and Jews.
In a recent interview at i24 News, Dr Dan Diker, the president of the Jerusalem Centre for Security and Foreign Affairs, stated, “It seems in the end that it may be better, even in an ideal world, that Israel and Saudi Arabia develop a closer strategic relationship but keep it under the radar.” Now this under-the-radar relationship could be decoded as a ‘tactical-implicit rapprochement’ with no formal recognition or normalisation. In case of heightening tensions with the Houthis and recurring restraint from Pakistan and Turkey in aggressively attacking the Houthis directly, Saudis might pursue the one with Israel.
Conclusion
In essence, a Saudi-Israeli rapprochement could emerge as a marriage of convenience, driven by shared security threats rather than mutual trust and understanding. The threat from the Houthis, Iran’s regional influence, and Washington’s strong ‘encouragement’ may create incentives for covert cooperation, even if there is no normalisation of ties. However, any such convergence will remain constrained by public opposition to any such normalisation – especially because of the ongoing genocide, the unresolved Palestinian question, and Saudi Arabia’s political and religious standing in the Muslim world. The critical question is not simply whether Riyadh and Tel Aviv can cooperate, but whether their shared goals are strong enough to outweigh the cons of doing so.
Aleena Im is an independent researcher and writer and is interested in international relations and current affairs
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