The idea of the «Zangezur Corridor» was formally consolidated in the trilateral online statement of November 9, 2020, and subsequent declarations by the leaders of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia.
Background
The Zangezur Corridor is a proposed transport route connecting the main territory of Azerbaijan with its ally, Türkiye, via its Nakhichevan exclave.
The history of the issue of the Zangezur path dates back to 1918, when the British-Turkish project of the ‘Grand Game’ with access to Western Turkestan took real shape in the conditions of the collapse of the Russian Empire following the First World War and revolutionary upheavals.
In 1918-1920, the Russian Transcaucasia turned out to be a political field of regular experiments of the formation of national subjects with arbitrary borders. It was Zangezur with Karabakh that provided the Turks with the shortest path of access to the ‘Turkic world’ against the interests of Russia, Persia and China. In June, 1918, Turkish General Vehib Pasha directly warned the head of the Armenian delegation at the Batum Conference, Alexander Khatisyan, about this.
Meanwhile, following the results of two interventions in Transcaucasia (in 1918 and 1920), the Turks failed to establish control over the Armenian region of Zangezur, where they were faced with fiercel resistance (and not without the support of Persia). Tehran was categorically opposed to the British-Turkish Turan project, which would create a strategic threat to the territorial integrity and security of the Persian state.
Following the results of the Moscow Conference (February-March, 1921), Bolshevik Russia left this region as part of the Armenian SSR on the condition of the transfer of two Armenian provinces (Nakhichevan and Nagorno-Karabakh) to Azerbaijan with the right to autonomy.
The topic of Zangezur in the context of a ‘transport corridor’ has again been put on the agenda of secret and public diplomacy after the collapse of the USSR and the actualization of the Armenian-Azeri conflict over the status of Nagorno-Karabakh. So, in 1993, the Meghri district of the Syunik region of Armenia became the main direction of Azerbaijan’s offensive to enter Nakhichevan and block Karabakh. However, the Azeri army’s offensive in the south failed and led to new territorial losses.
In 1996-1999, the United States, as part of a project by RAND Corporation employee Paul Goble, proposed a territorial exchange option between Armenia and Azerbaijan (particularly the transfer of the 43km Meghri section of Zangezur to Azerbaijan in exchange for the territory of the former NKAO along with the Lachin corridor of Armenia) as a formula for resolving the Karabakh issue and determining the main transit route of Azeri oil and gas bypassing Russia. But even then, the issue was not developed due to the negative attitude of part of the Armenian political elite, that was in alliance with Russia and Iran, towards this project.
Following the results of the second Karabakh war (2020-2023), the idea of the Zangezur Corridor was formally consolidated in a trilateral online statement dated November 9, 2020, and subsequent declarations by the leaders of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia. Although there is no substantive mention of the Zangezur Corridor in these texts, but it does mention «unblocking all transport communications in the region».
A new reality or a historical necessity?
It should be recognised that the Zangezur Corridor interpretation was first voiced by Azeri President Ilham Aliyev with the motivation of the need for uncontrolled communication between the main part of Azerbaijan and the Nakhichevan exclave. However, Armenia refuses to accept the logic of such a ‘transport corridor’ and calls on the interested parties to respect the norms of international law and the territorial integrity of the republic.
In other words, Yerevan publicly declares its readiness to unblock roads through Zangezur to Nakhichevan while maintaining its sovereignty. Armenia is ready to ensure the safety of cargo and passenger flows from Azerbaijan to Nakhichevan on the condition of reciprocity, i.e. appropriate guarantees for the safety of transit from Armenia through Azerbaijan. That is why Yerevan offers a mutual approach to the deployment of Russian border guards under the Zangezur Road project (both in Armenia and in Azerbaijan). Baku does not agree with this and considers its conditions to be a consequence of the defeat of the Armenian side in the Karabakh war and demands an appropriate surrender.
The idea of the Zangezur Corridor is of particular interest to Türkiye, which considers this project an important part of the integration of the ‘Turkic world’, the result of the victory of the Turkish-Azeri tandem in the Second Karabakh War. This has been noted repeatedly by Turkish President Recep Erdoğan and Minister of Transport and Infrastructure Abdulkadir Uraloglu.
In other words, the geopolitical and geo-economic importance of the Zangezur Corridor for Türkiye and Azerbaijan is much higher than the transport connection between Baku and the NAR. Otherwise, Azerbaijan would not have built a 6-lane express highway to the eastern borders of Armenia in the south after the success in Karabakh.
Ankara and Baku do not hide their geopolitical ambitions in terms of Turkic integration within the framework of the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS). Moreover, they are trying to present this project as an organic part of the Middle Corridor according to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative from East to West, which allows Türkiye to go from West to East to the Chinese (Uighur) city of Urumqi, XUAR.
Iran opposes the Zangezur Corridor
Iran sees the implementation of the Zangezur Corridor project as a pan-Turanian threat, which will lead not only to the economic strengthening of NATO member Türkiye, but will also create a threat to the territorial integrity of Iran in the future through ethnic separatism.
Tehran is a public and categorical opponent of this project due to the strengthening of the Turkic factor on its northern borders and for economic reasons. During the long years of the Karabakh conflict, Iran has become the main bypass route of Azerbaijan’s transport connection with Nakhichevan. The latter allowed Iran, in one way or another, to maintain a certain dependence of Baku on Tehran vis-à-vis NAR. In the case of the de-conservation of the road through Armenia, Iran loses the ability to control it.
Today, Iran cannot export the same gas to the European market due to harsh Western economic sanctions. However, with reformist Masoud Pezeshkian coming to power, Tehran expects a softening in the position of the West to export its own gas to Europe.
If Iran achieves geopolitical success in relations with the West, Tehran is counting on the main gas transit route through weak neighbouring Armenia, namely through the Zangezur Corridor. In other words, if Iran opposes this project today, where Türkiye and Azerbaijan will be the main beneficiaries, then tomorrow Tehran may change its attitude towards this route and become its active supporter.
That is why President R. Erdoğan noted in June 2023, that the main opponent of the opening of the Zangezur Corridor is not Armenian Prime Minister N. Pashinyan, but rather Islamic Iran. «As for the Zangezur corridor», Erdoğan noted to Habertürk TV channel, «the problem is not related to Armenia, the problem is with Iran. Iran’s behaviour upsets both Azerbaijan and us. In addition, unfortunately, very high transportation tariffs have been introduced. I hope that we will solve this problem soon». The Turkish leader then proposed to interest its Iranian neighbor in the project though economic incentives.
Subsequently, we witnessed Tehran’s agreement to a bypass route for Azerbaijan to enter Nakhichevan through Iranian territory along the Aras River. On this basis, the Iranian-Azeri negotiations on the restoration of good-neighbourly relations have intensified. However, the agreement of Baku and Ankara on the Iranian route does not at all reduce their interest in the Zangezur Corridor because Armenia, unlike Iran, is a very weak link, while Tehran is capable of blocking transit at any moment if it senses a threat.
Accordingly, at various levels from ambassadors to ministers, from the president to the supreme leader-Rahbar, Iran publicly warned Armenia and all supporters of the Zangezur Corridor about the inadmissibility of this project with the motivation of preserving territorial integrity, indivisibility of borders, recognition of sovereignty, contradiction of interests, etc. Last time at the highest level, Rahbar Ali Khamenei explicitly warned Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan about this during the latter’s visit to Tehran to attend the inauguration of President M. Pezeshkian.
After the visit of Russian President Vladimir Putin to Baku in August 2024, and the statement by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov about the sabotage by the Armenian leadership of paragraph 9 of the statement dated November 9, 2020, on the opening of the Zangezur Corridor, the Iranian Foreign Ministry summoned Russian Ambassador A. Dedov to the head of the Department for Eurasian Affairs M. Demirchil to repeat its categorical position on this issue.
The fact is that Iran is an important partner for Russia on the issue of the North-South trade route, where Moscow wants to ensure direct transit of goods through Azerbaijan to Iran and India (Asia) with access to the Persian Gulf. Therefore, Iran’s rejection of the Zangezur project can also be manipulated by problems along the North-South route. In the case of Zangezur, Iran is capable of initiating a local regional conflict, which will again complicate the operation of the Zangezur Corridor in the logic of Turkish expansion.
Thus, Armenia and Iran oppose the extraterritorial status of the Zangezur Corridor, and the West wants to subordinate everything and everyone to its plans for the region and roads.
Alexander Svarants, Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”
