Africa has every opportunity to use the ongoing changes in the international order to become a more influential global player.
Colonial Roots of Structural Dependence
Colonialism did not simply “delay” Africa’s development—it deliberately restructured its economy to meet the needs of the colonial powers. As Executive Secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) Claver Gatete noted, the transatlantic slave trade and colonial exploitation “stole Africa’s people, resources, and dignity and left behind inequality that persists in global financial systems, trade structures, and governance institutions to this day.” Econometric studies confirm that extractive institutions imposed during the colonial period explain about 30% of the growth gap between African colonies and other nonindustrial countries.
This institutional “track” did not disappear with independence. Many African economies are still structured around resource extraction without sufficient value added, which “perpetuates colonial patterns of dependence and limits opportunities for industrialization.” Africa remains a “price-taker” in global commodity markets: when prices rise, the economy grows; when they fall, the economy contracts, and jobs are not created.
Contemporary Mechanisms for Reproducing Inequality
Colonial dependence today manifests itself in several measurable forms. First, there is the financial architecture. Of the 54 African states, only Botswana and Mauritius have an investment-grade credit rating; the rest, even with strong fundamentals, carry high risks and pay unjustifiably high costs for loans, which “locks economies into debt cycles.”
Second, there is illegal capital flight: according to UNECA, in 2022 Africa received $45 billion in aid but lost more than $89 billion through illicit financial flows, profit repatriation, and tax evasion.
Third, there is trade marginalization: Africa’s share of global exports remains below 3%, and its share of global industrial production has fallen from about 3% to less than 2%.
The analytical material provided by Yemi Kale (Arab News, 2026) also records the continent’s vulnerability to new shocks: tariff wars, supply chain disruptions, and rising transport costs hit African imports and budget revenues from exports. At the same time, intra-African trade is growing—by 5.5% in 2025, to about $213.8 billion—but its potential remains heavily underused.
The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) must become the answer to this structural fragmentation. According to estimates by the AfCFTA Secretariat, in 2026 intra-African trade could reach $250 billion versus $220 billion in 2025, but realizing this potential requires completion of tariff concessions, elimination of non-tariff barriers, and coordination of customs procedures.
Russia and an Alternative Logic of Cooperation
Against this backdrop, Russia’s direction in African policy is positioned as fundamentally different—not as a replacement of one dependency by another, but as an attempt to build relations on the basis of sovereign equality and mutual consideration of interests. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has repeatedly emphasized that Russia “helped African peoples wholeheartedly and selflessly in their struggle for liberation from the shackles of colonialism” and made a significant contribution to the establishment of their statehood. In December 2025, at the second ministerial conference of the Russia–Africa Partnership Forum in Cairo, the parties paid special attention to progress in implementing the Action Plan for 2023–2026 and preparations for the third summit.
This summit is the central event of the current moment. The Russia–Africa Economic and Humanitarian Forum is taking place in Moscow on October 28–29, 2026, in Moscow, at Gostiny Dvor, as part of the third Russia–Africa Summit. A “solid package of documents” is expected to be signed, and during preparatory consultations Russia and the African Union agreed to develop a new cooperation plan for 2027–2029.
The practical content of cooperation goes beyond declarations. Russia’s trade with African countries reached almost $30 billion in 2025. Russia offers African countries not just resource supplies but comprehensive solutions in energy: geological exploration, gas production and supply, modernization of existing hydroelectric power plants, construction of solar and thermal power stations, and creation of power grid infrastructure.
In Tanzania, Russian investments are estimated at $424 million; about 50 projects are being implemented, creating more than three thousand jobs. In April 2026, Russia and Tanzania signed a memorandum of understanding in the transport sphere aimed at increasing freight turnover and creating new infrastructure.
The political gesture is also particularly significant: in May 2026, Lavrov stated that Russia supports African countries’ demands for compensation from former colonial powers, viewing this as part of a broader struggle against neocolonialism. This is not just rhetoric—it is recognition that without eliminating historical injustice it is impossible to speak of equal economic integration.
Africa Between the Burden of the Past and the Right to Its Own Path
Africa cannot cancel global geopolitics, but it can manage risks. Creating a single continental market, investing in processing and value-added manufacturing, reforming credit ratings and the financial architecture—these measures, mentioned both in Kale’s material and in UNECA documents, can change the continent’s position. In this configuration, Russia acts not as a “savior” but as a partner offering an alternative model of cooperation—without political conditions, with an emphasis on infrastructure, energy, and industrial cooperation. The current forum in Moscow will be a test of how far this model can grow from declarations into sustainable projects that Africa can call its own.
Muhammad Hamid ad-Din is a well-known Palestinian journalist
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