On March 11-12, 2025, the conflict between the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Tigray Interim Administration (TIA) entered its ultimate stage: the military leadership of Tigray made its final choice, overthrowing the representatives of the latter militarily.
Also, the already negative dynamics of events in the region, where the TIA effectively lost control over most remote areas, was compounded by the influence of external factors. This is, first and foremost, the breakdown in relations between Addis Ababa and Asmara, which in early 2025 increasingly resembled preparations for a direct clash. In an article published in early March, General Tsadkan G. Bayru, former Chief of the General Staff of the Ethiopian National Defence Forces and now Getachew Reda right hand, said that a military clash between Eritrea and Ethiopia in Tigray had become inevitable. Against this background, more and more rumours about secret cooperation between the TPLF and the Eritrean Government are spreading, adding even more uncertainty.
Coup d’état
In the evening on March 11, Getachew Reda announced that the Tigray generals (TDF leaders), had begun to overthrow the legitimate authorities of the Interim Administration throughout Tigray (legitimate in accordance with the terms of the agreement in Pretoria). Bloody clashes between the TDF and supporters of the latter took place in Addi Grat and the state capital, Mekela. The military’s action took place shortly after the decision of the head of the Interim Administration to arrest three high-ranking military leaders close to Debretsion Gebremichael, the leader of the TPLF.
The next day, on March 12, some sources reported that Getachew Reda had left Tigray, having managed to avoid arrest. At the same time, the head of the Interim Administration immediately called on the federal government to intervene in the situation. The TDF blocked Mekela, apparently preparing for the final expulsion or destruction of political opponents.
Possible consequences
Thus, a military coup took place in Tigray. It was, however, not exclusively committed to the interests of the military elite, but also in favour of the TPLF, an important party that undoubtedly retains significant support in the state. In other words, such a step has legitimacy in the eyes of part of the population. However, it is not possible to accurately assess the ratio of TPLF sympathisers and supporters of the Interim Administration.
It should be noted here that earlier the commander of the TDF, General Tadesse Werede, stated on multiple occasions the neutrality of the military in the conflict between the civilian authorities. So far, he has not refuted his words, which means that it is necessary to take into account the possible scenario in which the military coup was organised only by some leaders of the TDF, while the reaction of the rest remains unknown (though this is, frankly, quite unlikely).
Perhaps the key issue at the current stage remains the reaction of the federal government. In 2020-2022, the government headed by the current Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmed Ali, was victorious in the bloody war with the TPLF, where much was at stake. Since then, priorities have changed; Ethiopia has stepped up efforts to strengthen its position in the region and in the world, including by seeking direct access to the sea. In addition, the ruling Prosperity Party is forced to wage a protracted war with Amharic nationalists from the Fano group operating in the state of Amhara. Finally, as noted above, the confrontation between the recent allies of Ethiopia and Eritrea is growing.
Even though information emerged about the movement of Ethiopian National Defence Forces units towards Tigray in the evening of March 12, it is premature to speak of the federal government’s readiness to actively intervene in the situation. In essence, throughout the months-long confrontation between the TPLF and the Interim Administration, Addis Ababa has distanced itself from the conflict, not providing direct support to either side – even if TPLF supporters consider the alliance of Getachew Reda and Abiy Ahmed Ali to be an indisputable fact. The possibility of a direct clash with Eritrea undoubtedly forces the Ethiopian military to act cautiously. At the same time, an incorrect assessment of the situation and any delays can not only lead to a fall in the authority of the government, which has let the situation in one of the states develop as it pleases, but also to an improvement in the initial positions of the Eritrean army if it moves deeper into Tigray.
Ivan Kopytsev, political scientist, junior research fellow at the Centre for the Study of North Africa and the Horn of Africa at the Institute of African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences; research intern at the Centre for Middle Eastern and African Studies at the Institute of International Studies of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations.
