In the short period of January-February 2025, Ethiopia and Eritrea have already taken a few steps that notably increase the risk of a severance of relations or even direct conflict.
Roots of the tension
Until the end of the 19th century, the territory of present-day Eritrea was the periphery of the Abyssinian Empire. The Ethiopian Negus (kings), as a rule, maintained access to the Red Sea through Eritrean harbours, though not having full control over this land. On the eve of the 20th century, the Italians established control over Eritrea, using it as a springboard to capture Ethiopia itself in 1935. After World War II, as a result of a complex geopolitical game, Eritrea became part of the Ethiopian Empire as an autonomy within the federation. 10 years later, in 1962, Emperor Haile Selassie I abolished the federation, which was the beginning of the armed struggle for the independence of Eritrea.
By 1991, the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and a number of rebel forces inside Ethiopia itself, primarily the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), had managed to defeat the socialist Derg regime established in Addis Ababa at that time and begin reforming state institutions. In this sense, the proclamation of Eritrean independence in 1993 was the logical end of a thirty-year struggle and was not met with any opposition from the new government of Ethiopia, the core of which was composed of the TPLF.
Nevertheless, soon after relations between the two governments began to deteriorate rapidly. This dynamic was facilitated by both significant ideological differences and individual grievances that manifested themselves at the stage of the joint struggle, as well as issues on the current agenda, including currency, the use of the Port of Assab and territorial claims.
From border war to military alliance
In 1998, at the peak of tensions in bilateral relations, an armed conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia, known as the Border War, began. The freezing of the conflict in 2000 did not lead to a resolution of its causes. The decision of international institutions regarding the delimitation of disputed territories, adopted in 2002, was not implemented by Ethiopia, which led to the de facto continuation of the state of war for another 16 years.
In 2018, internal political transformations in Ethiopia itself, including a change in the hierarchy of ethnic elites in the political firmament, led to a demand not only for the normalisation of relations, but also for rapprochement with the government of Eritrea. United by the ‘anti-migrant’ agenda, Addis Ababa and Asmara signed a peace agreement in September, 2018, and in 2020-2022 they fought side by side against a common enemy, the TPLF.
Prologue to a new stage of confrontation
The conclusion of a peace agreement in November, 2022, between the federal government of Ethiopia and the TPLF, on the one hand, put an end to two years of bloody war, and on the other hand it has already brought visible discord to the Ethiopian-Eritrean union. Asmara’s representatives did not participate in the negotiations in Pretoria; Ethiopia simply ignored its ally and did not want to include it in the formal process of solving internal problems. In turn, the Eritreans did not leave the Tigray areas as per the decision of the Commission in 2002 and, according to rumours, they began actively supporting the Amharic nationalists from Fano, who were attacked by Ethiopian government forces at the end of summer, 2023.
After an information lull since the beginning of 2024, Eritrea has spoken out against Ethiopia’s policies in the region with renewed vigour. At first, President Isaias Afwerki opposed Ethiopian plans to gain direct access to the sea, and later directly supported the federal government of Somalia, which found itself in a state of acute political conflict with the Ethiopian side. In October, 2024, the leaders of Eritrea, Somalia and Egypt met in Asmara, essentially demonstrating mutual understanding on the need to contain Ethiopian influence in the region.
Growing tension in relations
The gradual estrangement and the consequent growing tensions in relations between Addis Ababa and Asmara have been observed since the end of 2022, however, it was precisely in the context of the Ethiopian-Somali crisis that these contradictions moved into the public sphere. At the same time, support for the hostile Ethiopian centre of power in the Horn of Africa is not the only manifestation of changes in the Eritrean foreign policy line. A much more painful circumstance for Addis Ababa is the indirect support provided by Eritrea to various anti-government forces inside Ethiopia. Although there is no complete and accurate data, an article by former Ethiopian president Mulatu Teshome is of interest in this case. In the article, a politician close to the current prime minister accused Asmara of supporting the TPLF faction, which continues to try to undermine the peace process in Tigray, and also to create an Amharic Fano paramilitary structure as an instrument of pressure on Addis Ababa. In other words, Asmara’s blatantly anti-Ethiopian rhetoric and the Ethiopian establishment’s confidence in the Eritrean government’s interference in Ethiopian affairs create extremely worrying prerequisites that could lead to another round of escalation.
Ethiopia: supporting the Eritrean opposition
The N’hamedu Brigade – perhaps the most politically active and viable association of the Eritrean opposition today – was created in 2022 among the Eritrean diaspora in Europe and North America to counter the ideological influence of the Eritrean government, which annually organises nominally cultural events abroad. In the first months the main task of the brigade was a physical confrontation with supporters of the ruling regime on the streets of European cities, but soon after the agenda was expanded to the overthrow of the long-term and permanent President of Eritrea, Isaias Afwerki.
At the end of January, 2025, the brigade held an unprecedented congress in the capital of Ethiopia, attended by about 4,000 people, which surely demonstrates the presence of contacts between the government of the latter and the Eritrean opposition. Considering 1) the goals set by the brigade, 2) its leaders’ statements about the existence of numerous connections, including in the Eritrean army, 3) a cooperation pact with the Eritrean Afar National Congress and 4) establishing contacts with prominent Ethiopian politicians, including the head of the Tigray Interim Administration, Getachew Reda, the N’hamedu Brigade simply cannot be ignored in Asmara. Thus, Ethiopia’s open support for this movement inevitably causes an extremely negative reaction in the political leadership of Eritrea, becoming another factor in fuelling open conflict.
Eritrea: worrisome rumours
In turn, largely having lost the opportunity to exert pressure on Addis Ababa and operating in accordance with the Somali agenda, the Eritrean government nevertheless did not fail to respond to Mulatu Teshoma’s statements. According to some reports – and there is no smoke without fire – Eritrea is closing its diplomatic mission in the Ethiopian capital. Moreover, sources report the beginning of the mobilisation of Eritrean army reserves. Given the system of universal military service that exists in the country, such measures could arm at least some several hundred thousand soldiers.
So, there are numerous reasons, both historical and current, for the intensification of the Ethiopian-Eritrean confrontation, which in fact resumed after 2022. The already complicated situation is becoming even more unstable due to the influence of external variables, as well as the dual power in Tigray, a border region in northern Ethiopia. At the same time, Asmara’s tendency to avoid formal channels of communication and the isolationist tradition in foreign policy make the behaviour of the Eritrean leadership highly unpredictable. However, it is very difficult to assess the political and practical readiness of the Ethiopian government for another war.
Ivan Kopytsev, political scientist, junior research fellow at the Centre for the Study of North Africa and the Horn of Africa at the Institute of African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences; research intern at the Centre for Middle Eastern and African Studies at the Institute of International Studies of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations.
