EN|FR|RU
Follow us on:

Elections in Somaliland: General Overview and Political Significance. Part 1

Ivan Kopytsev, November 26, 2024

To date, Somaliland has established itself as the most viable and dynamic electoral democracy in the region, which, combined with ongoing geopolitical developments in the Red Sea area, underscores the significant importance of the recent presidential elections held there.

Recently, on 13 November 2024, presidential elections took place across the majority of the territory of the self-declared state of Somaliland. In these fourth presidential elections in Somaliland’s history (since 1991), the leaders of three different political parties contested the presidency. This included the incumbent national leader since 2017, Muse Bihi Abdi (Kulmiye Peace, Unity and Development party), and the leader of the largest opposition coalition, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi (Waddani National party). Although the official results had not yet been announced as of 16 November 2024, some sources were already reporting that Abdirahman Abdullahi, known by the alias “Irro”, had won the election after 95% of the votes had been processed, achieving 64.49% of the vote compared to Muse Bihi’s 34.76% and 0.74% for the representative of the Justice and Welfare Party (UCID Party). Overall, these figures are practically identical to the final data provided by the Electoral Commission on 19 November. In any case, even irrespective of the specific election results in Somaliland, the geostrategic position of this unrecognised state, as well as its growing involvement in regional and, moreover, global political and economic processes, necessitates paying close attention to the domestic and foreign policy agenda in the run-up to the elections, and also to their potential consequences.
Despite a high degree of societal polarisation, the electoral process was largely democratic and peaceful

The geopolitical context

The Somaliland presidential elections took place against a backdrop of arguably unprecedented tension surrounding this small political entity. Following the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between Somaliland and Ethiopia on 1 January 2024, two opposing coalitions began to form in the Horn of Africa region. On the one hand, Somalia, along with Egypt, Eritrea, and to a lesser extent Djibouti, which have voiced their support, are seeking to prevent the implementation of the agreement which would grant Ethiopia direct access to the Red Sea coast in the area of the port of Berbera. Those advocating for a “united and indivisible” Somalia are opposed by the initiators and main beneficiaries of the Memorandum – Ethiopia and Somaliland – and also, albeit not publicly, the UAE, which launched a costly modernisation project at the same port of Berbera several years previously. Therefore, despite Somaliland being drawn into the heart of a sharp confrontation between leading regional actors, the unrecognised state has gained the opportunity, if successful, to transform its territory into a vital transit route, thereby attracting infrastructure investment and bringing closer the prospect of official recognition.

Nevertheless, setting aside the complexities of the current political dynamics in the Horn of Africa, it is important to note the significant successes of Muse Bihi’s government on the international stage between 2017 and 2024, as well as the achievements of the Kulmiye party, which has been in power since 2010. Specifically, Somaliland gained recognition from another, albeit partially recognised, state – the Republic of China (Taiwan) – and also, in the form of a preliminary undertaking, from Ethiopia. In 2022, Muse Bihi made an unofficial visit to Washington, and discussion regarding Somaliland’s future gradually increased in the Western Hemisphere.

Domestic Political Context

In keeping with established “tradition”, the date of the Somaliland presidential elections was postponed by two years. However, according to assessments by international observers, despite a high degree of societal polarisation, the electoral process in the most stable “fragment” of the once-unified Somalia was democratic and peaceful. Unlike 2017, when Hargeisa controlled all 27 electoral districts of Somaliland, this time 10 eastern districts remained under the control of insurgents. The issue of Sool region’s allegiance is largely clan-based, and since the beginning of February 2023, the Somaliland Armed Forces have lost control of a significant portion of the eastern settlements. Undoubtedly, such a significant setback in domestic affairs could diminish the impact of Muse Bihi’s foreign policy successes in the eyes of the electorate.

 

Ivan Kopytsev, political scientist, junior research fellow at the Centre for the Study of North Africa and the Horn of Africa at the Institute of African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences; research intern at the Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at the Institute of International Studies of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

More on this topic
South Korea Declares and Cancels Martial Law: What Are the Geopolitical Impacts?
Why Biden Allowed Ukraine to Fire US missiles into Russia
Martial Law for Five Hours: A Live Broadcast of Political Suicide
Georgia at a Crossroads: Protests, Power Struggles, and the Battle for Legitimacy
Türkiye’s mistakes may cost it dearly in Africa