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On ratification of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty between the Russian Federation and North Korea

Konstantin Asmolov, October 26 2024

The State Duma of the Russian Federation ratified the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation.

On ratification of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership

On October 14, 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin submitted to the State Duma of the Russian Federation a bill to ratify the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation signed in Pyongyang on June 19, 2024.

The US expresses displeasure

Russia and the DPRK reaffirmed their aspiration to strengthen global strategic stability and promote a multipolar system of international relations
On October 16, spokesman of the US State Department Matthew Miller expressed “serious concern about the growing security relationship between Russia and North Korea.” In a separate briefing, White House press secretary Karine Jean-Pierre said the US will always “closely monitor the situation and certainly coordinate with our South Korean allies.” And media outlets like Wall Street Journal immediately began throwing in the topic of “secret additional protocols.”

On October 24, the Duma ratified the Treaty, and although it finally goes into force on November 6, when it passes through the Federation Council, this is an occasion for this author not so much to talk about the significance of this document, but to recall the content of key articles and dispel some fears.

What is a comprehensive strategic partnership and how did we arrive at this one?

In terms of accepted diplomatic constructs, this is the highest level of interaction between countries. If we compare this treaty with previous ones, it is evident that we have jumped a few steps, if not a whole flight of stairs. The onset of global turbulence largely contributed to this, as North Korea turned out to be one of Russia’s few loyal allies, being one of the first to recognize Crimea and support the (ongoing) Special Military Operation. At the same time, it became clear that despite the desire for consensus (a moratorium on DPRK nuclear tests is still in place), Pyongyang has received nothing in return, and the demonization strategy that the West used against North Korea began to be used against Russia after the Special Military Operation began.

In such a situation, these two countries, both declared “world pariahs” by the Collective West, naturally began to cooperate. The signing of an open-ended (this is important!!!) treaty opened up prospects for increased cooperation between the DPRK and Russia at a time when both countries are facing diplomatic isolation and sanctions pressure.

Does the concluded Treaty constitute a military alliance?

The conditions for this are present. Article 4 of the Treaty states: “In the event that one of the Parties is subjected to an armed attack by any state or several states and thus finds itself in a state of war, the other Party shall immediately provide military and other assistance by all means at its disposal in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter and in accordance with the laws of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation.” Note that very similar guarantees are found in the 1953 ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty, but it explicitly states “state of war” rather than any armed conflict.

However, as the author has repeated many times, the key article of this block is not Article 4, but Article 3: “The Parties shall cooperate with each other to ensure lasting regional and international peace and security. In the event of an imminent threat of an act of armed aggression against one of the Parties, the Parties shall, at the request of one of the Parties, immediately activate bilateral channels for consultations with a view to coordinating their positions and agreeing on possible practical measures to assist each other to help eliminate the threat.”

Let us also pay attention to Article 8, which states that “The Parties shall establish mechanisms to conduct joint activities to strengthen defense capabilities in order to prevent war and ensure regional and international peace and security.”

Frankly speaking, talk about the possible presence of North Koreans in the Russian Far East may have something to do with this article—joint military exercises and other events of this type would significantly help soldiers to familiarize themselves with the realities of this war. However, such cooperation is formally prohibited by international sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council.

Does this mean that sanctions will be lifted automatically?

Not exactly. Article 16, which was perceived as Moscow’s refusal to implement the UNSC sanctions resolutions, reads as follows: “The Parties shall oppose the use of unilateral coercive measures, including those of an extraterritorial nature, and consider their imposition illegal and contrary to the UN Charter and norms of international law. The Parties shall coordinate efforts and cooperate in order to support multilateral initiatives aimed at eliminating the use of such measures in international relations. […]

The Parties shall refrain from joining or supporting unilateral coercive measures by any third party if such measures affect or are directed directly or indirectly at one of the Parties.”

Similar language has been used before: Vladimir Putin has repeatedly stated that the current level of sanctions is unfair and should be reconsidered, but there is no indication in the text that the Treaty abolishes the UN Security Council sanctions that Russia voted for in 2016–2017: it refers to “unilateral” measures, meaning sanctions imposed by third countries in addition to international ones.

Does this strengthening of Moscow-Pyongyang relations mean a simultaneous decline in Moscow-Seoul relations?

No. “Non-targeting against third countries” means something slightly different. Carefully read Article 5: “Each of the Parties undertakes not to conclude agreements with third states against the sovereignty, security, territorial inviolability, the right to free choice and development of political, social, economic and cultural systems and other key interests of the other Party. The Parties shall not allow the use of their territory by third States for the purpose of violating the sovereignty, security, territorial inviolability of the other Party.”

It is clear that Seoul is losing the opportunity to conduct anti-Pyongyang propaganda on Russian territory, which South Korean “human rights activists” have been doing from time to time—some activists have even taught this way in Russian universities! The same can be seen in terms of technological cooperation, if there were any. There will be no condemnation of the North in joint statements by Russian and South Korean officials and diplomats, but neither will there be any impact on the economic, much less humanitarian, spheres of health, education, and culture.

NEO at the forefront

Article 20 attracts the author’s special attention: “The Parties shall promote broad cooperation in the media sphere in order to raise the level of knowledge about the life of the peoples of the two countries, promote objective information about the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation and bilateral cooperation in the global media space, further create favorable conditions for interaction between the national media, strengthen coordination in countering disinformation and aggressive information campaigns, and promote cooperation in the media sphere.” The editorial staff of New Eastern Outlook has been doing this for the past 12 years.

Will the situation change once both sides ratify the treaties?

Probably not. The processes noted above are already underway. As soon as the treaty was signed, cooperation in each of the noted areas began, and this can be seen at least in the quantity and quality of delegations.

As for relations between Moscow and Seoul, the ratification coincided with another round of global turbulence, one of the consequences of which is another round of US pressure on Seoul to pursue a more pro-Ukrainian policy. The Yoon Suk Yeol administration, as in the previous round, has made a number of statements and threatens to “look into the matter.”

Perhaps it is no coincidence that the ratification of this treaty coincided with the BRICS summit. This is another brick in the foundation of the new global world order that Russia, China and the countries of the Global South are building to counterbalance the West. The Treaty provides for the permanent maintenance of partnership based on the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in internal affairs. In addition, Russia and the DPRK reaffirmed their aspiration to strengthen global strategic stability and promote a multipolar system of international relations.

Andrei Rudenko, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, stated before the ratification that “the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty between Russia and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is designed to play a stabilizing role in Northeast Asia; it will make a positive contribution to maintaining the balance of power in the region on the basis of the principle of indivisibility of security, reducing the risk of a recurrence of war on the Korean Peninsula, including with the use of nuclear means, and in general lays the foundation for building a new Eurasian security system.”

The treaty is not directed against third countries and does not contain any secret clauses.

 

Konstantin Asmolov, Candidate of Historical Sciences, leading researcher of the Center for Korean Studies of the Institute of China and Modern Asia of the Russian Academy of Sciences, especially for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook

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