On March 28, 2024, Russia vetoed the extension of the mandate of the UN panel of experts to monitor the sanctions against the DPRK until April 30, 2025. This is important, because according to the established procedure, the decision to extend the term of office of the so-called 1718 Sanctions Committee must be made by April 30, otherwise it will be unable to continue with its activities…

Japan and North Korea do not currently have any diplomatic relations, but Tokyo periodically tries to gain political capital by attempting to establish a dialog with Pyongyang. The most successful such attempt occurred in 2002, when, in a meeting with Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, DPRK leader Kim Jong Il admitted that 13 Japanese citizens had been abducted by North Korea’s intelligence services…

Contrary to the anticipation of anti-Pyongyang propaganda discussed in the previous part of this digest, there have been no direct provocations, including in the area of the disputed maritime border. Instead, the North conducted its own exercise and criticized the enemy’s. Already on the day the exercise began, March 4, a DPRK Ministry of Defense spokesman issued a press statement. “The frantic war drills by the ROK puppets and vassal forces led by the US make…

From March 4 to 14, 2024, the Armed Forces of the United States and the Republic of Korea conducted the annual joint exercise Freedom Shield. This is a complex exercise involving many large and small maneuvers, so first it should be described the main points in which Freedom Shield 2024 differed from previous exercises. The stated objective was to improve interoperability and enhance the ability of alliance forces to conduct joint operations…

On February 10, 2024, the Lunar New Year holiday, Yoon Suk-yeol visited the Second Marine Corps Division in Gimpo, inspected the Cheonmoo multiple rocket launcher system, and urged troops to be prepared for any North Korean provocations. “If the enemy provokes, you have to sternly and overwhelmingly respond under the principle of ‘act first, report later’ to completely crush the enemy’s will.”…

On 11 March 2024, Russian media reported that a 53-year-old South Korean citizen named Baek (the detainee’s name varies – Baek Won Sung, less frequently Baek Kwang-soon) had been arrested for espionage and was currently being held in Moscow’s Lefortovo prison, normally reserved for high-level political prisoners. The news raised eyebrows both in Russia and abroad, as it is the first time a South Korean citizen has been arrested in Russia…

According to media reports, at least 11 officials of the ROK Election Commission (4 of them high-ranking officials, including Secretary General Park Chan Chin, his deputy Song Bong-sup, and former Secretary General Kim Se Hwan) facilitated the improper employment of their children in government agencies affiliated with the Election Commission or its regional divisions: in an interview with his father’s colleagues, Kim Se Hwan’s son received near-perfect scores.

It will soon be 10 years since the publication of South Korea’s review of the state of human rights in the DPRK, which, thanks to its uncritical treatment of sources, turned out to be “much ado about not very much”. 10 years later, on February 6, 2024, South Korea’s Ministry for Unification presented what it considered to be a serious report, Perceptions of the Current Socioeconomic Situation in the DPRK, based on the results of an analysis of surveys of 6,531 defectors who left the DPRK between 2013 and 2022…

On 14 February 2024, the representatives of the ROK and Cuba at the United Nations exchanged diplomatic notes in New York, marking the establishment of official relations. Cuba became the 193rd country with which the ROK established diplomatic relations. According to the ROK presidential office, the event was the culmination of Seoul’s diplomatic efforts to establish relations with socialist countries that have traditionally maintained friendly contacts with the DPRK. In this regard…

Will Fumio Kishida be able to abandon his harsh rhetoric against Pyongyang and strengthen his popularity with Japanese voters, or is he counting on favour from the DPRK leadership? Not even a few months have passed since the Japanese Defence Ministry’s threatening statements to Pyongyang over North Korea’s test launch of a ballistic missile towards the Sea of Japan on January 14 this year. “The DPRK’s actions threaten the peace and security of our country, the region and the world. Such ballistic missile launches violate UN Security Council resolutions and pose a serious problem,”…

The session ended, and the idea of peaceful unification was discarded. Even the monument dedicated to it was removed. What did Seoul have to say on the matter? During a cabinet meeting held just hours after Kim Jong-un’s speech was published…

While preparing the material, the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the WPK was held on January 23–24, 2024, where Kim Jong-un’s proposed strategy for the development of local industry began to take shape. The Politburo meeting lasted for two days, which is rather rare. The meeting structure suggests that there was significant conceptualization taking place. The composition of the observers suggests that it was a nationwide planning meeting. The meeting included “members of the Presidium of the Political Bureau of the WPK Central Committee, members, and alternate members of the Political Bureau…