If a durable agreement with Iran is established, the GCC may gradually move toward a form of “integration.”
Introduction
The 2017 GCC summit in Kuwait became a symbol of intra-GCC divergence. In 2021, the dispute between Saudi Arabia and Qatar was “resolved.” However, the 2026 US–Israeli war against Iran has emerged as one of the most significant historical tests of cohesion within the GCC.
Various factors and variables have contributed to the emergence of divisions among the member states. Since the nineteenth century, independent or autonomous Arab ruling families have been engaged in intense internal rivalries.
Over the past decade, traditional patterns of bloc formation and tribal affiliations within the Council have also challenged the institutional effectiveness and organizational cohesion of the GCC.
The GCC Approaches
Although considerable emphasis has been placed on GCC integration and cooperation at the declaratory level, practical developments reveal a more complicated picture. According to Jasem Mohamed Albudaiwi GCC Secretary-General, the organization is more united than ever, has cooperated with all six of its member states across various fields, and has become even stronger.
Indeed, following February 28, the extraordinary GCC summit emphasized the expansion of cooperation in logistics, water connectivity, electricity-grid interconnection, strategic storage, railway projects, military affairs, security, food security, electricity, energy, and healthcare.
At the operational level, however, divergence is fundamental in nature. During 2025–2026, deep-seated strategic and structural fault lines became increasingly pronounced.
The Direct and Indirect Implications of the 2026 US–Israeli War against Iran for the GCC
The US and Israeli military aggression, conducted in two phases—the “12-Day War” and the “40-Day War”—failed to dismantle Iran’s defensive capabilities. Drawing on the resilience and cohesion of its political and institutional elites, it sustained the war, regionalized the conflict, and weaponized the Strait of Hormuz. Tehran shifted its defense doctrine toward “asymmetric, extensive, and high-volume retaliation,” thereby placing critical GCC infrastructure at risk.
The GCC, comprising Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman, is not homogeneous in terms of political structure or military capabilities.
GCC member states differ in their perspectives on Iran and the regional order, their perceptions of common threats, and their assessments of those threats’ origins. Iran does not pose an identical threat to all GCC member states. A common understanding of the Iran is an important prerequisite for strategic convergence within the GCC.
In practice, Saudi Arabia prioritizes safeguarding its territorial security and oil infrastructure, preventing the country from becoming a direct front in the war, and preserving its Vision 2030 program. Saudi maintained diplomatic channels with Tehran.
Saudi Arabia is unwilling to relinquish its position as the “big brother,” whereas Abu Dhabi does not wish to assume the role of the “younger brother.” Riyadh’s and Abu Dhabi’s approaches have increasingly diverged under the influence of conflicting interests and differing perceptions of threats and opportunities. The concept of integrated deterrence has consequently given way to divergence in the dominant role within the Council.
Differences in foreign policy between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, particularly regarding their respective approaches to Iran, also influence the behavior of other GCC member states.
Indeed, private criticisms expressed by GCC countries concerning one another’s approaches to the US war against Iran have, on several occasions, received considerable coverage in the public media. Over the past year, the UAE has adopted a more confrontational stance toward Iran and sought to deepen its defense cooperation with the US and Israel. Abu Dhabi was the largest GCC member state to advocate a “collective response” against Iran. The UAE conducted limited attacks against Iran in March and April 2026.
Among the GCC member states, Oman adopted a cautious position, reflecting its distinct and longstanding religious and political tradition of neutrality, and emerged as the actor maintaining the closest relations with Iran. Oman has prioritized preventing the Persian Gulf from becoming an arena for conflict among external powers, preserving its relations with the US and Iran, and making use of diplomatic mediation.
Despite its security cooperation with the United States and its hosting of American military facilities, Qatar has pursued diplomatic engagement and mediation-oriented negotiations with Tehran, reflecting its geographical and economic ties.
Bahrain, however, which has a Shia-majority population and is one of the smallest GCC member states, has supported strengthening collective anti-Iranian defense arrangements but lacks strong and independent capabilities to implement such a policy.
Given its geographical position, proximity to Iran, and dependence on maritime routes, Kuwait seeks to strengthen deterrence while containing the geographical and operational scope of the war.
In the military domain, the Peninsula Shield Force, the GCC’s joint military force, was not activated as a collective defense mechanism during the war with Iran. In other words, over the past year, GCC member states focused on joint missile early-warning programs and military exercises. In practice, however, they were unwilling to relinquish their sovereign authority over security-related decision-making.
Historically, a substantial proportion of GCC countries’ security has depended on American military guarantees. The war with Iran, by exposing the breakdown and ineffectiveness of the US defensive umbrella, has demonstrated that the traditional American security model can no longer, on its own, adequately meet the GCC’s security requirements.
The Iran war has undermined confidence in the United States among GCC member states. Moreover, differing attitudes toward diversifying external partnerships have not translated into greater GCC cohesion.
The “Mecca Pact” and the recent regional meeting involving (R4) + E3 in Istanbul on October 23, bringing together the United Kingdom, France, and Germany with Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Egypt, demonstrate the Intra-GCC Divergence.
By contrast, the Emiratis have shown greater interest in the Indian and Israeli options. Furthermore, member states have considered additional initiatives and bilateral partnerships with the United Kingdom, Israel, Ukraine, Italy, and China.
In the energy sector, alternative solutions for circumventing the Strait of Hormuz have also largely remained national initiatives, and comprehensive collective cooperation has not materialized within the GCC.
The Iran war has also affected GCC member states’ perceptions of Israel. The UAE and Bahrain maintain formal relations with Israel; however, differences persist in their levels of confidence in security guarantees and assistance provided by the US, the EU, and even Israel. Alternatively, under pressure from Tehran, disagreements over military cooperation with Israel may intensify.
At present, GCC member states appear to hold divergent views regarding how to combine indigenous defense capabilities with new regional partnerships, increase investment in domestic defense industries, and expand cooperation with a diverse range of external partners.
The devastating consequences of the war with Iran for global economic arteries and energy security, particularly following the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, have affected GCC economies unevenly.
However, GCC member states differ in their degree of dependence on the Strait of Hormuz. Consequently, their approaches to the future legal status, security arrangements, and governance of the strait will remain a source of disagreement, particularly between Oman, on the one hand, and Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, on the other.
From the perspective of many in Iran, the country has consistently advanced proposals for the indigenization of regional security, does not owe the region anything, and should not be expected to emerge from the war in a position of indebtedness to regional states. At present, GCC member states also appear to hold divergent views regarding the establishment of a regional security mechanism involving Iran.
Outlook
Although GCC sovereign wealth funds manage more than $5 trillion, a substantial proportion of which is invested in Western economies, GCC countries appear likely to pursue greater independence from the West, selective partnerships, and strategic reassessments.
Nevertheless, given differences in their respective levels of need and dependence on the West, the GCC is unlikely, in the short term, to maintain a uniform approach toward Iran, the US, and Israel.
By contrast, it is evident that American monetary and energy hegemony has weakened. Evidence from 2026 suggests that the United States is facing a structural financial crisis. Its $40 trillion debt imposes severe constraints on its capacity for global strategic maneuverability.
Given the high vulnerability of Washington’s military bases and installations in the Persian Gulf to Iranian attacks, the United States will probably relocate a substantial proportion of its military presence in the Middle East.
Just as the expulsion of the Portuguese by Iran in 1622 paved the way for a new regional order in the Persian Gulf, negotiations between the GCC and Iran, as well as a more comprehensive agreement led by the United States and Iran, could provide an important pathway toward reducing tensions within the GCC.
If a durable agreement with Iran is established, the GCC may gradually move toward a form of “integration.”
The continuation of the war with Iran will not strengthen GCC cohesion. Rather, it could transform the organization into an assemblage of actors pursuing divergent and, at times, conflicting security policies, characterized by “divergent tendencies,” “unilateral initiatives,” and “bilateral alliances.”
Samyar Rostami, а political observer and senior researcher in international relations
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