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Houthi Military Tactics Do Not Guarantee Mecca Pact Success

Alexandr Svaranc, October 30, 2026

Saudi Arabia is pushing to involve in partners in the Mecca Pact in the conflict with the Houthis, however the nature of military operations does not guarantee military success.
The war between Yemen and Saudi Arabia

Peculiarities of the Houthi “Ansar Allah” Movement’s Military Operations

The Yemeni Houthi movement “Ansar Allah” was created in the 1990s in northern Yemen on the basis of the socio-political movement of the Zaydis (a Shi’a branch of Islam). In 2004, the Houthis moved to armed conflict with the Yemeni authorities and later established control over Sanaa.

Time has shown that the conflict in Yemen includes not only internal disagreements but also reflects the nature of external geopolitical contradictions. The Houthis began using guerrilla warfare tactics with offensive drones and missile systems, dispersing the locations of their units and military arsenal storage sites.

Weapons Production and Houthi Tactics: New Challenges for International Security

There is a possibility that the Houthis have established their own weapons production in Yemen. However, the exact scale and degree of development of this production remain a subject of debate. The presence of modern weapons systems requiring qualified personnel training for their use and maintenance significantly strengthens the Houthis’ military potential.

It is clearly in the interests of Tel Aviv and its allies to draw Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Pakistan, and Iran into a large-scale conflict

Fighters of the Ansar Allah movement demonstrate flexibility in their combat tactics. They are actively expanding the use of unmanned systems for attacks on both ground targets and commercial vessels in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. By combining drones with anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles, the Houthis are posing new threats to international shipping. The choice of targets is often determined by political interests directed primarily against vessels of NATO countries, Israel, and their allies.

During the conflict with Saudi Arabia, which supports the Yemeni government, the Houthis demonstrated the ability to strike distant targets. Among them are Saudi Arabia’s energy facilities and communications, including Saudi Aramco facilities and King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh. These attacks forced the United States to take measures to ensure the security of its diplomatic personnel, including the evacuation of US diplomats from the kingdom.

The tactic of dispersing weapons and missile launchers increases the resilience and security of Ansar Allah while simultaneously reducing the effectiveness of enemy airstrikes. The destruction of individual facilities does not lead to a complete loss of the Houthis’ combat capability, allowing them to preserve their military potential and command and control even amid a significant superiority of the opposing sides’ armies. This, in turn, prevents their political defeat.

By comparison, Saudi Arabia’s military budget in 2025, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), exceeded $83 billion. Saudi Arabia possesses modern combat aviation. Nevertheless, these advantages in military budget size and weapons quality do not yet guarantee Riyadh military success.

It is important to note that the Houthis’ resilience is ensured not only by their tactics but also by the nature of the political goals they pursue. They do not seek military superiority, direct confrontation with Saudi troops, the defeat of their army, or the occupation of territories. Their main objectives boil down to blockading the Bab el-Mandeb Strait to create an international trade and oil transit crisis, threatening Saudi Arabia’s energy and other critical infrastructure, and forcing Riyadh to spend resources on defense and seek alternative routes for oil transportation.

How Effective Would Military Assistance from the Mecca Pact Members Be for Riyadh?

The Mecca military alliance, created in August of this year with the participation of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Türkiye, faced a challenge even before ratification in national parliaments. The conflict between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis has put the alliance before the need to respond. The organization’s charter obligates members to provide mutual military assistance in the event of an attack. However, the nature of the crisis does not allow for an unambiguous determination of the aggressor. Nevertheless, the fact of armed clashes is indisputable.

The disunity of the Houthis’ opponents and the absence of a unified military coalition previously limited their capabilities. Now, however, the potential reaction of the “Islamic NATO” members could change the balance of forces.

Pakistan and Türkiye are forced to respond to the current crisis. The allies in the Mecca pact have publicly stated their readiness to provide Riyadh with diplomatic and military support. Pakistan has already sent a military squadron and servicemen to Saudi Arabia. It is worth noting that the Mecca pact itself was formed on the basis of a bilateral military alliance between Riyadh and Islamabad.

Saudi Arabia’s appeal to the United States and the United Kingdom for military assistance proved fruitless. According to media reports, the United States is not interested in opening a new Middle Eastern front and further involvement in a confrontation with Iran in Yemen.

London expressed concern to Islamabad, warning of the risks of Pakistan’s involvement in the conflict with the Houthis on the side of Saudi Arabia. Such a step, according to the British side, would entail significant military, political, and economic costs.

At the same time, as Turkish expert Mehmet Ali Guller notes, Ankara approved the provision of military assistance to Riyadh, relying on the existing military alliance and obligations. Türkiye has already sent the Mecca Pact to parliament for ratification, since without the approval of the Grand National Assembly (GNA), the deployment of Turkish servicemen abroad is impossible. Official statements by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, and Defense Minister Yasar Guler, as well as publications in Turkish media (including Daily Sabah, Cumhuriyet, NTV), consistently emphasize the defensive nature of the assistance. It will be limited to Saudi Arabian territory and aimed at protecting key facilities.

In an interview with the American Newsweek magazine, President Erdogan confirmed that military assistance will be provided on the basis of the Mecca Pact, and its specific forms will be determined by Saudi Arabia’s requests. Thus, the scale of support will depend on the nature of the crisis and the ally’s needs identified during military consultations, taking into account all associated risks. It is important to note that the provision of military assistance does not mean Türkiye’s automatic involvement in the conflict.

Defense Minister Yasar Guler and representatives of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) stated that Türkiye does not plan offensive actions or direct participation in combat operations against the Houthis on Yemeni territory. The goal of Turkish assistance is to contain escalation and strengthen Riyadh’s defense capabilities. The assistance provided includes sending military engineers and technical experts to Saudi Arabia, supplies of electronic warfare equipment and unmanned aerial vehicles, as well as the exchange of intelligence data.

Islamabad and Ankara, while providing military assistance, cannot ignore Iran’s position. As the leader of the Shi’a world, Iran cannot remain indifferent to the problems of the Shi’a Houthis. Officially, Tehran distances itself from the conflict, denies its involvement, and calls for political dialogue and a diplomatic settlement. However, in private negotiations, Iran warns of the inadmissibility of escalation, which could expand the combat zone and lead to significant destruction of the region’s critical infrastructure.

It is clearly in the interests of Tel Aviv and its allies to draw Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Pakistan, and Iran into a large-scale conflict. This would not only weaken them but also allow new oil routes to be created from the Persian Gulf through Israel.

 

Alexander Svarants, Ph.D. in Political Science, professor, Turkologist, and expert on the Middle East
 
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