The increasing frequency of attacks from Yemen targeting airports and energy infrastructure in Saudi Arabia has highlighted the serious challenges facing Riyadh.
Repeated attacks by Sana’a on airports and energy infrastructure have exposed significant challenges in Saudi Arabia.
On 15 September 2026, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi welcomed Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in Cairo.
17 October 2026 — President el-Sisi announced that Cairo would be prepared to take the necessary measures to defend Saudi Arabia if Riyadh requested assistance. Egypt’s National Defense Council and Parliament expressed support for Saudi Arabia.
Motivations for Egypt’s Involvement
Over the past decade, Egypt has pursued a policy shaped by its own independent considerations.
Egypt’s policy rests on three priorities: securing the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, preserving strategic relations with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and preventing the Yemen war from spreading.
Egypt’s economic vulnerability in the Red Sea is a major concern. Suez Canal revenues in fiscal year 2025–2026 have reportedly fallen to approximately $11 billion—roughly half their pre-crisis level. Intensified attacks on vessels, a direct threat to the Suez Canal, or vital maritime routes could alter Cairo’s strategic calculations.
The prospect of extending Saudi Arabia’s $5.3 billion deposit and injecting $10 billion in new Saudi investment into Egypt is a significant motivation for Cairo.
Cairo is concerned about the expulsion or unemployment of millions of Egyptians in the GCC, as well as reductions in Saudi investment and financial deposits in Egypt.
The national security of Arab countries is an integral component of Egypt’s national security.
Cairo is concerned about threats to freedom of navigation, attacks on commercial vessels, and disruptions to international trade flows. Red Sea security is one of the variables affecting foreign trade, foreign-currency revenues, and the country’s geopolitical position.
The connection between the security of Bab al-Mandeb and that of the Suez Canal is essential. Increased insecurity in the southern Red Sea could lead to a decline in foreign-currency revenues generated by the Suez Canal, reduce the attractiveness of Egypt’s maritime route, and intensify economic pressures.
Protecting this maritime corridor is therefore not merely a political commitment to Saudi Arabia but a matter of Egypt’s direct economic interests.
Supporting Saudi Arabia helps preserve Riyadh’s confidence in Cairo and strengthens Egypt’s position in regional arrangements.
Egypt’s direct interests in the security of Bab al-Mandeb and the Red Sea could be presented to public opinion as a justification for intervention.
Egypt’s strategy is likely to involve neither an all-out war nor complete silence. Accordingly, the boundary between defending Saudi Arabia and refraining from fighting on Yemeni territory will probably constitute the most important tactical consideration.
Egypt also seeks to distinguish between supporting Saudi Arabia’s defense and engaging in a broad war against the Axis of Resistance. These instruments can help Egypt to assist Saudi Arabia without exposing itself to direct participation in the war.
As of early 2026, Egypt’s official position has centered on de-escalation, a political settlement, Yemen’s unity and sovereignty, the preservation of national institutions, and the need for a comprehensive resolution to the crisis.
Cairo’s strategy is likely to focus on maintaining a viable state framework for negotiations, preventing further fragmentation, and pursuing a political compromise with Sana’a.
Challenges
Clearly, Egypt and Iran do not share the same views regarding Ansar Allah’s role and Red Sea security. But Egypt’s cooperation with Saudi Arabia and the littoral states to counter maritime threats could lead to the involvement of foreign military coalitions in Red Sea security.
Officials in Sana’a have repeatedly warned against any Egyptian military intervention. Sana’a can launch missile and drone attacks against Egypt.
From Cairo’s perspective, military support for Riyadh would be limited to the defense of Saudi territory. However, even a defensive approach offers no guarantee of immunity from attacks by Sana’a; Sana’a might interpret such involvement as full participation in the war.
The July drone attack on two oil tankers in Egyptian waters demonstrated the extent of Egypt’s vulnerabilities. Through its unconventional tactics, Sana’a could potentially threaten the Suez Canal, the Canal’s service infrastructure, the SUMED pipeline, energy terminals, and fuel-storage facilities if Egypt entered into direct hostilities with Sana’a.
Sana’a could disrupt navigation through the Suez Canal by threatening maritime traffic in the southern Red Sea, increasing costs and diverting vessels away from the route.
A broader war could further disrupt navigation, reduce foreign-currency revenues, increase energy and import costs, and fuel inflation in food prices for Egyptians.
Even limited Egyptian defensive involvement could exacerbate disagreements between Cairo and Tehran over regional security, while large-scale operations against Sana’a would entail substantially greater costs. More extensive involvement could further complicate Egypt’s relations with Iran and expose Cairo to retaliatory actions by actors aligned with the so-called Axis of Resistance.
From Sana’a’s perspective, renewed Egyptian involvement would strengthen Israeli ambitions throughout the region. Tehran has also warned that Egyptian military intervention would make the conflict “more difficult.”
Al-Azhar, Egypt’s prominent Islamic institution, called for the establishment of an Arab and Islamic mediation committee, while the Journalists’ Syndicate prioritized diplomacy.
Islamist, left-wing, and democratic parties generally express serious criticism of Saudi Arabia’s regional policies. Some Egyptian opposition parties reject any involvement of the Egyptian army in any regional war.
Other opposition figures argue that any Egyptian action requires economic resilience, credible institutions, public trust, and independent decision-making.
The principal concern among Egyptian opponents of possible Egyptian military participation centers on the objectives, duration, potential costs, and risks of a mission involving Egyptian troops in ground operations inside Yemen or Saudi.
From this perspective, an Egyptian military campaign inside Yemen could serve American and Israeli interests by weakening Sana’a rather than safeguarding the country and protecting Egypt’s national cohesion.
Deploying troops to Yemen and engaging in a broader war in the Red Sea could undermine national unity and weaken Egyptian public support.
Others argue that an extensive commitment to Saudi Arabia’s security, while Egypt’s national interests in Ethiopia, the war in Sudan, and Israel are neglected, makes little sense.
The memory of Egypt’s intervention in Yemen during the 1960s remains particularly vivid. The number of Egyptian troops stationed in Yemen reached approximately 70,000 in 1965. More than 10,000 Egyptian soldiers were killed. The adverse consequences led to Yemen becoming known as “Egypt’s Vietnam.” The bitter experience of the 1960s demonstrated that Yemen could become a strategic quagmire for Egypt. Consequently, the complete military defeat of Sana’a would require a prolonged and costly war.
Outlook
Undoubtedly, following Saudi Arabia’s unconditional support for al-Sisi’s Egypt at the beginning of his administration, Cairo will not remain indifferent to Saudi Arabia’s security and stability.
Cairo’s efforts appear likely to focus on finding a political solution between Saudi Arabia and Sana’a in its capacity as a regional mediator, while maintaining channels of communication with opposing parties, including Aden, Sana’a, Israel, and Iran.
Cairo is exploring all possible channels that could lead to an agreement between Iran and the United States, as well as an agreement in Yemen to end Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia.
Recently, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, and Pakistan issued a joint statement condemning attacks by Yemen’s Ansar Allah and disruptions to waterways and maritime communication routes, and issued a warning.
However, if Cairo chooses confrontation with Sana’a, its most likely initial instruments would be air and naval power. A ground deployment or the use of special forces would be considerably more difficult.
In that event, disagreements among religious institutions, politicians, political parties, and the media over how Saudi Arabia should be defended would intensify.
Furthermore, any extensive Egyptian military and security presence in Riyadh’s war against Sana’a could heighten concerns among political parties and the public about the repetition of the Egyptian Vietnam scenario.
If Egypt maintains a conservative foreign policy and continues to prioritize its own national security, its symbolic alignment
with Riyadh in the war against Ansar Allah will be conditional, accompanied by specific recommendations and considerations, and limited in scope and non-aggressive in character.
Samyar Rostami, а political observer and senior researcher in international relations
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