This autumn was unusually tense for Azerbaijan and Türkiye, two strategic allies. What exactly caused this?
Hijab Ban As an External Irritant
Things reached the point where Oktay Saral, an adviser to President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, called on the Azerbaijani authorities not to infringe on the rights of Muslims. Some members of the ruling Justice and Development Party asked the country’s leadership to raise the issue with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev. Unexpectedly, Kemal Kilicdaroglu – the leader of the opposition Republican People’s Party, which traditionally advocates a strictly secular character for the Turkish state– also joined the criticism.
Formally, the dispute began on September 21, when the Azerbaijani government adopted Resolution No. 309. The document banned “additional items of clothing that violate the uniform requirements for school attire and contradict the principle of secular education”.
Ankara’s reaction was not long in coming. On September 23, President Erdoğan, speaking at the UN General Assembly (without directly naming Azerbaijan), characterized restrictions on wearing hijabs in schools as an attack on the fundamental rights of women.
Reaction in Baku and Growing Tensions
Protests by believers and representatives of public organizations also took place in Azerbaijan itself. These demonstrations were harshly suppressed, with dozens of activists being arrested on charges of organizing unrest.
At the same time, Baku placed Turkish citizens on the international wanted list, whom law enforcement agencies suspected of calling for the violent overthrow of the Azerbaijani authorities. Moreover, Baku accused Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan of interfering in internal affairs. According to the Azerbaijani side, during a visit to Baku to participate in the 7th CICA Summit, the minister met with representatives of the Youth Assistance Fund and allegedly gave them instructions on the protest movement. However, the Turkish embassy in Baku refuted these accusations, stating that it was only a matter of a protocol photo of Fidan with local members of the public.
Turkish criticism of Azerbaijan resonated in Iran, where protests condemning the actions of the Azerbaijani authorities also took place. In turn, the Iranian Foreign Ministry called on the parties to resolve the conflict through dialogue between society and the authorities. Given the difficult relations between Baku and Tehran, the Azerbaijani side put forward the theory that the Islamic Republic could be behind the criticism. According to Baku, Iranian intelligence services traditionally try to use the radical sentiments of believers against Azerbaijan’s secular institutions.
It is worth noting that Azerbaijan became one of the first Muslim countries to support the idea of a secular state in the early 20th century, as well as issues of family and women’s rights. The press played a major role in the struggle for women’s emancipation, including publications such as Sharqi-Rus, Hayat, Irshad, Yeni Irshad, Taraqqi, Ishyg, the magazine Molla Nasreddin, and others, which in 1903 starting advocated equality and were against religious fanaticism. As early as 1921, the First Congress of Women was held in Soviet Azerbaijan, where changes in their role in society, family, work, and education were discussed. Thus, the principles of a secular state in Azerbaijan have deep historical roots.
The modern Turkish Republic, founded by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in 1923, was also created as a secular state. However, Türkiye’s current leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, is of conservative views and favors moderate Islamism. For years, he sought the return of hijabs to public life. Moreover, in Ankara’s diplomacy, Islam serves as one of the instruments for integrating Turkic states, and Erdoğan himself sees Türkiye as one of the leaders of the Islamic world.
Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the dispute over hijabs could have become the main cause of the “autumn chill” between Türkiye and Azerbaijan, given their allied brotherly relations. It is hard to imagine that Baku underestimates Ankara’s key role in implementing the oil and gas “contracts of the century”, which allowed Azerbaijan to enter the European energy market in the 21st century, not to mention the decisive Turkish military and diplomatic factor in Baku’s success in the Second Karabakh War, the 2021 Shusha Declaration on strategic alliance, and billions in Turkish investments. So what are the true reasons for this flare-up?
Experts name Israel as the main factor behind the seasonal cooling. During Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s speech at the UN General Assembly in New York, the Turkish delegation demonstratively left the hall, but the Azerbaijani delegation did not follow suit.
Azerbaijan remains Israel’s strategic partner in the South Caucasus. Baku continues to develop trade and economic ties with the Jewish state (supplying almost 40% of Israel’s oil consumption) and purchases Israeli weapons. Notably, the transit of Azerbaijani oil to Israel runs through Turkish territory via the port of Ceyhan.
Baku indirectly accused Ankara of continuing partial trade with Israel despite an official embargo. As Ankara’s strategic ally, Azerbaijan traditionally tries to smooth over Turkish-Israeli contradictions and acts as the initiator of closed-door talks. Moreover, Baku sharply condemned Israel’s recognition of the Armenian Genocide, which in the summer of 2026 led to the de facto freezing of this issue in the Knesset.
For its part, Israel is not interested in Türkiye’s economic strengthening. Such strengthening could pose a threat to the Jewish state’s interests in the Middle East, especially after the launch of the “Trump Road”, which is supposed to link Türkiye through Armenia to the countries of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) into a single Turan.
This transport corridor is also extremely important for Azerbaijan itself, as its oil and gas reserves are more modest than those of Kazakhstan or Turkmenistan. That is precisely why Baku seeks to secure for itself the role of the main transit hub for hydrocarbon supplies from Central Asia through Türkiye to Europe. By developing its alliance with Israel, Baku counts on the support of the influential Jewish lobby in the US and the UK, which will help keep the European market open to Azerbaijani resources.
Another hidden source of tension in Azerbaijan-Türkiye relations is the Armenian issue. Although Ilham Aliyev has levers of influence over Nikol Pashinyan, for Baku the prospects of a soon opening of the Armenian-Turkish border and the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries remain an alarming signal. Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan increasingly speaks of imminent positive shifts on this track. In response, Baku insists that Armenian-Turkish rapprochement must proceed in sync with the settlement of relations between Baku and Yerevan, the main condition of which is Azerbaijan’s fulfillment of all preliminary demands for signing a peace treaty.
So far Yerevan has been avoiding fully satisfying Baku’s maximalist demands (for example, amending the preamble of the Constitution concerning Nagorno-Karabakh). Meanwhile, the implementation of the Trump Road project in southern Armenia under US control inevitably imposes new requirements on Türkiye as well. Washington could make it a condition for Ankara to open the borders and ensure access for Armenian goods to the Black Sea port of Trabzon. In that case, Türkiye would have no arguments left for continuing the blockade of Armenia, which is demonstrating increasing loyalty.
In addition, given difficult relations with Iran, Russia, and Georgia, it will be extremely difficult for Azerbaijan to implement new transit projects to Europe bypassing Armenia.
Ilham Aliyev is showing a high degree of independence from his large neighbors, namely Iran and Russia, and recently also in relations with Türkiye. Azerbaijani media emphasize that the military success in the Second Karabakh War was the exclusive achievement of Azerbaijan itself, especially since Turkish weapons were purchased on a commercial basis. Baku had previously refuted Recep Erdoğan’s thesis about Türkiye’s decisive role in that victory, which is unlikely to please Ankara. In this connection, Turkish expert Fatih Mehmet Koyucuk even proposed freezing active military-technical cooperation with Baku.
While sharing the “one nation, two states” formula, Baku nevertheless does not intend to sacrifice its sovereignty or make concessions to Ankara. Azerbaijan’s priority today is partnership with the US, the UK, China, and Israel. Such a pronounced tilt toward the West by Aliyev and the leading world powers is unlikely to meet approval in Moscow, Tehran, and Ankara.
But perhaps tensions between Azerbaijan and Türkiye is part of a well-thought-out diplomatic strategy? Such an approach could serve to contain serious threats, prevent new conflicts in the region, and implement the ideas of Turan, including the opening of the Zangezur corridor. In any case, even with differences of position on a number of issues, the strategic character of the friendly ties between Türkiye and Azerbaijan remains unchanged.
Alexander Svarants, Ph.D. in Political Science, professor, Turkologist, and expert on the Middle East
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