South Korea faces a difficult choice over whether and how to support maritime security efforts in the Strait of Hormuz. With pressure from the United States, risks from Iran, and the continuing threat from North Korea, Seoul must balance alliance commitments with its own security priorities.
In this dilemma, South Korea’s choice will define its foreign policy and alliances. The question is not simply whether it should assist the United States, but how much involvement is necessary in line with South Korea’s own national interests and security priorities.
Seoul’s Expanding Choices
Washington’s pressure has forced Seoul to reconsider how it can contribute to the security efforts. For this, Seoul is considering various options, including freedom of navigation, deploying naval vessels and maritime aircraft. Until now, Seoul has not taken a final decision; only assessments are underway. Seoul has also sent its inspection team to the UAE to assess the environment there before deciding what level of participation is necessary.
One possible contribution can be the deployment of a naval vessel. Seoul has operated the Cheonghae Unit, an anti-piracy force. This destroyer can provide an escort if Seoul decides that a naval deployment is appropriate. Other than this, Seoul has six P-8A Poseidon aircraft designed for long-range maritime surveillance. The possibility of deploying these aircraft became clearer when Seoul sent its inspection team to the UAE; reports say that possible P8 operations can be conducted at Al Dhafra Air Base.
Apart from this direct assistance, South Korea can consider navigation operations. Recently, on 8th September, South Korean President Lee Jae Myung and French President Emmanuel Macron discussed cooperation on freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. Till now, no final decision has been made; South Korea’s national security advisor, Wi Sung-lac, said that “We are still in the review stage; no decision has been made.” Also, South Korea can contribute through its shipbuilding capacity. In June, President Trump asked President Lee whether South Korea can rapidly build 10 US warships, highlighting Seoul’s ability in shipbuilding. For this, South Korean company Hanwha bought a Philly Shipyard in America, as American laws require U.S. Navy ships to be built in domestic shipyards.
The Price of Saying Yes
If Seoul participates in the Hormuz conflict, it will have to face severe consequences from Iran and North Korea. The presidential official said that “Seoul would also have to consider domestic legal procedures, military readiness on the Korean Peninsula, and parliamentary approval.” It means that Seoul would also have to consider its border security, as it has a plausible threat from North Korea.
Iran had already warned that the involvement of the South Korean military in the Hormuz conflict could be considered as US “aggression”, and Iran’s foreign ministry said that decisive actions could be taken against any military actions (after the recent US attack on oil tankers). In this case, deploying naval vessels will not be a suitable option for South Korea, but its Poseidons can surveil from an approximately 2,200 km radius. In this context, UAE Al-Dhafra Air Base is the most viable option. But for now, the diplomatic channels are still open between Tehran and Seoul.
Another cost of saying yes to the US is that if Seoul deploys its vessels and aircraft, then it would also have to maintain deterrence on the Korean Peninsula. Seoul had already stated that military readiness on the Peninsula must be taken into account before taking any decision to assist the US in the Hormuz conflict. The concern is not simply whether South Korea has enough forces on paper, but whether the right capabilities would remain available and responsive if the security situation on the Peninsula changed. This does not mean that a Hormuz deployment would automatically weaken South Korean deterrence. The impact would depend heavily on what Seoul deploys, for how long, and in what numbers.
A Balance Between Two Fronts
To secure its borders and preserve its alliance with the US, Seoul has to balance strategically. Seoul can deploy its Poseidon aircraft and conduct maritime patrols while preserving its naval vessels and military on the Peninsula. It could demonstrate alliance solidarity with Washington and strengthen its role as a security provider beyond Northeast Asia. This would allow South Korea to practice burden-sharing without risking its border security. This would be a win-win situation for Seoul, as it can participate in international security without staking its national security.
Conclusion
South Korea is trapped between choosing its own security and its alliance. But if it makes the right choices, then it can shape Seoul’s future role. Seoul has to keep its borders secure and also maintain its alliance with the US. For this, it has to make decisive decisions and find a middle ground. The challenge is further complicated by public opinion. A Gallup Korea poll says that 55% of the public opposes sending troops to the Strait of Hormuz. The decision will shape Seoul’s future role as a middle power.
Taut Bataut is a researcher and writer who publishes on South Asian geopolitics.
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