The Ministry of Unification of the Republic of Korea has stated its intention to restore a section of the Gyeongwon railway line, which, before the division of the Korean Peninsula, connected Seoul with the city of Wonsan on the eastern coast of North Korea.

What Happened?
On November 10, 2026, Vice Minister of Unification Kim Nam-jung announced the imminent resumption of construction on the South Korean section of the railway line intended to connect the two Koreas.
According to him, the government plans to restore the section of the Gyeongwon line that previously linked Seoul with the port city of Wonsan in eastern North Korea. Restoration began in 2015 but was suspended in May 2016 following North Korea’s fourth nuclear test.
Currently, the last operational station on the southern section is Baekmagoji in Cheorwon-gun (Gangwon Province). The ministry plans to resume work on the stretch between Baekmagoji and Woljeong-ri stations –the northernmost station on the South Korean side, located near the DMZ.
Earlier this year, the ministry notified the National Assembly of its intention to carry out preparatory work this year and resume construction on the border section next year.
Kim Nam-jung emphasized that peace is achieved not through declarations but through gradual people-to-people encounters. Therefore, the ministry seeks to facilitate such contacts by developing transport infrastructure and tourism in the border areas. He also called on the private sector and the international community to show greater interest, noting that developing tourism in the border region cannot rely solely on government funding.
Seoul’s Positioning
Technically, the project is feasible, as it involves building only a few kilometers along the border. By the standards of transportation construction, this is an inexpensive project that can be scaled almost indefinitely, with the only real risk being the budget.
According to South Korean experts, Deputy Minister Kim’s statement is aimed at several audiences. For the South Korean public, the administration is demonstrating a course of engaging the North in dialogue without requiring actual negotiations.
To the international community and business, Seoul is signaling the development of a transport network with an eye toward cross-border tourism that does not require concessions to Pyongyang. At the same time, the government stresses that without private investment, border-area tourism will not succeed, attempting to attract investors in advance. However, without the opening of the northern direction, a tourist flow capable of recouping private investment is unlikely.
To Pyongyang, the signal is: “We are leaving the door open and preparing infrastructure in case relations improve.” While Seoul can independently build the section up to the border, the inter-Korean portion of the project requires Pyongyang’s consent.
How This Surprises the Author
The idea of connecting the inter-Korean railways was popular under Presidents Roh Moo-hyun and Moon Jae-in. It was assumed that a unified network would allow South Korean goods to reach Europe via North Korea, and that economic cooperation would ultimately lead to national reunification. However, the Olympic “thaw” of 2018 showed that the North could not count on real assistance from the South. At the end of 2023, i.e. three years ago, North Korea clearly stated its view of the South as a hostile state, rejecting the idea of reunification and any form of close interaction. A symbolic step was the demonstrative severing of all communication lines and the fortification of the border, turning it into an even more serious defensive barrier.
Against this background, South Koreans have once again begun talking about the need to connect the railways. The first logical question is: how did the North react? The answer is simple: not at all. At the same time, it is obvious that such a project requires not only the North’s consent but also the dismantling of the defensive fortifications that have been erected. This raises even sharper questions: if Seoul fully understands that connecting the railways is impossible, why raise the issue and allocate funds for it?
What Might the Explanation Be?
There are two main explanations. The first is relatively simple –populism and corruption. First, by ignoring the North’s position and focusing on the domestic audience, South Korean authorities are simulating a course of engaging the North in dialogue. However, rising military spending and large-scale exercises point in the opposite direction if one looks at the facts rather than the statements. It creates the impression that part of the South Korean establishment, especially around Unification Minister Chung Dong-young, genuinely believes that dialogue and reunification remain possible, despite radical changes over the past 20 years.
Second, such projects can serve as a cover for spending money. From the experience of President Lee’s time as mayor and governor, it is known how people close to him enriched themselves through infrastructure projects. It is worth recalling that $8 million was spent lobbying his plans for “economic cooperation with the DPRK.” The criminal case against the president has been suspended but not closed.
An Alternative View: Railway Repair as Preparation for Conflict
There is another, less obvious but quite alarming scenario. The repair of the railway can be viewed not only as an infrastructure project but also as an element of preparation for a potential conflict. Unlike the North, which, judging by its defensive actions over the past three years, has abandoned the idea of militarily annexing the South, the Republic of Korea may still be harboring such plans. In that case, functioning transportation arteries would be necessary for the rapid transfer of ammunition, and repairing the railway fits this strategy perfectly.
At first glance, such reasoning against the backdrop of “peaceful rhetoric” may seem heretical. However, the author holds the view that at a certain stage, Lee Jae Myung may radically change his position. He may adopt a slogan once used by ultra-right politicians who were, in essence, ultra-left: “We defeated dictatorship in the South; now it is time to defeat dictatorship in the North and achieve reunification.”
From a foreign policy perspective, such a step would allow Lee to improve relations with the United States. Domestically, it could attract conservative votes, offsetting the outflow of “old Moonists” already engaged in a new round of factional struggle. Moreover, by demonstrating resolve, the president could raise his approval ratings. Conservatives, especially young people who hold extremely negative views of the North, would enthusiastically support such a leader. The more difficult President Lee’s domestic political situation becomes, the higher the probability that this pragmatist, ready to change his convictions to suit the political climate, will take such a decisive step. All the preceding rhetoric could turn out to be merely a pretext: “We tried to the very end to engage the North in dialogue, but their unconstructive position and terrible provocation leave us no choice.”
Of course, this forecast is one of the author’s “anti-forecasts.” Publicly voicing such scenarios generally reduces their probability. The author sincerely hopes that this prediction will prove wrong.
Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, leading research fellow at the Center for Korean Studies of the Institute of China and Modern Asia at the Russian Academy of Sciences
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