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On the Peculiarities and Intricacies of India’s Foreign Policy Course

Anvar Azimov, November 20, 2026

The multi-vector and independent line of Indian leadership in international affairs is dictated by India’s status as a major and influential global power with the world’s highest GDP growth.
India's foreign policy and politics

India is indeed a unique, self-sufficient state of an ancient civilization that has managed to achieve impressive results in foreign policy for many decades, based on a skillfully pursued independent pragmatic course of developing multilateral ties with both Western and Eastern states. Traditionally, India’s priority partners are, on the one hand, the USA, Canada, Israel, and key European countries, primarily those within the European Union, and on the other hand, Russia as a particularly privileged strategic partner, influential states of the Asia-Pacific region, including Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and island nations of the Indian Ocean with large communities of Indian origin – Sri Lanka, Mauritius, Seychelles, and Maldives.

India’s Foreign Policy: Relations with Neighbors and Global Engagement

Russia is interested in improving India’s relations with China, proceeding from the importance of close trilateral interaction on pressing global and regional issues

A challenging, yet nonetheless important, direction of India’s foreign policy is its relations with China, Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan. In the case of China, despite territorial issues, known rivalry, and lingering elements of mistrust in recent years, active efforts are being made to resolve bilateral issues and to rectify and develop relations overall. With its closest and most problematic neighbor, Pakistan, relations have remained essentially hostile and conflict-ridden for many decades, and prospects for their normalization are not yet in sight. Relations with Iran are developing dynamically, while relations with Afghanistan and Bangladesh are characterized by instability and tension.

India in Global Blocs: BRICS, SCO, QUAD, and Others

A distinguishing feature of the Indian leadership’s foreign policy efforts is New Delhi’s active participation in various international and regional structures, including the UN, where India seeks permanent membership in the Security Council, as well as in the G20, BRICS, SCO, ASEAN, and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), which also includes the United States, Australia, and Japan. At the same time, India has so far been unable to become a member of APEC, formally for two main reasons: the geographical factor – India does not have direct access to the Pacific Ocean – and due to the specifics of its rigid protectionist trade policy. New Delhi, however, does not abandon the prospect of joining APEC and continues to make efforts in this direction.

As for the recent ASEAN summit in Manila, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi took part in it on November 16–17, as well as in a meeting between the association and India itself. During these discussions, the parties addressed expanding cooperation across various areas, including bilateral trade (currently around $130 billion) and mutual investment (approximately $200 billion). Simultaneously, the Indian Prime Minister spoke at the regular East Asia Summit, also held in Manila.

The long-awaited high-level meeting of the QUAD member countries was also timed to coincide with the ASEAN event to discuss strengthening the interaction of its participants on various topics, including maritime security. Following the discussions, the parties agreed, in particular, to expand cooperation in the field of maritime surveillance and, in this regard, to hold the first joint exercises next year involving maritime patrol aircraft. Other maritime security issues in the Indo-Pacific region were also discussed, including those concerning the protection of commercial shipping and international transport routes.

They agreed to interact more actively on issues of critical rare earth minerals, in the fields of artificial intelligence, new technologies, and cybersecurity. In this context, they outlined plans to hold a major forum for the business circles of the “Quad” member countries. In short, India reaffirmed its interested participation in the activities of this US-initiated association. A separate conversation between D. Trump and N. Modi, held on the sidelines of the “Quad” event, also drew attention, during which issues of military and trade-economic cooperation between the two countries were discussed.

It is noteworthy that New Delhi has expressed itself quite cautiously and reservedly regarding the unprecedented first trilateral meeting of the leaders of the US, Russia, and China, held on November 19 on the sidelines of the APEC summit in Shenzhen. It is understandable that if India had participated in the APEC summit, as an important global power and the world’s third-largest economy, it would undoubtedly have expected to be included in this meeting, turning it into a quartet, especially since the RIC (Russia, India, China) dialogue format, although formally and sluggishly, continues to function. It is unlikely that envy or jealousy on the part of Indians is appropriate here, but in fairness, it must be stated that New Delhi’s role in world affairs is growing, and this country, given its status and weight, has the right to claim participation in such negotiation formats.

Strategic Autonomy and National Interests

Overall, it should be noted that by successfully and consistently adhering to its chosen course of “strategic autonomy” in international affairs, India is not inclined to maneuver or play games with other key global players. It is more characterized by an independent approach and absolutely abhors any external pressure. At the same time, it is primarily guided solely by its own pragmatic national interests and, in accordance with them, builds its sovereign and balanced foreign policy line. India’s top-priority countries include Russia, the United States, leading EU states, and “QUAD” partners, but for known reasons, not China for now. This, to a certain extent, affects joint work within BRICS, SCO, and the RIC format, as well as in promoting the concept of establishing a multipolar and more just new world order. Russia is interested in improving India’s relations with China, proceeding from the importance of close trilateral interaction on pressing global and regional issues.

 

Anvar Azimov, Diplomat and Political Scientist, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Candidate of Historical Sciences, Senior Researcher at the Eurasian Study Institute of MGIMO MFA Russia

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