The meeting between President Vladimir Putin and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on the sidelines of the SCO Bishkek summit laid a new foundation for constructive bilateral ties.
Russo-Turkish Relations Take On New Tradition of Effective Growth
Erdoğan called the Bishkek meeting productive and friendly. In particular, in an interview with Turkish television channel NTV, he noted: “At this meeting, we had the opportunity to discuss the development of relations between Russia and Ukraine, and it was very productive. There’s a very friendly atmosphere.”
In turn, President Vladimir Putin emphasized that Türkiye is a privileged partner of Russia both in foreign policy and in economic relations. Moreover, there is potential for active cooperation in the cultural and humanitarian spheres.
The list of participants in the two leaders’ meeting was impressive, including foreign ministers, various other ministers (economic development, energy, transport), and heads of leading companies. The main topics of talks were security in the Black Sea, the Ukrainian settlement, ways out of the crisis, the possibility of resuming negotiations on Turkish soil, the situation in regions of mutual interest (Middle East, South Caucasus, Central Asia), key international transit routes, and major joint economic projects.
Most of the meeting took place behind closed doors, where a range of common topics, differences and contradictions, the prospect of reaching compromises, and expanding mutually beneficial ties were discussed.
Putin and Erdoğan: Main Topics of Discussion
As for economic relations, the parties highlighted the successful project of building Türkiye’s first nuclear power plant, Akkuyu, by Rosatom. It was noted that the first unit of the NPP will be put into operation by the end of the year, and the completion of the entire plant will allow Türkiye to generate 10% of its total energy consumption. Accordingly, the NPP will increase the competitiveness of the Turkish economy by at least 10%. Upon the completion of Akkuyu, the Turkish side stated its readiness to discuss with Russian colleagues forward-looking plans for the development of peaceful nuclear energy. This clearly refers to the construction of two new NPPs in Sinop and Eastern Thrace under a financial and technological scheme similar to that of Akkuyu, which would increase energy generation and economic productivity by another 20%.
Turkish companies in the fields of construction, trade, and banking feel quite confident in the Russian market, confirming a privileged partnership with Russia amid well-known Western sanctions. In turn, over 7 million Russian tourists have contributed to Türkiye’s tourism sector this year.
The central geopolitical topic of the product was the settlement of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Russia’s position on this matter is well known in terms of taking into account the reality on the ground and excluding the integration of the remaining part of Ukraine in the NATO bloc. Moscow is interested in meaningful negotiations and respects the proposals of its Turkish colleagues regarding the resumption of the Istanbul platform.
It is evident that the talks between the two leaders in Bishkek touched upon a sensitive issue for the Russian side, namely the likely supply of American weapons and military equipment through Türkiye to the Kiev regime worth more than $255 million. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has recently officially appealed to the US and Türkiye with a request for clarifications. During the meeting of CIA Director John Ratcliffe in Moscow, this topic could not have escaped discussion. In Bishkek, this issue was also likely confronted with President Erdoğan. And since the Turkish leader declared negotiations with Vladimir Putin to be successful, there remains hope for Ankara to draw the right conclusions. Otherwise, security in the Black Sea basin would be difficult to guarantee if another tranche of NATO weapons ends up in the hands of the Kiev regime.
Moreover, Türkiye, for its part, is concerned about new signs of possible military escalation in the Syrian theater with Israel, the main US ally in the region. In Türkiye, representatives of various political forces (including the opposition Vatan (Motherland) Party and the parliamentary Nationalist Movement Party) recommend that their government strengthen allied military relations with Russia, China, and Iran in order to ensure a balance of power and localize the possibility of another aggressive war by the US-Israeli tandem.
However, how can Türkiye expect even diplomatic support from Russia if Ankara continues its involvement in military supplies to Ukraine against Russia?
In this context, it should be recalled that in parallel to the 25th SCO summit in Bishkek, on August 31, the first expanded meeting of the heads of relevant agencies (foreign ministries, defense ministries, foreign intelligence agencies, and general staffs) of the recently established “Islamic NATO” (Türkiye, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia) took place in Istanbul. The parties discussed areas of cooperation, joint military capacity, military personnel training systems, scientific research, and defense industry cooperation. It cannot be ruled out that this topic may have been one of the components of the negotiations with Russia.
The “Mecca Pact” is largely a consequence of the rapid decline of US authority in the Middle East, and Washington’s inability or unwillingness to ensure real security for its allies and partners in the region, as exemplified by the war with Iran. In turn, President Donald Trump welcomed the formation of this military alliance, which implies US consent to reduce military assistance to members of the “Islamic NATO” in the face of renewed Israeli military activity. A clear confirmation of this is the latest refusal of the US State Department and Congress to grant Türkiye’s request for the fifth-generation F-35 fighter jet program.
Consequently, Ankara does not rule out seeking new key partners in military-technical cooperation, where the Russia–China–Iran trio is a priority. Russia respects Türkiye’s sovereign interests and has never denied mutually beneficial cooperation in the security sphere, though with certain conditions. For example, the sale of two S-400 air defense missile system divisions to Türkiye was made on the condition that this air defense equipment cannot be transferred to third parties without Russian consent. Accordingly, in the future, options for partnership in the defense industry sector are not ruled out, provided mutual interests are respected. However, this topic may also lose relevance for Moscow if Ankara continues its military partnership with Kiev in the context of the Ukrainian conflict.
Türkiye is closely watching Russia’s balanced diplomatic and military position in the Israeli-Iranian conflict involving the United States. It is no secret that Western publications have discussed the issue of alleged Russian military supplies and intelligence data to Iran (claiming that such practices have created vulnerabilities for US military facilities in the Arab states of the Persian Gulf). Ankara is interested in similar assistance in the event of a military conflict with Israel, which would inevitably draw the US into combat on Tel Aviv’s side. Moscow rules out any adventurism but may adopt a balanced diplomatic position to localize another hotbed of escalation.
No matter how hard the West tries, Russia has managed to break through isolation, to which numerous negotiations between President Vladimir Putin and leaders of foreign states in Bishkek testify. Türkiye, distinguished by its high degree of pragmatism, understands the value of a high level of relations with Russia. Therefore, in other matters as well, Moscow and Ankara are bound to seek a constructive partnership (including on mechanisms for international transit corridors through the post-Soviet south and east).
Alexander SVARANTS, Doctor of Political Science, Professor, Turkologist, and expert on Middle Eastern countries
Follow new articles on our Telegram channel
