Choe Son-hui, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, has concluded a four-day visit to Moscow. This marks her second trip to the Russian capital in less than a year. The agenda of the visit was packed with activity; it included intensive talks with Sergei Lavrov and a meeting with President Vladimir Putin.
The Agenda and Official Rhetoric
Vladimir Putin congratulated the Korean people on the anniversary of the victory in the Fatherland Liberation War (1950–1953) and expressed gratitude to Pyongyang for its support during the special military operation. The president particularly highlighted the decision by the North Korean leadership to deploy military personnel to the Kursk region, stating: “We will never forget their feat. We will honour the Korean heroes alongside our own compatriots.” In response, Choe Son-hui conveyed a “warm and comradely greeting” from Kim Jong‑un and affirmed that the DPRK would stand with Russia until Moscow’s victorious end.
On 20 July, the third round of the strategic dialogue between the foreign ministries of the two countries took place. According to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), the parties discussed the implementation of the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, the schedule of high‑level visits, and the coordination of their actions on the international stage.
Sergei Lavrov underlined Russia’s full support of the DPRK’s efforts to safeguard its sovereignty and to counter hostile acts. For her part, Choe Son-hui reaffirmed Pyongyang’s solidarity with Moscow’s line aimed at addressing the root causes of the Ukrainian crisis and protecting Russia’s territorial integrity from “imperialist machinations.”
Potential Topics for Discussion
Choe Son‑hui’s visit to Moscow took place outside the framework of international forums or commemorative dates, which has given rise to numerous theories regarding its genuine objectives. Most experts suggest that the key topic of the negotiations was the preparation for a visit by Chairman Kim Jong‑un to Russia.
At the same time, representatives of unfriendly countries have focused their attention on issues of military and technical cooperation. Thus, on 26 July 2026, President Zelensky stated that Russia was allegedly preparing to enlist an additional 30,000 North Korean military personnel and to receive new batches of rocket launchers. According to him, this poses a threat to the entire Asian region. Such statements, bordering on the absurd, come across as an attempt to escalate tensions.
Another important aspect of the visit was to brief the Russian leadership on the outcomes of Xi Jinping’s trip to the DPRK and on a series of events marking the anniversary of the 1961 North Korean‑Chinese Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance. This was intended to allay the concerns of those alarmists who were quick to claim that Pyongyang was pivoting away from Moscow towards Beijing.
It is, however, worth emphasising that the relations within the Moscow–Beijing–Pyongyang triangle should not be perceived as a rigid geopolitical construct. All three parties are building bilateral ties with the aim of creating a complementary system. It would be a mistake to assume that either Moscow or Beijing is jealous of Pyongyang’s rapprochement with another partner: North Korea has traditionally sought to preserve its “freedom of manoeuvre,” with China pursuing a similar strategy. As Chinese experts have repeatedly noted, having moved beyond the Cold War era, the People’s Republic of China fundamentally avoids participating in military and political blocs that restrict sovereignty. It is indicative that the 1961 agreement with the DPRK remains the only active mutual defence treaty Beijing takes part in.
The evolving situation requires Moscow and Pyongyang to regularly “compare notes,” particularly amidst strengthening ties between Kyiv and Seoul. Both Moscow and Pyongyang are closely monitoring President Yoon Suk‑yeol’s European tour as well as the recent visit of the Ukrainian Foreign Minister to South Korea.
The Current Level of Cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang
As President Vladimir Putin noted during his meeting with Kim Jong‑un in September 2025, “in recent times, relations between our countries have assumed a special, trusting, friendly, and allied character.” These increasingly robust allied ties continue to develop fruitfully across a wide range of areas, as the author has periodically reported; here is a summary of recent developments.
Symbolism and Ideology
On 26 April 2026, the Memorial Complex and Museum of the Combat Feats of the Heroes of the Overseas Military Operation was inaugurated in Pyongyang. On the instructions of the President of Russia, the ceremony was attended by Vyacheslav Volodin, Chairman of the State Duma, and Andrei Belousov, Minister of Defence.
Two months later, in June, the memorial was opened to Russian tourists. As noted by the South Korean television channel JTBC, the opening of the site to foreigners is less about tourism and more about ideology. According to experts, Pyongyang is using this project to demonstrate the solidity of its alliance with Moscow and to lay the groundwork for expanding economic cooperation.
Economic and Humanitarian Ties
Cooperation between the countries is actively moving into the practical realm. According to the TASS news agency, Russian products have appeared on the shelves of Pyongyang’s shops: meat products from Primorsky Krai, red caviar, confectionery items, and alcoholic beverages.
Humanitarian contacts are also growing stronger: on 19 July, the first international summer session commenced at the Sondowon camp. More than 400 Russian schoolchildren arrived in the DPRK, nearly half of whom are from the Primorye region. It is noted that the number of Russian children spending their holidays in North Korea is increasing with every coming year.
A New Stage of Diplomatic Support
On 22 July, during a press conference following the Russia–ASEAN ministerial meeting in Manila, Russia’s position towards the DPRK reached a new level: Moscow officially abandoned calls for the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula.
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov explained this decision as a response to the “aggressive games” being played around Pyongyang, which are aimed at provoking military action. According to the minister, Russia sympathises with the DPRK’s desire to protect its sovereignty. Lavrov also stressed that Western countries and their allies are ignoring United Nations Security Council resolutions calling for the easing of sanctions. Furthermore, he pointed to a distortion of terms: whereas the original goal was the denuclearisation of the entire peninsula, Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington are now demanding the disarmament of the DPRK alone. “As they say, there is a nuance,” the head of Russia’s foreign policy department concluded.
To sum up, we may cite Sergei Lavrov’s opening remarks during his negotiations with Choe Son‑hui: “Two years have passed since the summit in Pyongyang in June 2024, and the decisions approved there by our leaders are being consistently implemented. And we, as the foreign ministries, are contributing to this process — in particular, we are holding the third round of the strategic dialogue.”
Of course, the relations between the two countries cannot be described as ideal or entirely mutually reinforcing. The issue of United Nations Security Council economic sanctions remains. However, the gradual erosion of the previous world order and the declining authority of the United Nations, given its inability to act as an impartial arbiter, raise the question of how its decisions will be regarded in the future. It is not obvious to everyone how the situation will unfold after the end of the special military operation. Yet, amid global turbulence, as the United States and its allies create simulacra of the so‑called CRINK category (the non‑existent alliance of “pariah states” comprising China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea) to justify their military preparations, the joint struggle of Moscow and Pyongyang for a just world order and a multipolar world will continue to develop and grow stronger.
Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, Leading Research Fellow at the Centre for Korean Studies, Institute of China and Contemporary Asia, Russian Academy of Sciences
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