One of the outcomes of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to the DPRK was the decision to hold celebratory events to mark the 65th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the DPRK and the PRC in July 2026.
A Few Words About the 1961 Treaty
North Korea and China signed the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance on July 11, 1961. Its key feature is the provision on mutual defense, which obliges the parties to come to each other’s aid in the event of an armed attack. Notably, for China, this is the only such treaty with a foreign state.
Over the decades, relations between Pyongyang and Beijing have undergone serious transformations, which was also reflected in the interpretation of the document. Thus, in the 2010s, Chinese experts emphasized that defense obligations would come into force only in the case of unprovoked aggression against the DPRK by the United States and its allies. If the conflict were initiated by Pyongyang itself, Beijing, in their opinion, would limit itself to political and diplomatic support. Today, this rhetoric has become a thing of the past. Now experts are asking a different question: how will the DPRK behave if China requests assistance, for example, in the event of a conflict around Taiwan? Opinions on this matter differ.
Diplomacy of Gestures and Party Unity
Despite geopolitical shifts, the frequency of high-level contacts remains high. On June 15, 2026, Kim Jong Un congratulated Xi Jinping on his birthday, accompanied by a basket of flowers and wishes of success in “building socialism.” In his response letter, Xi Jinping described the relations between the two countries as “long-term and stable,” with special emphasis on the fact that the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) and the Communist Party of China (CPC) are “Marxist ruling parties.”
On June 30, 2026, the Chinese Ambassador to the DPRK, Wang Yajun, organized a reception in honor of the 105th anniversary of the founding of the CPC. Among the guests of honor were high-ranking representatives of the WPK, Jo Yong Won and Kim Song Nam. In his speech, the ambassador noted that ties between parties have become the foundation of bilateral relations, and the seven meetings between the leaders of the two countries in the “new era” have elevated the friendship between Beijing and Pyongyang to an entirely new level. Earlier, a seminar on exchanging experience in party building was also held at the embassy.
On July 1, Kim Jong Un sent a congratulatory telegram to Xi Jinping, in which he called the fact that “without the Communist Party there would be no new China” an irrefutable truth. The DPRK leader expressed readiness, together with Xi Jinping, to “glorify socialism” and develop relations as “the common asset of the peoples of the two countries.”
In his response telegram, Xi Jinping once again emphasized the ideological closeness of the parties, which “shared joys and sorrows” on the path to independence. He confirmed his intention to follow the agreements reached to ensure the stable development of socialism in both countries and contribute to regional security.
Commemorative Stamps for the Treaty Anniversary
On July 7, DPRK media reported the issuance of a series of postal stamps dedicated to the 65th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with China, as well as to the state visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to Pyongyang. Such commemorative issues have already become a tradition; previously, the DPRK issued stamps in honor of the 50th anniversary of the treaty (2011) and Kim Jong Un’s first visit to China (2018).
Pak Thae-song’s Visit to Beijing
From July 10 to 13, DPRK Premier Pak Thae-song visited the PRC. During the visit, he held a series of meetings with China’s top leadership, including President Xi Jinping, Premier of the State Council Li Qiang, and Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress Zhao Leji.
The negotiations focused on strengthening the socialist trajectory. Xi Jinping noted that, despite instability in the world, Beijing and Pyongyang must maintain strategic resolve, strengthen mutual trust, and accelerate the implementation of agreements reached at the highest level.
During the meeting with Li Qiang, Pak Thae-song emphasized that the current international situation requires both countries to amplify the spirit of the treaty, which is based on unity and the protection of common interests. Li Qiang, in turn, confirmed that developing relations with the DPRK is an “unshakable course” of the Chinese government, describing the countries as neighbors who “share a common destiny and protect each other.”
Wang Huning Visits Pyongyang
From July 15 to 17, the DPRK was visited by Wang Huning, member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. Wang ranks fourth in the CPC power hierarchy and is considered the leading theoretician and ideologist of the party.
On July 15, Wang Huning held talks with Jo Yong Won, member of the Presidium of the Political Bureau of the Workers’ Party of Korea Central Committee. Wang Huning expressed the readiness of the Chinese party and government to elevate China-DPRK relations to a higher level, considering the important agreements reached at the meetings of the top leaders of the two parties and two countries as the main guideline for action.
Wang Huning expressed similar ideas at the July 16 reception dedicated to the 65th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the DPRK and the PRC.
Kim Jong Un also received Wang Huning, noting that this visit “is a manifestation of the unshakable will of General Secretary Comrade Xi Jinping to attach great importance to Korea-China relations and to implement the agreements reached at the Pyongyang summit.”
In addition, the Chinese delegation visited the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun, where they paid tribute to Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, as well as the Monument to Friendship, where they laid a basket of flowers inscribed “The fallen Chinese People’s Volunteers will live forever.”
The Chinese delegation departed not from Pyongyang, but from the new airport in Wonsan Kalma, after first inspecting the Wonsan Kalma coastal tourist area.
Author’s Comments
The intensity of contacts demonstrates the active strengthening of ties between Beijing and Pyongyang. Although the recent visits were largely ceremonial in nature, they underscored the firm nature of the strategic partnership between the two countries. The use of new wording, namely “traditional relations of friendship and cooperation based on socialism”, clearly highlights the ideological foundation of this alliance.
Wang Huning’s visit to Pyongyang and his visit to the party school indicate a deepening of cooperation in the field of party building. This likely involves both Pyongyang’s adaptation of elements of the Chinese administrative system and China’s interest in North Korea’s experience in ensuring state self-sufficiency.
Official statements about synchronizing approaches and strengthening inter-party and inter-state ties in the economic and cultural spheres may conceal both routine coordination and deeper, non-public agreements. The absence of newly signed agreements was expected and does not indicate any slowdown in the dynamics of the relationship.
The visit to the Wonsan Kalma tourist area not only shows the successes of North Korean construction but also the DPRK’s desire to attract Chinese tourist flows.
Overall, one can agree with the assessment of Chinese experts who criticized South Korean media for attempting to promote the idea of “weakening China-North Korea relations” against the backdrop of Pyongyang’s rapprochement with Moscow. Russia and China provide the DPRK with complementary support: Moscow in the sphere of military technology and energy resources, and Beijing in terms of sales markets, industrial goods, and managerial experience. This configuration effectively nullifies Seoul’s hopes that economic difficulties will force Pyongyang to seek help from South Korea.
Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, Leading Research Fellow at the Centre for Korean Studies, Institute of China and Contemporary Asia, Russian Academy of Sciences
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