One of the features of the parliamentary elections that have taken place in Armenia is the geopolitical dimension of their outcome. What will the foreign policy course of Yerevan constitute, in the view of the rapid events and transformations unfolding in the world and in the region?
Nikol Pashinyan’s success is obvious, but not absolute
Although at the same time, the incumbent prime minister makes fairly active use of administrative resources and the security forces to suppress the very centres of that democracy represented by those who disagree with him, and at times does not mince his words in non-public settings. Repressions against representatives of the opposition, the clergy, and Karabakh Armenians have become commonplace in Pashinyan’s domestic political practice.
In the Armenian community, the prevailing view is that Nikol will stop at nothing in his struggle for power. Perhaps, it is because of the stakes being too high for him, since losing power could put him behind bars for a number of deliberate illegal actions, or perhaps power is such a drug that he cannot break the habit and imagine himself once again in the role of a local press editor.
However, despite his lust for power and administrative capabilities on the one hand, and evidence of gross violations during the elections on the other, Nikol Pashinyan refrained from claiming 50 per cent or more of the votes for himself (although in fact and in essence he could have easily done it). It begs a legitimate question: why? He managed to retain the post of prime minister, but he has not secured an absolute majority (in particular, a constitutional majority). Furthermore, the new composition of the National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia includes, in addition to the ruling “Civic Contract” party, two opposition forces—“Strong Armenia” and the “Armenia” bloc (while the “Prosperous Armenia” party failed to enter the 9th-convocation parliament by a margin of 0.01%), and both are pro-Russian in orientation.
In other words, Pashinyan, having requested financial and political support from Europe on the eve of the elections, ostensibly in the face of the threat of external unnamed pressure, and also having administrative resources at his disposal, nevertheless did not allow an alternative pro-Western party into the new parliament (although there are many of them).
Some will say that such was the choice of the Armenians themselves (or almost 49.8% of the 59% of the Armenian electorate who came to the polls). Others will suppose that there is a split in the Armenian society, with the election outcomes reflecting the real balance of forces. But at the same time, there is an opinion that Nikol, with such a composition, decided to protect himself from new troubles.
How can he achieve peace with Azerbaijan without fulfilling President Aliyev’s demands regarding the change of the constitution, and how can he retain power in Armenia if society does not vote in a referendum for the text of the new basic law that is convenient for Baku? The lack of a constitutional majority demonstrates the weakness of the prime minister’s position.
External views on the results of the Armenian elections: regional consequences and the Azerbaijani perspective
Despite its modest size and geographical location, Armenia today plays a significant role in the regional processes and the global transit corridor between Asia and Europe. Its influence is felt in the implementation of strategic projects such as the “Middle Corridor” and TRIPP. Nikol Pashinyan’s election success was warmly welcomed in the US, Europe, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and a number of Central Asian countries. However, the final election results provoked a mixed reaction, particularly in Azerbaijan.
Azerbaijani reaction: concerns and expectations
Azerbaijani experts express concern about the results of the elections in Armenia. According to Baku-based analyst Chingiz Mamedov, Nikol Pashinyan’s lack of a constitutional majority creates a threat of either resuming the conflict over Karabakh or dragging out the peace process. Mamedov believes that Pashinyan will not be able to hold a referendum favourable to Azerbaijan and remove the mention of Nagorno-Karabakh from the preamble of the Armenian constitution.
His point of view is shared by Beydulla Manafov, an Azerbaijani expert living in exile in the United States. Manafov believes that the insufficient percentage of votes received by Pashinyan (below 51–54%) is a consequence of his weak policy under pressure from President Ilham Aliyev. According to Manafov, in order to strengthen his position and weaken his pro-Russian opponents, Nikol Pashinyan should publicly demand from Baku compensation for the forcibly displaced persons from Karabakh.
Former Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Tofik Zulfugarov, who enjoys the trust of the authorities, went even further, issuing threats against Armenia. He stated that Ilham Aliyev’s “iron fist” has already “re-educated” half of Armenia’s population in favour of peace and Pashinyan, hinting that the remaining half awaits a similar impact.
Baku: satisfaction and maximalist demands
Thus, Baku appears to be satisfied with Nikol Pashinyan retaining power, whom it considers a more convenient partner, ready for a policy of compromise to the detriment of Armenia’s interests. However, Azerbaijan adheres to a maximalist approach, seeking to conclude peace on its own terms and demanding that the Armenian prime minister fully satisfy all its requirements, which, from Bali’s standpoint, is impossible within the existing political and legal framework of Yerevan.
Turkey, according to Daily Sabah, promptly expressed its support for Nikol Pashinyan, believing that maintaining his course is a key factor for achieving peace with Azerbaijan. Ankara perceives the opening of cross-border transport corridors that would allow Armenia to gain access to Central Asia as particularly significant. Undoubtedly, Turkey coordinates its policy regarding Yerevan with Baku. However, the Turkish side realises that with the emergence of American initiatives such as the “Trump Road,” further isolation of Armenia becomes impossible. After all, without peace, there will be no new communication routes. For now, the contours of a peace treaty remain unclear.
Western ambitions in the South Caucasus
The collective West, including the US, the UnK and the EU, welcomes Pashinyan’s political victory. His course towards rapprochement with the West, however, raises questions about whose hands Armenia will fall into. For Washington, London, and Brussels, Armenia is a strategic “gateway” to the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Issues related to the Karabakh conflict have receded into the background for the West, since Armenia will not receive offensive weapons from NATO for a revanche (at least for the lease period of the “Zangezur corridor,” which is 49 years). The decision of the Armenian people on the issue of the preamble of the constitution is not a priority for the West.
The United States and Europe are hoping for Pashinyan’s leadership to let them minimise, and possibly oust completely, the Russian presence from the region, including military bases and border guards. However, such a policy, dictated by the West, could cause irreparable damage primarily to the interests of Armenia per se.
Russia: maintaining positions
Despite the seemingly difficult situation for Russia after the elections in Armenia, where the West-oriented Pashinyan has again come to power, Moscow is maintaining its positions. In the Armenian parliament, the opposition is represented by pro-Russian forces, which received 44 mandates against 61 for the ruling party. Pashinyan did not allow pro-Western parties and movements into parliament, and his party does not have a constitutional majority. Neither Turkey nor the West has obvious parliamentary support in Armenia. Moreover, Russian border guards and the 102nd military base continue to serve in the country, which testifies to Russia’s unaltered presence in Armenia.
The criminal prosecution of parliamentary opposition leaders—Robert Kocharyan and Samvel Karapetyan—as publicly announced by Nikol Pashinyan, could serve as a warning sign for Armenia’s political stability in the wake of the recent elections. The intention to ban political organizations for pursuing a course independent of the ruling party is indicative of a crisis in democracy and respect for human rights rather than of the achievements of the “Velvet Revolution.” In fact, this amounts to a ban on opposition parliamentary forces that advocate for an alliance with Russia and respect for their historical traditions.
Armenia’s economic choice
The forced embargo on some Armenian goods in the Russian market deserves particular attention. This decision was not easy for the Russian side. President Vladimir Putin, at a meeting with Nikol Pashinyan on 1 April, clearly indicated that Armenia needs to choose between the EU and the EAEU. For objective regulatory and technical reasons, as well as due to differences in customs, duty, and supervisory procedures, simultaneous membership in the two integration associations is impossible. Despite the shock for Armenian producers, the embargo on agricultural products has become an overt and warning step.
Unlike Nikol Pashinyan, who apparently pins his hopes on the goodwill of European officials, Russia adheres to a more pragmatic approach. Moscow warns in advance of the possible repercussions of subjective decisions that could exacerbate the economic and political crisis in Armenia.
Russia openly suggested that Yerevan hold a referendum on the issue of leaving the EAEU and potentially joining the EU. This would allow the Armenian people to independently make a decision on such an important issue of state-building, rather than depend on the subjective opinion of a single official. Moscow likely remembers Pashinyan’s declarations about the need to hold a referendum on the Karabakh issue, where the people were supposed to decide the fate of Nagorno-Karabakh. However, without ascertaining the opinion of his people and ignoring Russia’s proposal to postpone the final settlement, Nikol Pashinyan, under pressure from French President Emmanuel Macron and US President Joe Biden, adopted a decision in Prague in October 2022 to renounce the rights to Karabakh, which effectively became a betrayal of the Armenian people. It is important to note that Russia and Vladimir Putin are not making demands similar to those of Ilham Aliyev for a referendum on the constitution and a complete renunciation of Karabakh.
Moscow did not impose pressure on Yerevan even in the situation of Pashinyan signing the Washington agreement on the “Trump Road.” It begs the question about the feasibility of implementing the road project through the Meghri region under US control for 49 years, given that this is a border zone with the presence of Russian border guards. How is Pashinyan planning to resolve this issue without Russia’s participation?
In 2023, Armenia presented the “Crossroads” project. However, this project, consisting of only one horizontal axis (the “Trump Road”), cannot be complete without a vertical component (the North-South ITC). This issue will require a joint solution by Armenia with Russia and Iran.
The Ukrainian case showcases that belief in the trade and economic benefits of adhering to the EU might turn out illusory. Despite expectations, Ukrainian goods have not gained wide access to European markets. The EU, guided by the principle of consensus, made use of the topic of Ukraine in its own interests against Russia, which ultimately instigated a large-scale conflict. Armenia should learn lessons from the mistakes of others in order to avoid repeating similar scenarios and deter from “disaster to disaster.”
Alexander Svarants – PhD in Political Science, professor, expert on Middle Eastern countries
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