The Democratic landslide in the US midterms is more than just a rejection of Donald Trump’s domestic agenda. It’s a stark demonstration of the limits of personalist power and a significant weakening of the international network of leaders who have been in the MAGA camp.
Donald Trump has had a very bad political result. On 3 November voters handed the Democrats a very significant defeat in the midterms, taking control of both houses of Congress and effectively ending Republican dominance in a number of key conservative states. Texas and Kansas were particularly significant states in this. It was also a very significant election for minority representation with a number of Black, Indigenous and Latino candidates achieving historic wins.
This wasn’t just a Democratic win. It was a rejection of a political model in which personal loyalty was prized above institutions, confrontation above compromise and ideological mobilisation above the day-to-day concerns of citizens. The message of the electorate was very clear: democracy, civil rights, public education, social protection and economic security cannot be permanently sacrificed to political show.
The domestic cost of Trump’s foreign policy
The reasons for the defeat are inextricably linked to the contradictions of the Trump presidency. He promised prosperity for the American people, lower prices and an end to foreign wars. What the American people got was continued pressure on affordability, rising energy prices and the economic fallout from a large-scale war with Iran. His tariffs were a complete failure in terms of protecting the American consumer. His hardline stance on immigration and his attacks on the institutional checks and balances of government alienated a whole part of the electorate outside of the traditional Democratic base.
Vice President JD Vance’s subsequent explanation of the GOP’s defeat as being due to the Iran war highlights a serious fissure within the administration. The war has undermined the political standing of a movement which has been all about opposition to foreign intervention. The issue is no longer just whether Trump can win the next political battle, it’s whether MAGA can survive the inherent contradiction between its nationalist rhetoric and the international commitments it has made in the name of that movement.
A weakened president, but not yet a powerless one
Trump is entering his final two years with considerably reduced domestic legitimacy and a Congress that is quite prepared to look into his administration, challenge its budgetary-war agenda and question its decisions. He is by no means an internationally powerless lame duck. The President still has the power to deploy the military, make diplomatic approaches, impose sanctions and shape foreign policy.
The danger is that electoral weakness could, in fact, lead to more rather than less unilateral action. Iran is the immediate test. The administration has to choose between a negotiated settlement and a military escalation in order to regain some political initiative. Netanyahu’s government may well continue to push Washington towards confrontation, but the US electorate has shown that an open-ended war is very costly at home. A re-evaluation of the US-Israeli relationship is increasingly likely, though a fundamental rupture is not.
Brazil and Latin America: the return of strategic autonomy
For Brazil, the timing is absolutely key. Lula’s re-election on the 25th of October, followed immediately by Trump’s defeat, is a complete knockout for the regional far right. It really does undermine the argument that going down the path of alignment with the Washington conservative establishment is a viable route to both domestic legitimacy and international standing.
People like Javier Milei in Argentina and others who are part of Trump’s Latin America approach are going to have to rethink their game. Their relationship with Washington can’t be based solely on how close they are to the White House. There will be stricter U.S. congressional oversight, there’s the restriction of foreign aid and there’s the very real prospect of investigations into arrangements which are clearly politically motivated. Marco Rubio should be out of Trump’s government, and this is good news for those who seek strategic autonomy in Latin America.
Lula, on the other hand, has a real opportunity to reassert Brazil’s regional leadership through multilateralism, Mercosur, BRICS, trade diversification and renewed engagement with the region. Brazil is a major international player; it does not want to be an arm of American domestic politics in the region.
First, far-right Bolsonaro’s defeat in Brazil, who was supported by Trump, and then Trump’s resounding defeat will probably lead to favourable trade negotiations with Brazil. US tariffs are still a very potent instrument of presidential policy, and there’s a very real chance that congressional opposition will actually lead to greater scrutiny and a desire to revise the current approach. Brazil should therefore be in a position of strength when it comes to negotiating, and should be advocating for reciprocal trade, investment, critical minerals and industrial cooperation rather than simply going along with the US on a political basis.
The Bolsonaro issue will also be more sensitive. The fact that members of the Bolsonaro family and of members of the failed coup attempt are in the US escaping from Brazilian judicial proceedings is creating a very delicate diplomatic situation. Congressional inquiries could look at the Trump administration’s role in their escape and the political use of US protection. The key point is that political protection will be harder to maintain. Deportation can become a reality for these Brazilians in the U.S.
Europe, China and the changing international balance
Europe should welcome the electoral defeat of Trump’s allies, but should by no means mistake that for strategic emancipation. Europe has learned the lesson that American commitments can be totally different from one administration to the next. The new Democratic Congress may well be a more receptive partner on Ukraine, NATO and the whole business of democratic governance, but it is by no means going to be the one that will make the US drop its demand that Europe takes on a greater burden for its own defence.
The biggest winner may well be China. Xi Jinping can position Beijing as a far more predictable international partner than the Washington establishment, which is so politically volatile. Of course the US is by no means going to walk away from strategic competition with China. This level of suspicion of Beijing is very much bipartisan. What Trump’s defeat has done is to give China a great deal of diplomatic space, particularly in its dealings with the Global South. With a weaker Trump, Brazil and the other emerging economies can now play that game and diversify their partnerships without having to trade one dependency for another.
Techno-feudalism and the limits of billionaire power
Another big loser is the political alliance between Trump and the Silicon Valley’s titans. Elon Musk and a number of other tech billionaires have put a huge amount of their own money into Republican candidates, and yet that hasn’t stopped the Democrats from having a massive landslide, especially in Musk’s new home, Texas. It’s a clear demonstration that even with the huge amount of private capital, the digital platforms and the algorithmic power that they have, they can’t reliably steer the outcome of an election. Previously, Meta’s algorithms had lost in Brazil too when it was played against them with their own tools.
AIPEC (the Israeli lobby) and Big Tech won’t be leaving their interests or their ability to influence policy behind. They’re more likely to spread out their political relationships, protect their federal contracts and fight against increased regulation. The new congressional balance could, of course, lead to greater scrutiny of AI, data centres, digital monopolies and the concentration of economic power that is jeopardising American democracy.
Ultimately, it’s Saudi Arabia and Pakistan that show why Trump’s loss is significant beyond the Western Hemisphere. Countries used to doing business with Washington on a transactional basis are going to have to ask themselves whether the promises made at the executive level are going to be credible when the balance of power in Congress shifts. The Saudi financial backing of Pakistan (including the refinancing of a $3bn loan) is a case in point. The value of strategic hedging rather than total dependence on one partner is going to become ever more important.
The winners and losers of Trump’s defeat
The immediate losers are Trump, the MAGA international network, his friends in Latin America and the billionaire donors who have poured so much money into the Republican machine to ensure its electoral dominance. The winners are the American democratic institutions, the Democratic opposition, Lula in Brazil and the middle powers who are now in a better position to act. China gets some diplomatic mileage as well, though not in any way a leadership position.
Perhaps the most significant geopolitical outcome is not the erosion of American power per se but the revelation of its limits. Iran may well have played a part in a political regime change in Washington (a foreign war which in effect broke the domestic coalition that had sanctioned it). The real lesson is that military might, economic pressure and the influence of the billionaire class can’t go on indefinitely to offset the erosion of political legitimacy.
For Latin America and Europe, this is an opportunity to stop the far-right winning wave and to reassert diplomatic initiatives on more autonomous terms. Whether or not it becomes a lasting geopolitical shift is going to be less to do with Trump’s defeat and more to do with the ability of the various governments to actually use the greater political space which they now have to generate real cooperation, real development and real strategic autonomy.
In sum, Trump’s loss is more than just a domestic election defeat. It’s a crisis of the political model that has underpinned his international strategy. The geopolitical repercussions are far-reaching, from the nature of US relations with Beijing, Moscow, Riyadh, Tel Aviv, Tehran, and Brussels to his calculations about government change throughout Latin America.
Ricardo Martins – Doctor of Sociology, specialist in European and international politics as well as geopolitics
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