The victory of the “Student List” in the Serbian elections marks the end of the Aleksandar Vučić era; however, the country’s new foreign policy agenda—which maintains military neutrality and ongoing relations with Russia—creates tension with the EU and presents the new government with the complex challenge of balancing various geopolitical and economic interests.
By October 29, preliminary results from 8,338 of Serbia’s 8,392 polling stations gave the student-backed opposition 53.04% of the vote, against 38.97% for Vučić’s coalition. The remaining voting could slightly alter the final figures and allocation of parliamentary seats, but not reverse the Student List’s victory. A new government has yet to be formed.
The result ends a political era. Vučić, who resigned the presidency in September to contest the parliamentary election as a prospective prime minister, has conceded defeat. Yet the foreign-policy programme of his victorious opponents contains a surprise for anyone expecting Serbia to abandon its traditional balancing act.
The Student List promises to preserve military neutrality, reject sanctions against Russia, maintain strategic cooperation with China and refuse recognition of Kosovo’s independence. Its candidates want cleaner institutions and closer economic cooperation with Europe, but their electoral victory does not amount to a mandate for joining a geopolitical bloc.
Serbia’s leadership is changing. Its geography, historical relationships and economic dependencies remain.
The Foreign Policy That Survived Vučić
The Student List’s foreign-policy programme retains military neutrality, a policy proclaimed in 2007, years before Vučić’s party came to power. It rejects NATO membership and maintains that Kosovo remains part of Serbia under the country’s constitution and UN Security Council Resolution 1244.
That position leaves Moscow with considerable diplomatic importance. Russia’s role in the Security Council remains useful to Belgrade in defending its position on Kosovo, and the programme explicitly commits Serbia to preserving traditional cooperation with the Russian Federation.
On September 30, the student movement declared that Serbia would not impose sanctions on Russia, invoking the suffering experienced under international sanctions during the 1990s. It simultaneously recognised Ukraine’s territorial integrity and advocated a negotiated settlement.
These positions suggest continuity rather than an exclusive alliance with Moscow. The movement also intends to strengthen relations with Washington, expand cooperation with EU member states and revive diplomatic connections with countries in Africa, Latin America and India.
Its appeal to the Yugoslav Non-Aligned Movement is particularly revealing. Serbia’s tradition of navigating between rival centres of power predates Vučić by decades. Under Josip Broz Tito, Yugoslavia developed relations across ideological divisions, seeking diplomatic freedom without becoming subordinate to either superpower.
The Student List is not proposing to recreate Tito’s Yugoslavia. It is drawing on a political inheritance in which maintaining several international partnerships is an instrument of sovereignty.
The programme is not necessarily the final word. On October 27, the movement’s lead candidate, Ilija Srdanović, confirmed his commitment to European integration and left open the possibility of reconsidering relations with Moscow through public debate. He insisted that foreign policy should reflect citizens’ preferences rather than decisions made by one individual.
That introduces uncertainty into the apparent continuity. The movement brought together people divided over Europe and national identity. Their common objective was removing Vučić’s political system. Governing will require converting those differences into decisions about sanctions, investment and international commitments.
Brussels Meets a Different Serbia
The European Union has welcomed Serbia’s political transition, but the first disagreement is already apparent.
On October 28, enlargement commissioner Marta Kos welcomed the Student List’s victory while warningthat significant progress towards EU membership would be difficult without closer alignment with European foreign and security policy, particularly regarding Russia.
The Student List has promised precisely what Brussels continues to oppose: maintaining relations with Moscow without adopting EU sanctions.
Belgrade’s economic relationship with the Union gives the Commission substantial influence. European markets are essential for Serbian exporters, while European financing supports infrastructure and development. The Student List wants to expand these relationships and strengthen cooperation with European financial institutions.
But commercial interdependence and political alignment are different matters. Serbia can seek better access to European markets without automatically accepting every collective foreign-policy decision adopted in Brussels.
Kosovo makes the dilemma even more difficult. The movement intends to examine earlier agreements negotiated with Pristina and preserve Serbian institutions and communities in the disputed territory. Its programme treats constitutional limits as binding on any future settlement.
Some individual candidates have taken particularly firm positions. Professor Radomir Saičić argued that Russia had done more to defend Serbia’s territorial position over Kosovo than Vučić’s administration, accusing the former leadership of making excessive concessions.
The new government may adopt a less confrontational diplomatic style while retaining positions that Brussels considers obstacles to integration.
The same tension extends to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Student List proposes defending the established constitutional powers of Republika Srpska, the Serb-majority entity within Bosnia, including its participation and veto rights in common institutions under the Dayton settlement.
It also questions the expansive use of authority by Bosnia’s international High Representative and insists on the importance of legitimate international appointment procedures.
A change in Belgrade therefore offers no guarantee that Serbia will retreat from supporting the political autonomy of Serbs elsewhere in the Balkans. Regional relationships reflect enduring national concerns, not merely the preferences of one president.
The Balkan Balance After the Political Earthquake
China presents a different test of the new leadership’s intentions.
The Novi Sad tragedy arose from a railway-modernisation programme involving Chinese contractors and agreements concluded under the previous government. The disaster raised serious questions about procurement transparency and construction supervision. Responsibility for the collapse remains a matter for judicial proceedings, and the involvement of Chinese firms does not itself establish their culpability.
Yet the movement born from those protests now promises to maintain Serbia’s comprehensive strategic partnership with Beijing.
That apparent contradiction becomes easier to understand when the distinction between investment and governance is considered. The Student List wants Chinese projects to comply with Serbian environmental regulations, labour protections and procurement standards. It does not propose rejecting Chinese capital or abandoning infrastructure cooperation.
China accounted for approximately 32% of Serbia’s foreign direct investment inflows in 2024. Its share fell sharply during 2025, while European investment became more dominant. The figures reveal both the scale of China’s recent economic involvement and the changing balance of external financing.
A new government may therefore seek more transparent agreements without sacrificing existing industrial relationships. Whether it can achieve that without discouraging future investment will be an early test of its governing capacity.
Hungary adds another complication. The close personal partnership between Vučić and Viktor Orbán has ended following political changes in both countries. After Péter Magyar’s April election victory, Budapest and Belgrade will have to reconstruct their relationship without the two leaders who previously dominated it.
Their economic interests, however, remain deeply connected.
Serbia’s oil company NIS illustrates the problem. Russian shareholders retain majority control, while Hungary’s MOL has negotiated a possible acquisition under pressure from American sanctions. The company operates the Pančevo refinery, a critical part of Serbia’s domestic fuel supply.
On October 30, Washington extended NIS’s operating licence until December 11, allowing refining, crude imports and other essential operations to continue. The ownership question remains unresolved.
Whoever forms Serbia’s next government will inherit a situation in which Russian assets, Hungarian commercial ambitions and American sanctions intersect. Reliable fuel supplies cannot be secured merely by announcing a new political orientation.
These constraints expose the practical difficulty of maintaining several strategic partnerships. Belgrade needs European markets, investment from China, workable relations with Russia and access to international finance. Its regional relationships also depend on questions of identity and territorial sovereignty that no election can simply erase.
Vučić managed much of that balance through personal diplomacy and concentrated political authority. The Student List promises a different method, involving institutional accountability, transparent contracts and a foreign policy less dependent on one individual.
Its challenge will be to preserve Serbia’s freedom of action while changing the way that freedom is exercised.
The election has removed the political leadership associated with Serbia’s recent balancing strategy. It has not removed the interests that made such a strategy attractive.
A genuinely different Serbia may emerge from the student movement’s victory. Whether that difference strengthens the country’s independence or gradually narrows its room for manoeuvre will depend on decisions still to be made in Belgrade, not on expectations formed in Brussels, Moscow or Washington.
Adrian Korczyński, Independent Analyst & Observer on Central Europe and global policy research
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