At the end of this May, APEC and Quad ministerial meetings were held. The content and outcomes of both of these events reflected current political problems and trends in the Indo-Pacific region.

Political Issues at the APEC forum
The APEC forum was established at the end of the Cold War, when political problems dividing countries seemed to fade into the background due to the “end of history.” It was assumed that humanity would then focus entirely on trade and economic issues, which would be resolved in accordance with the provisions of the Washington Consensus formulated at that time.
However, already in the 2000s, the latter proved to be completely counterproductive, mainly due to the “resumption of history.” This was because both the emergence of a new global power (China) and the prospect of the so-called Thucydides Trap (about which so much has been said recently) materializing, became apparent. The resumption of the historical process and new global political challenges appearing had a negative impact on the trade and economic sphere of interstate relations.
Rising political tensions in the relations between the two main APEC participants, the United States and China, did not spare this seemingly purely economic platform either. For example, on the eve of last year’s APEC Summit in Gyeongju, South Korea, the issue of naming the Taiwanese delegation caused a serious scandal. The island’s correct designation was a precondition from China. Commentary on this event draws attention to the implicit presence of the Taiwan issue among topics discussed.
Moreover, almost the entire agenda of the forum was determined by the tense political situation in the Indo-Pacific region as a whole. This primarily concerns the so-called supply chain problem. Until recently, this was mainly related to access to rare earth metals, which are critically important in modern technologies. However, in connection with the US-Israeli aggression against Iran, the issue of a sudden shortage of oil and gas energy resources on world markets is becoming particularly acute. Political aspects are also present in other problems discussed in Suzhou, for example, the trade imbalance between the US and China.
Quad Ministers Meet in New Delhi
Growing political turbulence in the Indo-Pacific region, resulting in a heightened level of uncertainty in assessing the region’s development, has had a very direct impact on the Quad configuration (consisting of the United States, India, Japan, and Australia). It would seem that nothing should threaten its smooth functioning. However, the current US leadership’s clumsy international maneuvering, significantly provoked by this uncertainty, as well as inappropriate verbal outbursts by Trump and some of his ministers directed at India, have strained Washington’s relations with New Delhi. This is despite the fact that the main goal of creating this configuration was to draw India into it.
After the last Quad Summit held in September 2024 in Wilmington, Delaware, Quad was limited to expert groups. As for the current meeting of the foreign ministers, it became possible following Washington correcting certain mistakes made in US-Indian relations. Nevertheless, it is too early to speak of a full-scale restoration of Quad’s work, since the question of holding the next summit remains unclear. The answer to this question will be determined by the further development of US-Indian relations.
The final document adopted by the Quad foreign ministers is permeated by the main motivation for creating this configuration, i.e. China’s emergence as one of the main players in the Indo-Pacific region. In this regard, the meeting in New Delhi focused on issues of controlling the situation in the waters of the Indian and Pacific Oceans. In particular, individual island states and the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), over which key regional players are increasingly fighting for influence, were mentioned.
Meetings On the Sidelines
Both of the events discussed served as an occasion for informal bilateral meetings among participants, which is common practice for all international platforms. Moreover, such meetings often have even greater significance than the mere fact of the scheduled sessions of these forums.
For example, the main objective of Rubio’s trip to India was, by all accounts, to heal the wounds in US-Indian relations inflicted by Donald Trump. The New York Times (which is, incidentally, unfriendly to Trump) is probably not mistaken in its skeptical assessment of the effectiveness of Rubio’s attempts to solve this problem, citing expert opinion about the lack of consistency in the current US foreign policy.
Also in New Delhi, a meeting took place between Rubio and his Japanese counterpart, Tomishitsu Motegi. The Japanese Foreign Ministry is currently the main and, in fact, almost the only American ally. During this meeting, the two sides aligned their positions on many regional issues.
One of the most prominent parts of the APEC ministerial meeting in Suzhou was the very appearance of Japanese Minister of Economy, Trade, and Industry Ryosei Akazawa in China, as well as his negotiations there with his Chinese counterpart Wang Wentao. Commentators particularly emphasized that this was the first ministerial contact since the sharp deterioration in bilateral relations last November due to Prime Minister Takaichi’s gaffe on the Taiwan issue. Quite predictably, this triggered a negative reaction in China, where they recalled the tragic history of Japanese-Chinese relations.
Let us also note the mutual day-to-day antipathy, which is more or less constant in both countries. However, individual excesses related to this factor, both in Japan and in China, invariably occur during periods of complication in bilateral relations.
Nevertheless, the Japanese minister’s aforementioned visit to Beijing and planned similar events are a reason for modest optimism for Japanese-Chinese relations, which are gradually moving to the center of the emerging political tensions in the Indo-Pacific region.
In this regard, Russia could play a positive role if the declarations about a pivot to the East in its foreign policy, with the establishment of constructive relations with all countries of the region, are realized. This, however, is knowingly impossible if certain preconditions of a “historical” nature are set.
Vladimir Terekhov, expert on Asia-Pacific issues
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