Despite turbulent processes in international relations, a complex history of interactions, and the existence of difficult issues in the current dynamic, Russia and Turkey have maintained partnership and mutual understanding over the past quarter-century.
Putin and Erdoğan’s Negotiations in Ashgabat
The intensity of Putin and Erdoğan’s negotiations is quite high, encompassing various formats—from personal meetings to phone conversations. Given the importance of our countries’ roles, such contacts between heads of state not only confirm the high level of relations but also solidify their positions on current issues of the global and regional agenda.
This time as well, the sides discussed a very broad range of topics: bilateral trade and economic ties, implementation of major energy projects (particularly, completion of the Akkuyu NPP construction), settlement of the conflict in Ukraine, development of the peace process in the South Caucasus, the EU’s destructive policy regarding frozen Russian assets, overcoming the financial-economic “pressure from third countries,” etc. The discussed agenda proved so extensive and lengthy that Pakistani Prime Minister Sh. Shahbaz had to wait for his scheduled audience and join the Putin-Erdogan dialogue.
Recep Erdoğan positively assessed the negotiations with Vladimir Putin in Ashgabat. In particular, he noted: “We had a very productive, comprehensive, and deep meeting with Mr. Putin. During the meeting, I especially emphasized that I await him at any time.»
Turkey is satisfied with the dynamics of trade and economic relations (especially in the energy sector, where a 14% increase in Russian gas supplies over 10 months of 2025 is noted, and there is high potential for cooperation). December in Turkish-Russian relations was also notable because, on the eve of the Ashgabat meeting and considering the expiration of long-term gas contracts, the leading Turkish state energy corporation Botaş extended two contracts with Gazprom for a volume of 22 billion cubic meters of gas and a term of two years (until 2028).
In other words, despite external Western pressure, gas cooperation between Turkey and Russia continues with some changes. Possibly, Turkey is trying to buy time, wait for the stabilization of the external situation around Russia, and in two years return to longer-term gas supply agreements. We should not rule out the Turkish side’s interest in Western investments, which forces Ankara to adopt a more flexible position in relations between the US and Russia. However, in all cases, Turkey will not, to the detriment of its own interests, refuse Russian gas considering the favorable terms, preferential prices, reliable supplies, and high volumes.
Ankara continues its mediation efforts for a peaceful settlement of the Russian-Ukrainian crisis and persistently proposes maintaining the relevance of the “Istanbul platform” for the negotiation process.
In turn, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, following the leaders’ meeting in Ashgabat, stated support for President Donald Trump’s peace plan and the advisability of Kyiv making painful territorial concessions. In particular, as reported by CNN Türk, the Turkish minister stated: “Europe needs to help Ukraine make a certain difficult choice. To prevent greater losses, that is, for the greater good, it is necessary to prevent a catastrophe here. Therefore, a choice must be made. I know it is difficult for them. Especially the land issue is incredibly difficult.»
Turkey, having experienced the EU’s “double standards” practice regarding Euro-integration, expressed solidarity with Russia on the inadmissibility of confiscating Russian assets for Ukraine’s benefit.
Successes and Difficulties of Turkish Diplomacy on the Russian Track
Perhaps the last 20-25 years have been the most productive period in the centuries-long history of Turkish-Russian relations. First and foremost, positive dynamics have been reflected in trade cooperation, the strengthening of Turkish economic sovereignty, and the implementation of major energy projects.
Russia and Turkey have quite actively developed a partnership regarding regional security (including North Africa, the Middle East, and the South Caucasus). While some contradictions persisted, the sides nevertheless avoided conflicting contradictions and concentrated on issues of mutual interest. In particular, in Libya, Karabakh, and Syria, Moscow and Ankara prevented confrontation, allowing Turkey to elevate its status as a regional power.
Meanwhile, Turkish diplomacy on other tracks has been less successful. Europe, besides promises of EU admission, has not offered Turkey real integration, advantageous investments, or security means. Brussels did not include its military ally Ankara in the SAFE program for supplies of military-purpose products worth $150 billion, although non-NATO members—Ukraine, Japan, and South Korea—became EU partners.
The US excluded Turkey from the F-35 fighter jet production program due to the acquisition of the Russian S-400 air defense system; American LNG supplies are much more expensive than Russian natural gas; and Washington’s patronage of the Kurdish issue still poses a threat to the interests of the territorial integrity of the Turkish state.
In the same Syria, it was not the US but Russia that allowed the Turks to conduct local operations to establish a “security zone” in the northern provinces of the Syrian Arab Republic. Washington continues to speculate on the security issues of its NATO ally regarding the conclusion of a “military deal” on fighter jets and repeatedly reminds Ankara of the Russian air defense system. Thus, recently, US Ambassador to Turkey Tom Barrak, at a press conference in Abu Dhabi, stated that within the next 4–6 months, Turkey will abandon the operation of Russian S-400 “Typhoon” air defense systems and remove issues regarding the F-35.
Ankara has not officially announced such a decision, but information is circulating about its intentions to jointly organize the operation of the S-400 SAM systems with the US. The latter seems unlikely considering preliminary agreements with the Russian side. Otherwise, transferring the Russian air defense system to Americans for technical testing or selling it to Europeans for supplies to Ukraine will have negative consequences for Russian-Turkish relations.
Turkey also has no particular achievements in settling the conflict in the Gaza sector. Its peace plan for Palestine is also far from implementation, and peacekeeping units to ensure security in Gaza have been rejected by Tel Aviv. Accordingly, Turkey’s hopes for rapprochement with the US during President D. Trump’s term did not allow Ankara to become a real participant in the Palestinian-Israeli settlement.
Unfortunately, the criminal policy of the Kyiv regime to disrupt peace initiatives leads to an escalation of military tension in the region. Thus, subversive activities of Ukrainian special services in alliance with European partners against tankers with Russian cargo lead to retaliatory measures by the Russian side, which also negatively affect civilian vessels of third countries (including Turkey). In particular, the accidental explosion of the Turkish vessel Cenk RoRo with power generators from the company “AKSA” in the port of Chornomorsk, Odesa region.
Turkey provides military-technical support to Ukraine and until recently advocated for preserving Ukraine’s 1992 borders. But today, Hakan Fidan is forced to agree with the territorial losses of the Kyiv regime considering the realities on the ground.
Naturally, disagreements, contradictions, and difficulties can persist in relations between countries in all cases (especially between such large states as Russia and Turkey). Nevertheless, Moscow and Ankara in all situations find an opportunity to develop mutually beneficial ties in the spheres of economy and diplomacy. It is no coincidence that the press secretary of the Russian president, D. Peskov, commenting on this leaders’ meeting in Ashgabat, noted that there are “no significant problems” in the relations between the two countries. In other words, problems exist, but at the present period they are not so critical.
Alexander Svaranc, PHD in Political Sciences, Professor, Turcologist, Expert on Middle Eastern Countries.
Follow new articles on our Telegram channel
