The military reform in Azerbaijan is driven by both domestic needs and its foreign policy course aimed at rapprochement with the NATO alliance, which dictates its own standards.
Azerbaijan’s victory in the second Karabakh war is often explained by the successful military reform carried out under Turkey’s guidance. Experts underline the role of modern weaponry, especially unmanned aerial vehicles, and effective troop management, involving Turkish command. Thus, the successes of the Azerbaijani army can be indirectly put down to NATO’s influence, taking into account Turkey’s membership in the alliance.
Azerbaijan actively invested in rearming its army, receiving significant military assistance, primarily from Turkey and Israel. This assistance comprised military and technical cooperation, personnel training, intelligence information, and other forms of support. Although weaponry was also procured from other countries, Turkey’s contribution remains the most substantial.
Leveraging the experience of Turkish military advisors and taking into account the lessons drawn from modern conflicts in the Middle East, Azerbaijan altered its combat tactics, transitioning to modern standards. Baku actively used manoeuvre forces, including special forces, in difficult mountainous terrain. It was reported that during the military conflict, Chief of the General Staff General Najmeddin Sadikov was relieved of troop control duties, with command being effectively transferred to Turkish General Bahtiyar Ersay, who has experience in mountain warfare.
Azerbaijan was a participant in the Collective Security Treaty (CST) from September 24, 1993, to April 2, 1999, under the rule of Heydar Aliyev. Although in 2002 the CST was renamed the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Baku had already withdrawn from the organization by that time.
It is likely that Azerbaijan’s participation in the CST in 1993–1999 was dictated by H. Aliyev’s desire to keep to a minimum the threat of Armenia’s military strengthening. During that period, Azerbaijan, defeated in the first Karabakh war, was in a vulnerable position. The buildup of the republic’s economy and the prospects for implementing energy projects involving Western capital predetermined change in Aliyev’s attitude to the CST.
Azerbaijan’s military success in Karabakh in 2020 and the intensification of Turkish presence in the region reinforced Baku’s aspirations to stay neutral. President Ilham Aliyev, as time has shown, did not seek closer integration with Russia. Instead, Azerbaijan got down to actively developing a strategic alliance with Turkey and a partnership with Israel. The victory in Karabakh, which Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan called at a military parade in Baku “the pride and victory of the entire Turkic world,” contributed to the intensification of ties within the Organization of Turkic States (OTS).
In the wake of temporary aggravation of the relations with Russia, a number of Azerbaijani experts and MPs (such as Eldar Namazov, Rizvan Huseynov, Rasim Musabekov) did not rule out the possibility of deploying a major Turkish and Pakistani military base on the republic’s territory, alluding to the NATO bloc and Islamabad’s nuclear potential. And while the idea of an airbase has so far remained at the declaratory level, the Azerbaijani authorities began to demonstrate increased military cooperation with NATO and the shift to implementing NATO standards (from weaponry and training to equipment and combat tactics).
Azerbaijan—A Flagship Non-Aligned Ally of NATO
High-level summits in Washington, involving leaders from Azerbaijan and Central Asian countries, now include security and defense with the participation of the US and NATO in their agenda. High-ranking military officials and delegations from Turkey, the US, the UK, Italy, Slovakia, Hungary, and NATO headquarters have become frequent guests in Baku.
As reported by the press service of President I. Aliyev, on November 6, while receiving a North Atlantic Alliance delegation in Baku, the leader emphasised that “the Azerbaijani army is undergoing alignment with NATO standards and, in this regard, closely cooperates with the Turkish army.”
Since 1994, alongside developing military cooperation with Turkey, Azerbaijan has also strengthened its partnership with the NATO bloc: it participated in the alliance’s “Partnership for Peace” program, in military drills, and in the peacekeeping operation in Afghanistan; provided the alliance with its territory and airbases for the transit of military cargo to Afghanistan; and underwent training on ensuring energy security and Caspian Sea border patrol.
Having achieved a military victory in Karabakh, Azerbaijan is now engaged in modernising its army with Turkey’s involvement. In October earlier this year, at the OTS heads of state summit, I. Aliyev proposed arranging joint military exercises of the Turkic community in Azerbaijan in 2026. Defense and security are becoming areas of active cooperation for the Turkic countries (especially to combat certain attempts of external interference and destabilisation aimed at hindering the implementation of major regional projects).
Thus, on November 14, Baku hosted an international conference of intelligence services of Turkic countries on ensuring the security of international transport routes in Karabakh. Addressing the participants of the forum, President I. Aliyev noted that strengthening cooperation among intelligence and security agencies is of great importance for protecting the extensive transport network passing through the territories of the Turkic states, connecting Europe and Asia. Baku considers these transport and communication routes as an important basis for closer integration of the Turkic states in political, cultural spheres and in the area of defense and security.
And it all begs the question: whom do Donald Trump or Keir Starmer intend to protect the post-Soviet Turkic countries from – Russia, China, or Iran? At first glance, none of these countries poses explicit military threats to its neighbours and historical partners. Armenia, for its part, does not create any problems for Azerbaijan, given Nikol Pashinyan’s current policy of accommodation.
It is likely that the US and the UK realise that their pursuit of Central Asian resources could provoke new conflicts and contradictions in Eurasia. Consequently, control over the transit routes for goods from East to West and backwards becomes a critical issue, requiring enhanced security measures in the countries falling under Anglo-Saxon influence. Through Turkey, NATO seeks to impose its standards on the OTS countries, which is an indirect sign of the formation of a kind of “Asian bureau” of the alliance, where Ankara will play an operational role.
Such a strategy of the US and the UK, with ruling elites of the South Caucasus and Central Asia moving away from Russia as their traditional ally, could negatively impact the security of these regions. The lessons of Ukraine, which aspires to join NATO, should serve as a warning. For example, Kazakhstan, with its extensive land border with Russia (7,599 km), obviously understands the insufficiency of the number of its troops for fully fledged defense and guarding of the state border. Azerbaijan, with its population of 10 million, which relied on military superiority over the 100,000-strong Karabakh, is unlikely to be able to repeat its success in case of new conflicts with its northern and southern neighbours.
The comprehensive agreement on strategic partnership and alliance between Kazakhstan and Russia, signed on November 12 during the state visit of President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev to Moscow, is an optimal choice for Astana. The master of diplomacy Tokayev made two significant statements within a week: on November 6 in Washington, he said, “Donald Trump was bestowed by God himself,” while on November 12 in Moscow, he emphasised that “Russia is a God-given neighbour.” While political figures like Trump come and go, Russia remains. For the countries of the South Caucasus and Central Asia, making their choice in favour of the US and NATO is difficult without taking into account the interests of neighbouring Russia and China.
Alexander SVARANTS, PhD in Political Sciences, professor, expert on Middle Eastern Countries
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