Since the M23 group gained control over the North and South Kivu provinces, the situation in the country as a whole, and in the region in particular, has remained complex.
This has contributed to an increasing number of rumours of a potential coup d’état circulating in the capital. For instance, on February 18th, the Reuters agency reported that in the wake of the fall of Bukavu, in Kinshasa they “overtly talked about the possibility of a coup” against Tshisekedi, even within his inner circle, where “a mood of panic prevails.”
The South African publication Independent Online, which specializes in covering regional issues, when assessing the evolving situation in the DRC, comes to the conclusion that the widespread growth of discontent (not only among the traditional opposition, but within his inner circle, the ruling “Sacred Union” collation, which has lost its trust in the president) over the current authorities’ inabilities in Kinshasa, which have brought the country to the brink of collapse, is paving the way for a coup d’état.
Moreover, the events of May 19th, 2024, related to an attempted coup d’état, are still fresh in the memory within the ruling circles. Then, the leader of the United Congolese Party (UCP), Christian Malanga, and a group of his supporters orchestrated an attack on the presidential palace, repelled by security forces, with the leader of the putsch being killed.
According the experts from the American newspaper Foreign Affairs, the humiliating defeat suffered by the Congolese armed forces as a result of the M23’s rapid offensive in the eastern parts of the country at the beginning of the year is reminiscent of the events surrounding the collapse of Mobutu Sese Seko’s regime in 1996. Just as back in Mobutu’s times, thousands of demoralised soldiers from the current Congolese army have now taken off their uniforms and joined the M23 rebels.
Activation of Opposition Forces in the Country
Amidst growing concerns over the recent defeats of the Congolese army, the country has seen a general increase in the activities of the forces opposing Tshisekedi’s regime.
The Robert Lansing Institute points out that who is particularly active in this regard is Thomas Lubanga, the former leader of the Union of Congolese Patriots, convicted in 2012 by the International Criminal Court for recruiting underage soldiers into his organisation. Having now bounced back as a political figure, he has created a new group, the “Convention for a People’s Revolution,” formed mainly from members of the Hema tribe in Ituri province.
This organisation positions itself as a political and military movement advocating for “people’s liberation and protection of the Congolese people,” as well as for the “restoration of Congo’s sovereignty,” specifically in the eastern regions of the country where there is a permanent build-up in the influence of foreign states, particularly Rwanda and Uganda.
The “Congo River Alliance” is also bolstering its ranks. The former governor of Sankuru province, Joseph Mukumadi, officially announced on April 3rd that he had joined this organisation and called on Congolese to follow in his footsteps to “put an end to the dictatorship of the regime in Kinshasa.” A few days earlier, former presidential candidate from the December 2023 elections, Rex Kazadi, had also defected to the said grouping.
But most notably, there has been the revitalisation of activities by former President Joseph Kabila, who, residing until recently in the South Africa, has stepped out of the political “shadows.” According to Africa Confidential, after the meetings with other prominent opposition figures, Moïse Katumbi, the former governor of Katanga province, the centre of the mining industry, and Claudel Lubaya, a member of the National Assembly, he blamed Tshisekedi’s government for the failures of the Congolese army in the east of the country.
Furthermore, on February 23rd, in the South African newspaper Sunday Times, he sharply condemned Félix Tshisekedi’s plans to seek a third term in violation of the constitution, which could push the country to the brink of a civil war and subsequent fragmentation.
Evaluating the current situation, the US-based Africa Center for Strategic Studies concludes that should the conflicting parties and the countries backing them not find a diplomatic solution to the problem, they may resort to military scenarios for resolving the conflict, similar to the events of the Second Congo War of 1998-2003, which pitted the DRC and its allies in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) on one side against Rwanda and Uganda on the other.
In this regard, the American publication Responsible Statecraft notes that the intentions of the M23 to advance further south towards Katanga province must also be taken into account. There, the local elite is becoming dissatisfied with the ruling establishment even more distinctly, which is of particular significance due to the local authorities having traditionally played one of the leading roles in the country’s political life under its former governor Moïse Katumbi but now finding itself marginalised in the political process.
Despite ongoing negotiations to resolve the crisis, according to the publication Agenzia Fides, the M23 has not abandoned its plans to establish control over the richest copper and cobalt deposits in Katanga province.
In this situation, the main goal of Tshisekedi, as noted by the British Africa Confidential, is to maintain his grip on power until the end of his second term, providing opportunities for his family members and inner circle to enrich themselves to the maximum.
Simultaneously, he is taking measures to intensify the crackdown on the opposition. On April 19th, the authorities of the DRC suspended the activities of the People’s Party for Reconstruction and Democracy, accusing it of aiding and abetting the M23 group, and its leader, former President Joseph Kabila, of high treason. Kabila had arrived in the rebel-controlled city of Goma by plane the day before. According to many local and foreign experts, his return could further exacerbate the already extremely tense domestic political situation.
Even prior to his return to the country, the former president voiced his intentions to take measures to put paid to the further advance of the M23, supported by Rwanda. To this end, according to the American publication GZERO Media, amid growing public discontent with Tshisekedi’s policies, he is negotiating with opposition leaders and representatives of civil society in order to consolidate them for a subsequent resolution of the issue of the country’s political future.
In response, on September 30th, Joseph Kabila was sentenced in absentia to death by a military court for high treason, specifically for collaborating with Rwanda and the M23, which captured key cities in eastern Congo in January. This move by the authorities, having provoked a negative reaction in the country’s public circles, including within the Congolese episcopate, could, in the view of analysts, only further complicate the resolution of the Congolese crisis.
In this particular situation, President Félix Tshisekedi has scaled back his schedule of trips abroad and within the country, having also engaged a private Israeli firm to ensure his personal security, in addition to Congolese security structures. It is also noteworthy that the embassies of the United States and a number of Western countries, as well as UN organisations, have preemptively evacuated part of their staff based on security considerations.
Viktor Goncharov, Africa Expert, PhD in Economics
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