The confrontation between Ethiopia and Eritrea is gaining momentum as support for alternative centers of power in Tigray and is escalating into a public spat over territorial issues.
Legitimizing the upcoming war?
Although in the spring of 2025 Ethiopia verbally ruled out the possibility of an armed conflict with Eritrea over the Red Sea coast, in September Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed said that the loss of the port of Assab in the 1990s as a result of Eritrea’s separation was a historical mistake that needed to be “corrected.”
In fact, these words alone can be considered an overt territorial claim against Eritrea. In the same days, Ethiopian Major General Teshome Gemechu, speaking about the need for access to the sea, named four justifications for such a demand, including 1) Ethiopia’s historical rights to Assab, 2) international recognition of the right of land powers to access the sea, 3) existential need, and 4) growing security concearns.
In general, this is not the first time Ethiopia has recalled its historical rights to Assab. Control over this port city would provide the shortest route from Addis Ababa to the Red Sea coast. At the same time, appealing to historical ties does not resolve the main problem – Ethiopia recognized the independence of Eritrea in 1993 and any claims to Assab in this sense cannot be taken seriously in terms of international law. However, since the world order is changing, the role of international law and “international decency” has noticeably diminished, as evidenced by numerous clashes and conflicts in various parts of the world map, which means that such restrictions are unlikely to become a deterrent in the Horn of Africa.
Factors contributing to escalation
In summary, the hardening rhetoric, including the justification for possible expansion, is a consequence of a number of factors pushing the Abiy Ahmed government to further polarize its positions in relations with Asmara.
Firstly, Ethiopia really needs access to the sea. This need can be attributed to the genuine national interests of a land power, both from an economic and strategic point of view.
Secondly, Eritrea, obsessed with fears about the strengthening of its neighbor and providing support for anti-Ethiopian forces, in itself – at least in the person of its current leadership – poses a threat to political stability in northern Ethiopia.
Thirdly, Eritrea is one of the most isolated states in the world, and a conflict with it is unlikely to lead to widespread condemnation and opposition from the most influential world actors.
Fourthly, Eritrea’s geography makes it extremely vulnerable, creating the preconditions for a successful “blitzkrieg”.
Fifthly, numerous internal problems and the inability of the federal center to destroy rebel groups or to improve the quality of life determine the interest of the Abiy Ahmed government in shifting the focus from internal to external. Military success in this sense could significantly strengthen the position of the leaders of the Prosperity Party.
Factors restraining escalation
Firstly, although numerous internal conflicts—primarily armed confrontations with the Amhara Fano and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA)—are pushing the federal center to try to strengthen its authority by defeating external antagonists, the presence of internal military threats objectively limits available resources.
Secondly, amid the extremely complicated political situation in Tigray, the Ethiopian government risks being attacked by the Tigray Defense Forces (TDF) in the event of an escalation with Eritrea. At the same time, an important objection should not be overlooked here: the start of an Ethiopian-Eritrean war could lead to a strengthening of the sense of national unity, including in Tigray, making an open alliance with Eritrea politically and image-wise disadvantageous for anti-government groups.
Thirdly, an open conflict with Eritrea will allow Ethiopia’s various opponents, including Egypt, to indirectly influence the balance of power by supporting Asmara and thereby sapping Addis Ababa’s resources through proxy means.
Conclusion
As we can see—and this dynamic can hardly be assessed otherwise—the tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea are far from subsiding. The toughening of rhetoric is not at all formal: we are talking about fundamental statements that shape the pre-conflict reality.
Both sides have reasons to act against the interests of each other, but Ethiopia is more likely to be the first to cross the red line. Given the difficulties that will undoubtedly arise in conducting military operations in the medium and long term, the only “conflict” scenario acceptable to Addis Ababa is a quick success in the event of an open clash, including access to the Red Sea with the accompanying collapse of the Eritrean defense on the plains.
Ivan Kopytsev, political scientist, junior research fellow at the Centre for the Study of North Africa and the Horn of Africa at the Institute of African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences; junior research at the African Programme at the Institute of International Studies of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.
Follow new articles on our Telegram channel
