Three years ago, in late summer 2022, the armed forces of Ethiopia and Eritrea were preparing for the final defeat of the Tigray Defense Forces (TDF), establishing a total blockade of the rebellious Tigray. Today, on the eve of a new war in the region, the balance of power has changed.
Brief background
Thus, Addis Ababa, represented by the government of Abiy Ahmed, dealt a decisive defeat to the most influential political opponent in the domestic political arena of Ethiopia, freeing up resources and, no less importantly, ambitions for pursuing an active foreign policy. The result was a sharp deterioration in relations with neighbors: Ethiopia’s desire to obtain the direct sea access was not appreciated by Eritrea, Djibouti and Somalia, which received immediate support from Egypt. In turn, the TPLF suffered a fiasco in the fight against the political forces that had recently ousted it from the political Olympus of Ethiopia, but retained the “right to life”. At the same time, the formation of the Interim Tigray Administration – a governmental body accountable to Addis Ababa and not controlled by the TPLF – created a direct threat to the Front’s more than thirty-year monopoly influence in Tigray. The subsequent split in the TPLF ranks between the faction of Debretsion Gebremichael (TPLF Chairman) and the more progressive wing of Getachew Reda (Head of the Interim Administration) became an existential threat to the TPLF’s “old guard”, forcing its leaders to use all their influence, including the support of loyal generals from the TDF, to forcibly expel the internal opposition.
Finally, Eritrea, which from the early days of the conflict established control over some northern areas of Tigray – the subject of the 1998-2000 Border War – was not admitted to the peace talks in Pretoria in November 2022 and did not receive any formal territorial concessions. Ethiopia’s subsequent “interest” in the Eritrean port of Assab served as the final break between the former allies: Eritrea apparently began to provide assistance to the Amhara rebels from Fano.
Political split in Tigray and its impact on the balance of power
The need to rethink the place and development paths of Tigray in the political system of Ethiopia, and then the split in the ranks of the TPLF, sharply exacerbated the political debate in Tigray, allowing moderate forces that had long remained in the shadow of the TPLF to raise their heads. Even after the de facto overthrow of the Interim Administration and the restoration of the TPLF control over the northern, central and eastern regions of Tigray, the political opposition in the Tigrayan environment did not disappear, but, on the contrary, began to take more decisive action.
Thus, with the tacit blessing of the federal center, paramilitary units of the Tigray Peace Forces began mobilization in Southern Tigray and in Afar State. In Addis Ababa, the recent Head of the Interim Administration of Tigray, adviser to the Prime Minister on East African affairs, Getachew Reda, headed the new Liberal Democratic Party of Tigray. Finally, in early August 2025, former Ethiopian Chief of General Staff and prominent TDF military leader General Tsadkan Gebretensae announced the formation of an anti-TPLF coalition comprising the Tigrayan parties Arena Tigray, Great Tigray National Congress (Baitona), and Tigrayan Democratic Solidarity Party (Simret).
The emergence of the armed opposition is unprecedented in Tigray in the past few decades, calling into question the legitimacy of the TPLF as the sole representative of Tigrayan interests. In fact, even a partial loss of support in Tigray could be a fatal blow to the TPLF, which has historically relied on the undivided support of ethnic Tigrayans.
New realities require new solutions: in the spring of 2025, after Getachew Reda was removed from office and General Tedesse Worede, commander of the TDF, was appointed Head of the Tigray Interim Administration, there were rumors of contacts between representatives of the TPLF and the Eritrean government of Isaias Afewerki. Until recently, mortal enemies, whose contradictions go back to the events of the 1980s, the Tigrayan and Eritrean leaders realized their interest in each other against the backdrop of the brewing conflict with Addis Ababa.
Ethiopia and Eritrea: the war is coming?
The sharp warming in relations between Addis Ababa and Asmara, which culminated in the alliance of the two recent adversaries during the Tigray war, gave way to growing antipathy in 2022: the common enemy, the TPLF, capitulated and the Ethiopian government no longer needed external support.
As it was mentioned earlier, the Eritrean leadership was disappointed by the complete disregard for its interests during the peace talks in Pretoria in November 2022, including a clear hint at the need to withdraw all armed forces, with the exception of the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF), from Tigray. However, strategic considerations have become an equally significant factor of escalating tensions: the strengthening of Ethiopia, the largest player in the Horn of Africa, is automatically perceived by its neighbors as a threat, which is especially true for Eritrea, which remained one of the Ethiopian provinces until 1993.
Today, we are witnessing a rapid approach to a possible escalation between the two countries: videos and images of heavy equipment of the EPDF heading for the Ethiopian-Eritrean border emerged. Asmara fears an attempt by its neighbor to gain long-awaited access to the sea by directly capturing the Eritrean port of Assab and is intensifying contacts with all forces capable of becoming the “fifth column” inside Ethiopia.
Thus, Tigray is acquiring enormous significance in the Ethiopian-Eritrean confrontation not only as a potential arena of military operations, but also as a place of concentration of significant military contingents (Tigray). Without overdramatizing, it should be understood that in the event of war, the front line will most likely pass through Tigray, reflecting the split between the TPLF and the conditionally democratic opposition.
Ivan Kopytsev, political scientist, junior research fellow at the Centre for the Study of North Africa and the Horn of Africa at the Institute of African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences; junior research at the African Programme at the Institute of International Studies of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation
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