The majority of post-Soviet countries, in the conditions of the ongoing global geopolitical crisis, are still searching for a foreign policy orientation.
Naturally, the collapse of the Soviet Union had a severe impact on the economic well-being of the former union republics, and Uzbekistan was no exception. However, centuries-old integrative ties with Russia objectively created preconditions for stabilizing the socio-economic situation in Uzbekistan (for instance, Uzbek labor migrants send home from Russia around 15 billion US dollars every year).
During the rule of Islam Karimov (1991–2016), Tashkent pursued a firm policy of consolidating its sovereignty and established a rigid authoritarian regime in the republic. In the early stage of the newly independent Central Asian states, border contradictions with neighboring countries persisted (for example, between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan). Uzbekistan supported the idea of maintaining integrative relations among post-Soviet republics and became a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Concerning new integration formats with Russia’s central participation, Uzbekistan often pursued a contradictory course (for example, joining the Collective Security Treaty Organization only to freeze its membership later). From 1999 to 2005, Tashkent was part of the ill-fated pro-Western GUUAM organization. Uzbekistan is a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and the Organization of Turkic States.
In the 2000s, Uzbekistan intensified its partnership with the United States. After September 11, 2001, Uzbekistan became a strategic ally of the United States and agreed to host an American military base in Khanabad for logistical support of the counterterrorism operation in Afghanistan. However, the struggle of the ruling elites against radical opposition Islamist organizations, in particular the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (an organization banned in the Russian Federation), led to contradictions with the American position on democracy and human rights (for instance, the harsh suppression of the May 2005 demonstrations in Andijan). In these conditions, I. Karimov curtailed relations with the United States, prohibited the stationing of American bases in the republic, and signed a strategic partnership agreement with Russia.
It should be noted that Uzbekistan took a more sensitive approach to the issue of sovereignty and remained cautious toward Turkey’s policy of pan-Turkic integration. Initially, after the creation in 2009 of the international association “Turkic Council,” Tashkent refused full membership and opted for observer status. The policy of mass repressions pursued by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan against the Fethullah Gülen–affiliated Islamic movement “Nurcular” (including on the territory of some Turkic states of the CIS) did not find support in Tashkent. Uzbekistan preferred a more bilateral format of dialogue with Turkey (especially in the spheres of culture, education, and economy). At the same time, Karimov was irritated by the fact that certain representatives of the radical opposition from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan* had received asylum in Turkey.
Given the geographic proximity of Central Asia to China, Uzbekistan began actively expanding its trade and economic cooperation with the Middle Kingdom, while also regarding the Chinese mega-project “One Belt, One Road” as an opportunity to develop logistical communications and transit routes.
The new leader of Uzbekistan, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, started pursuing a more pragmatic policy, building balanced relations with major players (Russia, China, Turkey, the European Union, and the United States). Yet, the geopolitical and economic transformations of the 2020s have led Tashkent to adopt new approaches.
The Turkish and Western Vector in Uzbekistan’s Diplomacy
After the military-political success of the Turkish–Azerbaijani tandem in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020 and the transformation of the “Turkic Council” into the international Organization of Turkic States in 2021, Tashkent became a member of this association, and a little later (in May 2025) joined the Shusha Declaration on the strategic alliance of Turkic–Islamic states (Azerbaijan, Turkey, Pakistan), which also envisages a defense alliance.
For Uzbekistan, Turkey and the Organization of Turkic States represent not only a close ethno-cultural bond but also a pragmatic union enabling access to the European market while bypassing Russia, taking into account the anti-Russian sanctions imposed due to the conflict in Ukraine. In the context of the Russian–Ukrainian military-political crisis, the Uzbek authorities chose to keep their distance and search for new foreign partners.
The Turkic states of Central Asia (including Uzbekistan) attach great importance to Azerbaijan’s logistical role in providing access to Turkey and Europe, as well as to the expansion of strategic cooperation with China within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative through Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, and the South Caucasus toward Turkey and the European Union. In this context, Tashkent supports the implementation of the Middle Corridor and the Zangezur Corridor.
The well-known meeting of the leaders of Central Asian states with the European Union in Samarkand in the spring of 2025 demonstrated that Tashkent counts on European financial support for the development of an international transit route from Samarkand to Istanbul and Strasbourg. At the same time, the Turkic countries of Central Asia have been displaying loyalty toward Europe on the Cyprus issue, even at the expense of the interests of “brotherly” Turkey.
Meanwhile, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan are becoming key geo-economic partners for Turkey, China, the European Union, and the United States due to their immense resources. The increasingly frequent summits within the framework of the Organization of Turkic States, and especially the meetings of the leaders of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Turkey on geopolitical matters and the creation of alternative transit routes, reflect a new trend of integration of the Turkic world with Ankara in the lead.
Particularly noteworthy is the intensified cooperation of the leaders of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan with the administration of United States President Donald Trump (especially after the signing on 8 August of this year of the Washington Agreements on the creation of the Zangezur Corridor through Armenia, dubbed “Trump’s Route on the Path to International Peace and Prosperity”). This agreement envisages not only transport connectivity between mainland Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic but also the international transit of goods from Central Asia to Turkey and Europe. The United States’ plans for accelerated penetration into resource-rich Central Asia, where Uzbekistan occupies a significant position, point to new regional challenges and global contradictions.
In the meantime, Russia has replaced its ambassador to Uzbekistan, sending from Ankara to Tashkent the experienced diplomat and Turkologist Andrei Ershov. This personnel policy of Moscow indicates an intention to strengthen its diplomatic corps in the Central Asian states with specialists. Uzbekistan, like other countries of the region, remains closely linked with the Russian economy. Russia continues to be Uzbekistan’s main exporter and importer, the Russian market still absorbs the majority of Uzbek labor migrants, and the Russian army remains the most combat-capable in Eurasia.
The implementation of new transit routes through the South Caucasus to Turkey and Europe bypassing Russia still largely remains on paper, depending heavily on regional stability, the 2018 Caspian Convention, and the reactions of other important players (including Russia and Iran). Attempts to bypass Russia’s interests, as a rule, do not lead to the achievement of the goals set by its opponents.
* banned on the territory of the Russian Federation
Alexander SVARANTS – Doctor of Political Science, Professor, Turkologist, expert on the Middle East
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