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European Union Reevaluates the Rules of the Game. How Will This Affect Relations With Türkiye?

Alexandr Svaranc, November 04, 2026

The European Union, seeking to strengthen its economic and military potential, is actively changing the rules of the economic and political game. These transformations promise to reshape the nature of relations with Türkiye for a long time to come.
The new EU Turkey policy

The Essence of EU Modernization

The union of 27 countries inevitably faces internal and external disagreements. The current European crisis, triggered by the shortsighted anti-Russian policies of key leaders, has exposed the EU’s vulnerabilities in economic stability, defense self-sufficiency, and overcoming contradictions between the national interests of member states.

Under these conditions, EU leadership plans to carry out a comprehensive set of reforms aimed at strengthening the economic and strategic potential. As Turkish expert Zeynep Gurcanli notes, these reforms cover everything from industrial policy to defense, from budgetary priorities to decision-making mechanisms. Particular attention is being paid to modernizing the SAFE defense mechanism and making significant investments in technology. The goal is to boost the EU’s competitiveness and strengthen its security.

The European defense mechanism SAFE, due to the veto of Greece and Cyprus, excludes Türkiye from active military-technical cooperation

The Ukrainian and Middle Eastern crises have revealed deep disagreements within the EU on issues of war and peace, which manifested themselves in the positions of individual countries such as Hungary, Slovakia, and Spain. Seeking to avoid the blocking of strategic decisions, Brussels intends to change the organizational foundation of the Union, moving away from principles that could previously hinder progress.

Key Changes in Decision-Making Mechanisms

The main vector of change in the EU is directed at improving decision-making mechanisms. In the context of the Union’s expansion, plans are being made to abandon the rule of unanimity and consensus in the areas of foreign policy, security, and sanctions. A transition to qualified majority voting in these areas is already under discussion. “Transitional periods” for new members and restrictions on autonomous policy for external partners seeking cooperation with the EU single market are also being considered.

In the field of industrial policy and the export of cutting-edge technologies, the European Commission proposes granting preferences exclusively to European producers, using a system of targeted subsidies and government contracts. This is intended to weaken the competitive positions of external players such as China. However, such protectionist measures may deprive current EU partners that are part of the customs union of their competitive advantages. It remains unclear how, for example, Türkiye will be able to participate in EU public procurement or receive subsidies from Brussels.

Modernization of the customs union will also be aimed at ensuring the compatibility of economic relations with the foreign policy of EU members, including issues of security and sanctions. These reforms are acquiring a pronounced political dimension.

Defense and New Technologies

The redistribution of budgetary funds from agriculture to the defense-industrial complex (DIC) and the modernization of the SAFE defense mechanism will also introduce substantial changes. Countries that do not have corresponding defense partnership agreements with the EU will not be able to participate directly in joint SAFE procurement or gain access to advanced defense technologies, including electronics, software, artificial intelligence, aviation, and modern production capacities.

Such a prospect may have a significant impact not only on the EU’s internal situation but also on relations with its closest partners linked to the Union through the single market and the customs union, particularly with Türkiye.

The New EU Reform: What Challenges Face Türkiye?

Türkiye has been striving for integration with the European Union for more than half a century, consistently modernizing its legislation and production in accordance with European standards. Yet despite these efforts, progress is practically nonexistent. Ankara is aware that “Old Europe,” despite Türkiye’s membership in NATO since 1952, continues to be guided by outdated stereotypes and civilizational differences that prevent its full membership in the EU.

Since 1995, Türkiye has been a member of the customs union and the EU single market. This partnership contributed to significant modernization of Turkish industry, the introduction of modern technologies and equipment, and improvements in the quality of products and services. Türkiye gained limited access to the common defense chain and to the latest technologies in electronics, artificial intelligence, and equipment. Thanks to this dynamic development, Turkish automotive and light industry, the chemical sector, electronics, as well as energy and transport infrastructure achieved some progress.

It is important to note that Türkiye managed to build strong economic relations with the EU while fully retaining autonomy in foreign policy, security, and defense matters. This situation helped strengthen Türkiye’s economic and political sovereignty, allowing it to conduct flexible diplomacy and avoid joining disadvantageous sanctions, such as those against Russia in the context of the Ukrainian conflict.

However, the latest trends coming out of Brussels carry potential risks for Türkiye. The new EU reforms may lead to restrictions causing technological lag or increasing Türkiye’s political dependence on European countries – something that could affect its centuries-old national dignity.

As Turkish analyst Gurcanli rightly notes, changes in the EU system will inevitably reshape the framework of relations with Türkiye as well. In exchange for preserving access to the European single market, Ankara will likely have to pay a high “political price”, i.e. renouncing autonomy in foreign policy, especially on issues of defense, security, and sanctions.

To maintain Türkiye’s integration into European production chains (in sectors such as automotive manufacturing, mechanical engineering, household appliances, construction, metallurgy, and others), modernization of the customs union must provide for Türkiye’s participation in public procurement and strategic sectors. Yet Ankara’s status in Europe’s new industrial policy remains unclear for now.

As is well known, Türkiye has limited participation in the customs union, which primarily covers industrial goods. Agriculture, services, public procurement, digital trade, and investment remain outside the agreement. Without full coverage of these areas, it is impossible to build a comprehensive trade policy. Including Türkiye in European chains in these spheres will require strategic dependence of Ankara on Brussels.

The European defense mechanism SAFE, due to the veto of Greece and Cyprus, excludes Türkiye from active military-technical cooperation. The EU has not concluded a corresponding partnership with Ankara. Since defense investments stimulate the development of advanced technological ecosystems (in electronics, aviation, artificial intelligence, and so on), Türkiye is unlikely to gain access to these cutting-edge systems and the associated funding.

Thus, the new systemic reform of the EU (protectionism in industrial policy, growth of defense potential, technological modernization of production, replacement of the unanimity principle with qualified majority decision-making) presupposes the linking of economic relations with foreign policy, security strategy, and defense. This practice narrows Türkiye’s opportunities to remain an independent state while preserving economic attachment to Europe under conditions of political independence.

The new European model, as Gurcanli notes, “does not close the door to Türkiye completely. However, it fundamentally changes the way that door opens.”

The EU is moving toward a new centralized development model in which the economy will be tied to geopolitics and security. For Türkiye, this signals the end of the era of business and politics being separate. Brussels will demand political and strategic loyalty from Ankara in exchange for access to the European market. Yet by preserving political independence and economic pragmatism, Türkiye will be able to develop relations with other key world centers (for example, China, Russia, and India) and gain competitive advantages over a Europe that remains acutely dependent on Asia for raw materials.

 

Alexander Svarants, Ph.D. in Political Science, professor, Turkologist, and expert on the Middle East

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