At the close of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit held in Tianjin on 31 August–1 September 2025, the shapes of multipolar order were evident.
The SCO: An Expanding Eurasian Bloc
Founded in 2001 as a successor to the Shanghai Five, the SCO has transformed into the world’s largest regional organisation. Its members now include China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, India, Pakistan, Iran (since 2023), and Belarus (since 2024). The organisation spans over three billion people and covers vast energy resources, transport corridors, and some of the world’s most strategic geography.
Originally focused on security cooperation—especially countering terrorism, separatism, and extremism—the SCO has steadily broadened into economic, cultural, and political domains. Its structures include the Secretariat in Beijing and the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) in Tashkent, with initiatives expanding into finance, education, infrastructure, and digital governance.
Xi Jinping’s Vision: A Multipolar, Inclusive Order
At Tianjin, Chinese President Xi Jinping positioned the SCO as a cornerstone of his broader geopolitical strategy. He described the organisation as an “anchor of stability” and a “platform for building an equal and orderly, multipolar world.” The language, strikingly different from the Western lexicon of “rules-based international order” (meaning West own rules but only selectively followed by them), reflects Beijing’s ambition to replace US-centric governance with institutions where China holds greater influence.
Xi urged members to “seek common ground despite differences,” signalling Beijing’s readiness to work with diverse states—from rivals India and Pakistan to sanctioned members such as Russia and Iran. He placed particular emphasis on aligning SCO projects with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), framing both as complementary vehicles for Eurasian integration.
Key thematic priorities included energy security, infrastructure connectivity, green industry, digital economy, science, and artificial intelligence. Notably, Xi’s emphasis on AI reflects Beijing’s determination to lead global technological standards in emerging fields.
Financing the Future: China’s Package of Initiatives
Concrete proposals formed the backbone of China’s summit diplomacy. Beijing pledged to establish an SCO Development Bank “as soon as possible,” an institution that would anchor financing for regional projects while reinforcing China’s centrality.
Backing this institutional step, Xi Jinping made several financial commitments:
- 2 billion yuan in grants for SCO member states this year.
- 10 billion yuan in lending through the SCO Interbank Consortium over the next three years.
- A pledge to deliver 100 small-scale livelihood projects, scholarships, PhD programmes, Luban Workshops (vocational training), and 10,000 training slots across five years.
By denominating aid and loans in renminbi, Beijing advances the gradual de-dollarisation of Eurasian trade and investment. Analysts such as Alexander Gabuev of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center note that the SCO is also becoming a testing ground for what some term the “electro-yuan”: settlements in yuan for green energy projects, particularly across Central Asia.
Key Outcomes of the Tianjin Summit
The summit concluded with the adoption of 24 documents, including the Tianjin Declaration and the SCO Development Strategy to 2035. Together, they provide a long-term roadmap for institutional deepening and project-based cooperation.
I would include some other highlights of the summit:
- Reaffirmation of the SCO as a non-bloc security platform grounded in the UN Charter, opposing “Cold War mentality.”
- Dynamics of trilateral engagement among Xi, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, signalling attempts to manage Sino-Indian rivalry while reinforcing Sino-Russian coordination.
- Thematic statements marking the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II and the UN’s founding, reinforcing the need of global governance reform underpinned by sovereignty and non-interference.
- Consensus on regional de-escalation, including in the Middle East, though the summit avoided binding commitments.
Xi’s Global Governance Initiative
I also considered central in the summit was Xi’s unveiling of the Global Governance Initiative (GGI), presented as China’s “fourth major global initiative,” following those on development, security, and civilisation. The GGI rests on five principles: sovereign equality, international rule of law, “true multilateralism,” people-centred development, and action-oriented governance.
In practice, the GGI aims to legitimise China’s worldview of multipolarity, to institutionalise alternative norms within the SCO, and to expand Beijing’s influence in setting rules for digital economy, infrastructure, and cross-border finance. The SCO, given its geographic scope and diversity, is expected to serve as the pilot stage for these ambitions.
Broader Implications and Discussion Points
Beyond official declarations, several issues caught my attention:
- Institution-Building vs. Symbolism: The planned SCO Development Bank can transform the organisation from a coordination forum into a genuine provider of global public goods. Yet, questions remain open about capitalisation, governance, and India’s willingness to endorse a financial body likely dominated by China.
- Currency Dynamics: The renminbi’s growing role in SCO financing shows Beijing’s ambition to internationalise its currency. If adopted widely for trade and energy deals, this would further erode the dollar’s dominance in Eurasia.
- China–India Relations: Modi’s presence in Tianjin showcased a pragmatic effort to re-engage, though tensions persist. India’s cautious approach to SCO financial initiatives will be a barometer for whether Beijing can truly lead a bloc with such internal rivalries.
- Security Stance: The SCO continues to portray itself as a guardian of stability without forming a military bloc. This rhetoric appeals to members cautious of US alliances but leaves open questions about the SCO’s ability to manage crises, especially in Afghanistan or Central Asia.
- Sino-Russian Partnership: With Moscow leaning to the East, the SCO provides Russia an opportunity to solidify its ties with Central Asia, China and India. However, the economic asymmetry between China and Russia means that Beijing sets much of the agenda.
Conclusion
The 2025 SCO summit challenged Western dominance and showcased Beijing’s determination to consolidate its position as a global leader by pairing ambitious institutional proposals with concrete financial commitments. Xi Jinping’s framing of the SCO as a laboratory for his Global Governance Initiative illustrates China’s intent to move from norm-taker to norm-maker.
The SCO is evolving into a robust organisation capable of delivering on its promises. The ability to reconcile competing national interests is still a work in construction. Yet one conclusion is clear: in Tianjin, China made significant progress in setting itself at the centre of Eurasian and global governance debates, signalling a shift in the world order that will be difficult for the West to ignore.
Ricardo Martins, PhD in Sociology, specializing in International Relations and Geopolitics
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