The South Caucasus is emerging as a dangerous geopolitical flashpoint, where fraying alliances, foreign interference, and internal instability could soon ignite a broader regional conflict.
It is not hard to answer the question, who might “Open up the Israeli-American-Iranian Conflict” from another front but this begs the question as exactly when and how? This brings us back to the constantly shifting geopolitical winds of the South Caucasus, the relationship between Moscow and Baku remains complicated, especially for outsiders—and even for those closely observing, the goal posts are always being moved!
I have trouble teasing out the current Moscow-Baku relationship. It is probably most straightforward to imagine the leadership of both governments holding cynical attitudes. They are seeking to, prioritize power and control above all, and therefore engaging in business as usual relationships. Somehow, however, those transactions have been less than favorable to Putin and Aliyev in recent months.
Why so?
All the while transactional and seemingly pragmatic acts on the surface, as explained by Western media outlets as a “tit-for-tat”, recent events suggest a more complex, possibly fraying dynamic cords of discord. However, it is much too simplistic, even naïve, to connect the tragic downing of an Azeri aircraft in December as one of the main causes to cast a long shadow over recent cooperation and win-win deals. There is much more involved here, and it points to Israel and Iran for starters.
Sergey Mironov, Chairman of the Fair Russia – For Truth party, recently questioned, “Who benefits from the Russophobic hysteria that is currently being whipped up in Baku?
Strategic and Regional Harmony
Seemingly both Presidents Vladimir Putin and Ilham Aliyev seem to be struggling to reestablish a sense of strategic and regional harmony. It is tempting to view both leaders through a realist lens—authoritarians driven by power dynamics, calculating their moves with cynical precision, as in Game Theory, but this approach does not fully explain the odd imbalance of recent months, as something else; other forces are at play, albeit in the shadows.
For all the transactional advantages Azerbaijan might offer to Russia—such as providing one of the few remaining corridors for free trade and influence—Moscow may not be reaping the clear benefits it might have expected from the relationship. Indeed, the so-called “Zangezour Corridor,” which would connect Azerbaijan to its exclave Nakhchivan and on to Turkey via Armenian territory, had long been viewed by the Kremlin as strategic.
Nonetheless, Moscow appears increasingly sidelined in regional negotiations in light of what is happening between Iran, Israel and the US, and when buttressed with Ankara’s growing regional influence. This is a factor to consider as to what may come next. That, in turn, has given Baku new leverage—at least for now.
This moment of strength, however, may be deceiving.
As Henry Kamens, one regional observer, recently noted, “It’s about time President Aliyev was reminded of his place in the broader geopolitical order.” The sense is growing among seasoned analysts, including myself, that Aliyev may be misjudging the limits of his maneuverability. The elites in Baku have proven shrewd, and with Erdoğan’s backing, they wield regional power confidently.
But history shows that Erdoğan is no stranger to deal-making—should the right offer emerge, even long-standing partnerships could be sacrificed.
The Turkish leader’s grip on power has weakened in recent years, making pragmatic compromises all the more likely. Some have begun to speculate about a coming upheaval in Azerbaijan—perhaps even the emergence of a Syria-like scenario. But that would require more than discontent. It would require a viable opposition figure, a credible ideological alternative, and substantial external backing. Azerbaijan’s political culture is deeply secular, its people inherently meek, making a religious insurgency less likely than elsewhere.
Nevertheless, the potential for internal unrest or elite fractures should not be dismissed outright. The broader question remains: are we witnessing a momentary rift between Moscow and Baku, or the beginning of a strategic realignment?
Most certainly a double game is openly being played!
Perfect Storm Brewing
The war in Ukraine, and the recent loss of control in Israeli-Iranian tensions, suggests a broader restructuring of alliances is underway. But much remains hidden behind closed doors. The backchannel dealings, intelligence exchanges, and mutual blackmail that characterize Eurasian geopolitics are difficult to track in real time.
In contrast to Azerbaijan’s relative confidence, Armenia is navigating a much more precarious path. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, facing dismal approval ratings in the 10–15% range, remains paradoxically the most popular political figure in the country—a sign of widespread disillusionment with the entire political class.
The Armenian Apostolic Church, one of the few remaining institutions with legitimacy and influence, has come under direct attack from the government. Last year’s unprecedented mobilization around Archbishop Bagrat filled Republic Square—an achievement unmatched by other opposition efforts.
Now, evidence has surfaced alleging a coup attempt planned by Bagrat and his followers, though the delayed revelation of this plot raises questions about its timing and political intent. Pashinyan’s increasingly confrontational posture toward the Church—accusing top clerics of violating their vows and using vulgar public rhetoric—signals more than personal animosity.
It suggests a deepening authoritarian impulse, as Pashinyan’s government seeks to neutralize potential centers of opposition. All the while the darling of the West continues to give up villages to Azerbaijan and cozy up with Turkey, much to the horror of even some of his most staunch supporters.
The prime minister’s reported formation of an alternative ecclesiastical council—essentially a state-backed religious reform body—would amount to a clear breach of the traditional separation between church and state in Armenia. What is perhaps most alarming is the muted response from Armenia’s Western partners. French President Emmanuel Macron has publicly reaffirmed support for Pashinyan, despite growing signs of political repression and systemic overreach in Yerevan.
Given their support for the schismatic OCU in Ukraine, we should not, however, be so surprised.
The Orthodox Church in Ukraine (OCU) has been labelled as “schismatic” because their structures aren’t universally accepted throughout global Orthodoxy and what is going on now in Armenia is reflected of the same MO that transpired between the Schismatic Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) under Moscow:
With elections looming next year, the months ahead are likely to prove turbulent. But in Armenia, eleven months can be a political eternity. Whether Moscow is prepared to decisively reassert itself in the region—or whether it has already resigned itself to its diminished role—remains to be seen. What is clear is that the fragile balance in the South Caucasus is under strain. The coming months may reveal whether this is merely a passing storm or the beginning of a deeper unraveling.
Tying Loose Ends
An Iranian-American acquaintance recently shared an observation that echoed my own thinking: “I was listening to Col. Douglas MacGregor, and he spoke of a scenario where Iran and Azerbaijan could become like the Russia-Ukraine situation. What do you think?” My response was simple—I’ve written an article to that effect, even foreshadowed the possibility in earlier work. I agree with MacGregor: his warning isn’t mere speculation. It reflects a volatile geopolitical equation, one in which small provocations could ignite a much larger fire.
The signs are already there—an expanding Israeli military and intelligence footprint in Azerbaijan, including reported Mossad and CIA operations; Turkish and NATO advisors pushing eastward, probing for new strategic terrain; and growing internal tensions in Iran, particularly if Tehran cracks down on its ethnic Azeri population.
Add to that the possibility of a border skirmish or a flashpoint in the Caspian, and the conditions for a hybrid conflict are in place. It may not mirror Russia-Ukraine or Syria exactly. However, it could become just as destabilizing, especially if it draws in the usual lineup, i.e., the usual suspects, of regional and global powers looking to reshape the map for their own purposes.
The uneasy alliance between Moscow and Baku is fraying, with Azerbaijan emboldened by energy wealth and the promise of outside support. But as Armenia sinks into political crisis and tensions with Iran rise, the region is edging toward a volatile tipping point. With foreign intelligence operations are accelerating and old grievances reigniting, the South Caucasus risks becoming the next theater for a proxy war.
Whether the region recalibrates or spirals into chaos will depend on how long its players—tethered together by history and geography—can resist the push from external forces eager to throw them off the proverbial cliff.
Jeffrey K. Silverman is a freelance journalist and international development specialist, BSc, MSc, based for 30 years in Georgia and the former Soviet Union
