On April 27 of this year, Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba embarked on a four-day trip to Vietnam and the Philippines — an event of note in the ongoing evolution of the situation in the Southeast Asian subregion.
On the Complexity and Uncertainty in China–Japan Relations
The term “complexity and uncertainty” has been fitting for describing the entirety of postwar China–Japan relations. Recently, however, these qualities have been exacerbated by the change of administration in Washington — which remains Japan’s key ally and, at the same time, China’s primary geopolitical opponent. The sharp increase in uncertainty — not only in trade and economic matters but also in politics — triggered by the “tariff war” initiated by the 47th President of the United States, is pushing all significant players to seek alternative strategies on the global stage.
For both China and Japan, this is taking the form of efforts to reduce tensions in political relations through more frequent bilateral contacts, as well as through the revival of the long-dormant trilateral forum “China–Japan–Republic of Korea.” Among recent notable events, special attention was drawn to the April 23 visit to Beijing by Tetsuo Sato, leader of the Komeito Party, which is in coalition with Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). In addition to meetings with Chinese Communist Party and National People’s Congress leaders, Sato delivered a personal message from Ishiba to President Xi Jinping — the contents of which, however, were not disclosed.
A week later, a delegation of the Japan–China Friendship Association visited China — this time led by LDP Secretary-General Hiroshi Moriyama. Chinese commentators, reflecting on this second visit, emphasized remarks on the “reckless tariff policy of the United States undermining the global economic order,” which in turn is “stimulating increased interaction between China and Japan — two of the world’s largest economies.”
Nevertheless, anti-China elements have not disappeared from Japan’s foreign policy. These manifest both in relatively minor symbolic actions and in rather serious moves. For example, Beijing was forced to respond to what it saw as a symbolic jab — the name of the Taiwanese pavilion at the upcoming World Expo in Osaka. The outwardly neutral abbreviation “Tech World” can, with some imagination, be interpreted as shorthand for “Taiwan.”
A more significant gesture was the visit to Taiwan by Sanae Takaichi — until recently a contender for LDP presidency against Ishiba. Even more provocative was her remark made during that visit: given the unpredictability of Donald Trump’s foreign policy, “democratic nations” such as Taiwan, Japan, Europe, Australia, India, and others should form an autonomous “quasi-security alliance” independent of the U.S.
The overall results of Prime Minister Ishiba’s Southeast Asia visit have also tipped the scales in a direction unfavorable to China–Japan relations.
Ishiba in Vietnam
Immediately upon arriving in Hanoi on April 27, Ishiba was received by General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam, To Lam. The following day, he met sequentially with Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh, President Luong Cuong, and Chairman of the National Assembly Tran Thanh Man. The longest of these meetings was with the prime minister — during which they covered in detail the current state of bilateral relations, later summarized in a joint press release.
This noteworthy document was structured into three substantive sections: “Security,” “Economy,” and “People-to-People Contacts.” The sole item in the Security section announced the creation of a bilateral “2+2” dialogue mechanism — albeit, for now, at the deputy foreign and defense minister level. Still, the existence of such a platform reflects a high level of mutual trust and the comprehensive nature of Japan–Vietnam relations. As a symbol of this trust, the Japanese destroyer Suzunami was present at Da Nang port during Ishiba’s visit — a detail noted in the official communiqué.
The Economy section highlighted several key points. First, both prime ministers affirmed their intent to usher in a “New Era” in bilateral relations — a phrase first used the day before by To Lam. This is despite the fact that current economic ties are already quite robust: in 2023, bilateral trade exceeded $40 billion — which, while six and four times less than Vietnam’s trade volume with China and the U.S. respectively, still reflects Japan’s economic weight. It is also proportional to the smaller GDP of Japan compared to those two global giants.
Second, both sides expressed clear concern over the negative “global economic consequences” of U.S. tariffs and China’s retaliatory measures. A similar sentiment — albeit more reserved — was voiced during Ishiba’s meeting a month earlier with Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.
Lastly, special attention was paid to cooperation in advanced semiconductor manufacturing. Notably, Japan expressed its willingness to train half of the 500 Vietnamese postgraduate students who are being sent abroad to specialize in this vital sector of modern industry.
On the morning of April 29, Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh hosted a farewell breakfast for Ishiba and his wife — after which the Japanese delegation departed for the Philippines.
Visit to the Philippines
Immediately upon arriving, Ishiba held talks with Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. In welcoming the guest, Marcos Jr. described the current state of bilateral relations as a “golden age.”
Particular focus was placed on the broad theme of security — and it was emphasized that both nations “are allies of the United States.” On that note, it is worth mentioning that trilateral summits — in both in-person and online formats — have recently become more frequent. Under the previous U.S. president, the latest of these summits was held on January 13 of this year. Notably, the new U.S. defense secretary’s first overseas trip was to the Philippines and Japan. During Ishiba’s meeting with Marcos Jr., both sides reaffirmed their intent to “strengthen trilateral cooperation to ensure maritime security.”
This line in the joint statement was further expanded in a section on “The Situation in the East and South China Seas.” There, both leaders expressed opposition to any attempts at “forcibly changing the existing status quo.” The intended subject of this criticism was obvious. As a symbol of strengthened Japan–Philippines maritime cooperation, Ishiba also visited a Philippine Coast Guard vessel — one of two ships donated by Japan in 2022.
Still, despite the emphasis on defense and security — especially in the Philippines — analysts from both Japan and China are focusing increasingly on the broader turbulence in the global economy, sparked by the tariff war initiated by the 47th U.S. president. This conflict has affected all major players in the current “Great Global Game,” but has left the less powerful — such as the ten ASEAN nations — in a particularly vulnerable position.
Integrating these Southeast Asian countries into new trade and economic frameworks could become a key element of the regional strategies pursued by both China and Japan. Importantly, such efforts need not necessarily be confrontational toward each other.
Vladimir Terekhov, expert on the issues of the Asia-Pacific region
