Between March 28-30 of this year, the first — an important point to emphasize — foreign trip of the new U.S. Secretary of Defense, Peter Hegseth, took place. Certain aspects of his visits to the Philippines and Japan during this trip deserve attention.
Elbridge Colby as Future Deputy of P. Hegseth
In 2017-2018, during Trump’s first presidency, Elbridge Colby, then not yet forty years old, served as an advisor to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for strategic planning. Today, Trump has nominated him for the position of Deputy Secretary of Defense — presumably because Colby’s ideological views align well with those of Trump himself. Colby appears to be a proponent of the “Offshore Balancing Strategy,” which emerged in the U.S. in the early 2000s and became the target of harsh criticism from Trotskyist neoconservatives in the early 2010s.
The latter seek to use the U.S. government for their own, clearly anti-national, purposes under the guise of slogans about “democracy and human rights.” In reality, their goals include the global spread of the “new normal,” the free circulation of narcotics, “climate change” and the “green economic transition,” the protection of children from their parents, and the erasure of the boundary between humans and animals.
As for “offshore balancing,” this strategy rejects globalist ambitions altogether, narrowing national security concerns to a limited set of the most pressing threats. Colby is credited with introducing two fundamental tenets into the 2018 National Defense Strategy: first, that U.S. national interests should be focused on the Indo-Pacific region, and second, that China should be identified as the primary external threat.
Colby reiterated these points during Senate Armed Services Committee hearings in early March of this year, a necessary step before confirmation to his new role. Notably, he described China as “the largest and most powerful rival in the last 150 years.” It is worth recalling that during this timeframe, the U.S. has faced many challenges, including a four-year war against Japan.
These foundational principles must be kept in mind when considering the region chosen for Hegseth’s first foreign trip — namely, the Indo-Pacific — and his visits to the Philippines and Japan. It is also worth noting that his tour followed a similarly motivated trip by his colleague, Marco Rubio, to Central America, where Panama was the main country visited. This shared motivation should not be overlooked, especially as the “Canada-Greenland” issue gains traction in the media space.
Hegseth in the Philippines and Japan
This same strategic rationale shaped Hegseth’s public rhetoric throughout the trip, with nearly identical statements made in both the Philippines and Japan. He continued to criticize the previous Biden administration, accusing it of nearly sabotaging efforts to strengthen both the U.S. military and relations with key allies in the Indo-Pacific region. Now, as he declared in Manila, the Trump administration will “work with allies to enhance deterrence against threats worldwide, including Chinese aggression in the South China Sea.” However, during his one-day visit to the Philippines, Hegseth refrained — at least publicly — from elaborating on what specific actions this would entail.
Similar statements were made during his subsequent two-day visit to Japan. In meetings between the hosts, Prime Minister Shinji Ishiba and Defense Minister Gen Nakatani, and their guest, Hegseth, both sides emphasized the enduring and fundamental nature of the U.S.-Japan military alliance, which they see as essential for ensuring “freedom, prosperity, security, and peace” in the Indo-Pacific region.
A particularly significant issue — at least for Trump — was raised regarding “balancing commitments” within the alliance, specifically Japan’s need to dramatically increase its military expenditures. This remains a challenging task for Japan.
Hegseth’s trip to Japan began with a visit to Iwato Island — better known as Iwo Jima — located 1,200 km from Tokyo in the Pacific Ocean. Accompanied by Ishiba and Nakatani, he honored the memory of soldiers from both sides who perished there exactly 80 years ago in one of the fiercest battles of the Pacific War. Such joint commemorations, though not always at this high a level, have taken place for years and represent a meaningful gesture of remembrance.
A noteworthy event at the beginning of this tour occurred on March 27 in Subic Bay, the former key U.S. Navy base in the western Pacific. A state-of-the-art Japanese frigate of the Mogami class arrived for a three-day visit while en route home from Australia. Its presence coincided with Japan’s bid in an international tender announced in early 2024 to supply new frigates for the Australian Navy. If successful, Japan could secure an $11 billion deal with Australia.
And why not? After all, why should Japan be any less entitled than the U.S. and the U.K. to profit from Australia, as they are already doing on a much larger scale through the notorious AUKUS agreement? Business based on “blood” — or the fear of its potential shedding — is one of the most lucrative industries, just as with any other form of fearmongering. As the saying goes, “abracadabra, and your gold is gone.”
On the Significance of Various Tools in Global Positioning
In this context, it is relevant to briefly touch on the broader and longstanding issue of the importance of various tools available to a state in positioning itself within the “Great Global Game” and pursuing its own interests. In the current U.S. administration, Hegseth is responsible for the viability of the so-called “power instrument.” This is a curious designation, as sometimes a smile can be just as “powerful” — one that “makes the world a brighter place.” After all, the famous phrase about “a kind word and a gun” (unfortunately fitting for our imperfect world) does not exclude the importance of the first component.
In international politics, “smile-kind word” tactics encompass all measures preceding direct military confrontation. Even aggressive rhetoric, when unleashed in torrents by zealous propagandists or masked as pseudo-intellectual drivel from “highway Marxists,” can serve as a form of posturing. Their proper counterparts might be psychiatrists rather than diplomats.
Still, there remains a distinction between masters of public vitriol and statesmen who decide, “Enough smiles — it’s time to continue politics by other means.” In this regard, the author notes with satisfaction that the core element of today’s “Great Global Game” — the complex relationship between the two leading world powers, the U.S. and China — has not yet reached the point where their “guns” are at each other’s heads.
Nonetheless, during this tour, the U.S. Secretary of Defense was, as part of his duty, assessing the current state of America’s regional “gun.” That said, both Beijing and Washington still appear committed to maintaining a format of competition where military posturing grows more pronounced but does not yet drown out the sounds of diplomacy. This approach aligns with the Chinese concept of win-win — though how relevant that phrase remains will be better judged by the outcome of the upcoming meeting between the leaders of these two global powers.
Vladimir Terekhov, expert on the issues of the Asia-Pacific region
