On March 22–23 of this year, a series of notable events took place in Tokyo, featuring the foreign ministers of China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. Additionally, the China-Japan “Economic Dialogue” was resumed.
The Background of the Trilateral Meetings
All three participants deemed it possible to resume its functioning only at the end of 2023, when negotiations between the foreign ministers of the three countries took place, resulting in a decision to prepare a summit at the highest level. This summit eventually took place in Seoul at the end of May 2024.
Nevertheless, the shadow of persistent and, in some cases, growing (as discussed below) difficulties in Japan-China relations within the “China-Japan-South Korea” triangle continues to loom over all processes within this framework. On the positive side, however, we can note the mere fact of its resumption and the holding of yet another (the 11th in total) meeting of the foreign ministers, which this time was hosted in Tokyo.
Key Outcomes of the Recent Foreign Ministers’ Meeting
Let us briefly examine some points from the statement released by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the most recent trilateral meeting of foreign ministers — Wang Yi, Takeshi Iwaya, and Cho Tae-yul — held in Tokyo on March 22. Notably, this document makes no mention of the primary goal behind the creation of this platform, namely the formation of the trilateral FTZ. This omission is quite in line with the current state of political and strategic uncertainty in Northeast Asia. Under these conditions, the stated intention to “expand mutual understanding” — as found in the “Trilateral Cooperation” section of the statement — can already be considered a positive development. Overall, it appears that each participant primarily addressed their own pressing concerns.
Specifically, as the statement indicates, the Japanese foreign minister expressed concerns about all matters related to North Korea, especially its “developing military cooperation” with Russia. As for the situation in Southeast Asia, where Japan and China are increasingly engaged in a comprehensive competition — including in the military sphere — for influence, the document’s authors cautiously employed the term “cooperation.” The statement also mentioned the conflict in Ukraine, about which the parties “exchanged views.”
Regarding the timing of the next summit, the statement simply notes that it should take place “as soon as possible” but at a “mutually convenient” time for the leaders. The careful wording surrounding this crucial aspect of the “China-Japan-South Korea” triangle’s functioning is likely due to the ongoing political turbulence in one of its three “corners,” whose recent “leader” has ended up behind bars — something that, incidentally, is becoming almost a tradition for this country.
The political situation remains less than ideal not only within each “side” of the triangle but also in the overall configuration. The Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba received his guests and spent only 25 minutes speaking with both of them together. However, it is quite likely that one of Wang Yi’s objectives during his trip to Japan was to bring some clarity regarding a possible visit by the Chinese Premier (there is no discussion of a visit by Chinese President Xi Jinping to Japan at this stage). Such matters can only be discussed in a bilateral format.
Notably, after a prolonged hiatus, high-level China-Japan contacts resumed only in the second half of 2023, and even then, only on neutral ground or during international events. Therefore, if the “China-Japan-South Korea” summit in Tokyo does take place, the participation of the Chinese Premier would signify the first visit in many years by a top Chinese official to Japan.
For now, however, bilateral relations are characterized by cautious “probing” of each other’s positions, which has been a notable feature over the past year. In the current unprecedentedly uncertain phase of the “Great Global Game,” in which both China and Japan are among the key players, nothing else can realistically be expected.
Other Events During Wang Yi’s Visit to Tokyo
This cautious approach was also evident in the resumption of the bilateral “High-Level Economic Dialogue” during Wang Yi’s visit to Japan. Notably, this meeting took place six and a half years after the last session. Xinhua News Agency provided an interesting commentary on the event.
Likewise, the phrase “probing each other’s positions” accurately characterizes Wang Yi’s bilateral meetings in Tokyo with his Japanese and South Korean counterparts. In its commentary on the first of these meetings, Yomiuri Shimbun noted that “no new perspectives emerged on political issues,” nor are any expected following the planned visit of Chinese Premier Li Qiang to Tokyo. It is important to note that this visit remains merely a scheduled event at this stage.
Moreover, just one day after the aforementioned meeting with Prime Minister Ishiba, Tokyo issued a diplomatic protest regarding Beijing’s alleged “inaccurate account” of what the Japanese Prime Minister had said during the meeting.
The Political Context of the Events in Tokyo Remains Complex
The pessimism expressed by one of Japan’s leading newspapers is entirely understandable, as the current state of bilateral political relations creates a backdrop that is hardly conducive to any optimistic expectations. So far, it is primarily business representatives from both countries who are trying to introduce some positivity, which served as the basis for the resumption of the aforementioned “Economic Dialogue.”
It was hardly surprising that Beijing reacted strongly to reports that retired four-star general S. Iwasaki, formerly the commander of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces, will serve for a year as a consultant to Taiwan’s parliament on military development. Japan’s interest in Taiwan and its various forms of presence there have been evident for a long time. Notably, before assuming the role of Prime Minister, Shigeru Ishiba was a frequent visitor to Taiwan. However, this recent appointment marks a qualitatively new step in the process. Both this development and the position on Taiwan-related issues expressed by Foreign Minister Iwaya during the Tokyo meeting were met with “expressions of gratitude” from Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
China also commented on the passage of a Japanese destroyer through the Taiwan Strait in early February. Special attention was drawn to the fact that this operation took place just days before Prime Minister Ishiba’s visit to the U.S., where he held talks with the newly inaugurated American president.
Likewise, Japan is actively asserting its presence in the equally sensitive Southeast Asia region, working closely with the United States. In this regard, China could not overlook the fact that the first overseas visits of the new U.S. Secretary of Defense, P. Hegseth, will include trips to the Philippines and Japan. It is worth noting that among all Southeast Asian nations, China has the most strained relations with the Philippines, particularly as Manila is increasingly identified as one of the “corners” of a military-political triangle involving Tokyo and Washington.
Suffice it to say, all these factors explain the cautious language used by the Japanese press in summarizing both the recent foreign ministers’ meeting and the still-tentative planning of the “China-Japan-South Korea” summit.
Vladimir Terekhov, expert on the issues of the Asia-Pacific region
