Donald Trump’s approach to Southeast Asia has pushed the region toward closer cooperation with Beijing as its policies create uncertainty and undermine trust in U.S. commitments.
How Important is Southeast Asia for Trump
When Pete Hegseth, the current US Secretary of Defence, appeared before the US Congress in January this year for his confirmation hearing, he was unable to name any single member country of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). It raised a fundamental question about the quality of diplomacy he would be able to conduct and the defence ties he would be able to cultivate with the states in the region out of a sheer lack of knowledge. What impression did he leave on the ASEAN? Not good, most certainly. Can the administration he is representing, out of its ignorance, live up to the many promises that previous US administrations made via defence pacts? There are serious doubts. Of particular concern is the fact Donald Trump has refused to commit that he would come to Taiwan’s military defence in the wake of a Chinese military attack. This is already a major policy departure from the Biden administration’s commitment to defending Taiwan using American military means.
If the US is not willing to commit to Taiwan against China, what is the importance of Washington’s military pacts with other nations in the region? During the Biden era, Washington signed several security pacts. One of them is AUKUS. During his confirmation, Elbridge Colby, Trump’s nominee for undersecretary of defence for policy – the number three post at the US Department of Defense – said that selling US nuclear submarines to Australia and not having enough in US possession would be “crazy”.
In July 2024, the US, South Korea, and Japan signed a trilateral pact for common defence against China. In 2025, Japan and South Korea are, however, facing an administration in America that wants to put ‘America First’. In other words, with the US now looking more inward, it is least expected to look outwards offering a helping hand to the countries it has pacts with. Donald Trump, by not publicly committing to these pacts, has already sent the wrong message to the region.
Apart from defence ties, the Biden administration had also launched the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) as an alternative economic programme to China’s Belt & Road Initiative (BRI). With multilateralism now taking the back seat and Trump using tariffs to put America first and re-balance bilateral and multilateral trade to Washington’s advantage, IPEF stands little chance of surviving, let alone becoming operational.
For years, one of the key deficiencies of Washington’s policy in the Southeast Asian region, including the wider Indo-Pacific region, has been the almost total absence of an economic framework. The Obama administration had started the ambitious Trans-Pacific Partnership programme that, if it had turned into a formal treaty and begun its life, would have been one of the largest free trade networks. But Donald Trump withdrew from it on the first day in office in 2016. The memory of this unilateral act has not vanished, making the IPEF’s fate a lot less troubling for the region. At the same time, it is also making these states adopt a more pragmatic approach to China.
China Stands to Gain
Washington’s troubles, policy decencies, and sudden policy shifts have already begun to impact the region. In the latest 2024 ISEAS State of Southeast Asia survey, perceptions of the US as an influential economic power in the region were already far behind China at 14 percent (with China at 60 percent). This perception is likely to turn more in Beijing’s favour now that Southeast Asia has to deal with a president known for his unpredictable policies. This is not to suggest that all Southeast Asian nations will adopt similar approaches towards Washington and Beijing. The Philippines, for instance, is already doubling down on its special ties with the US, although it remains to be seen how Trump responds to it. There is still little gainsaying that the region, on the whole, will be left with dealing with China on its own.
But the region is not necessarily on a backfoot. With Trump imposing tariffs on Chinese goods, Beijing is looking for alternative markets. It might prefer ASEAN and/or the wider Southeast Asian region. This being the case, states in the area have an opportunity to use this situation to balance out their ties with Beijing and pragmatically resolve any outstanding issues without any external, extra-regional intervention from Washington. While there are concerns that the arrival of Chinese commodities will have domestic implications for these states, countries in this region also can buy Chinese goods and re-export them to the US and the rest of the world. Recent reports show that ASEAN nations have the potential to expand their contribution to global trade.
As it stands, ASEAN is already engaging with Beijing. The organization has decided to invite China to its next meeting in Malaysia in May. Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim said that the purpose of this invitation was less about “choosing sides” and more about “ensuring ASEAN’s strategic relevance in a multipolar world.” Still, the fact that Beijing has received the invitation and Washington has not strongly reflects the trajectory that ASEAN member states are looking to embark on and consolidate. For Beijing, it will be important to capitalise on this opportunity and not leave any gaps for the US to come back to exploit.
Salman Rafi Sheikh, research analyst of International Relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs
