The state visit to Japan by the President of the Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos Jr., which took place from 26 to 29 May 2026, turned out to be a highly noteworthy event, both for the rapidly developing bilateral relations between Japan and the Philippines and for the process of shaping the situation in the subregion of Southeast Asia as a whole.
Marcos Continues the Process of Exchanging Visits with His Japanese Counterparts
The formal reason for the trip boiled down to participating in some event pertaining to the generalised (pseudo-)issue of ‘the role of human beings in climate change’. A suitable pretext to once again discuss truly important matters with the leadership of the country whose significance in the process of reviving ‘Japan’s shift to the South-West’ is drastically increasing.
Principal Results of the Philippine President’s Visit to Japan
The four-day visit to Japan by the Philippine President was accompanied by a number of actions, some of rather symbolic nature and, on the contrary, others quite specific and substantive. The most significant event out of the second category was the reception of F. Marcos Jr. and his wife by the Imperial Couple, which was also attended by other members of the Imperial House.
It should be noted that although in Japan’s state system, which is regulated by the post-war constitution, the Emperor’s status is limited to representative symbolism, that particular symbolism is all-important in the eyes of the Japanese. The very fact of the Emperor receiving the leader of a certain country is intended to demonstrate the special significance with which maintaining relations with that very country is treated by Japan. Let us recall that two years ago, the President of Brazil, Lula da Silva, was accorded a similar ceremony.
As for the specific matters, these were discussed beforehand at the expert level and were finally agreed upon during the meeting between President F. Marcos Jr. and Prime Minister S. Takaichi. The agreements reached are set out in several documents, with the main ones — the ‘Joint Statement’ and the ‘Press Statement’ — issued after the talks between the two leaders.
The content of both these ‘Statements’ indicates that the parties devoted primary attention to the general topic of international security, which Prime Minister S. Takaichi characterised as ‘increasingly tense’. Japan’s previously stated intention to sharply strengthen its multifaceted presence in enhancing the defence capability and ensuring the security of the Philippines has been confirmed.
Moreover, it now concerns not only the foreign policy aspects of this issue but also domestic ones, when, for example, mention is made of ‘Japan’s unwavering commitment to the peace process in Mindanao’. Mindanao, let us recall, is the second largest island of the Philippine archipelago, which has seen various kinds of armed groups, including those with separatist inclinations, being active for decades.
As far as the trade and economic aspects are concerned, various directions for their further development are also reflected in the adopted documents. In particular, it is stated that the government of S. Takaichi will assist in advancing the Philippines’ application to join the regional trade and economic association known as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which is in fact led by Japan. Today, the CPTPP comprises twelve countries, among them, since the beginning of 2024, the United Kingdom, which, despite lying entirely beyond the realms of the region, also joined the association with significant assistance from Japan.
Attention was also drawn to the parties’ intention to implement a project to create a so-called ‘Luzon Economic Corridor’ (LEC), which was announced at the end of 2024. Certain aspects of this very project constituted perhaps the main political intrigue of the Philippine President’s visit to Japan, provoking an extremely sharp reaction from the People’s Republic of China.
The Issue of Delimiting ‘Exclusive Economic Zones’
The fact is that so far, Japan and the Philippines have not delimited the ‘Exclusive Economic Zones’ provided for by international law in the maritime space that separates the northern Philippine island of Luzon from the Japanese archipelago of Ryukyu. This delimitation must be carried out before work can begin on implementing the LEC. The situation is complicated by the fact that this maritime space adjoins the eastern coast of Taiwan, and Taiwan per se once demonstrated its interest in participating in this project.
Although the talks in Tokyo on delimitation took place in a bilateral format, that is, without the involvement of representatives from Taiwan, they were still met with a sharply negative reaction in Beijing, which considers the island to be its own territory. Consequently, any discussion of any issue in the waters adjacent to it cannot be conducted without some form of the Chinese participation. The very fact that Taiwanese representatives were absent from the talks on this issue, which touches upon matters of ensuring the territorial integrity of ‘One China’, was presented in Beijing as a betrayal by Taipei of the national interests of all Chinese people.
That said, had Taipei taken part in these talks, it would have still been subjected to harsh criticism from Beijing, albeit couched in different terms. Namely, those that would have highlighted the lack of legitimacy of Taiwan positioning itself on the international stage as autonomous from the People’s Republic of China. Yet it is precisely this that Taipei insists upon, when, in response to Beijing’s latest abrupt remarks directed at it, they declare that Taiwan is not part of the People’s Republic of China. That is, they are making it understood that Taipei does not require ‘third-party’ advice, in this case, on matters of Japanese-Philippine delimitation.
Let us note that the real autonomy of Taipei’s foreign policy course has recently also manifested itself in a rather positive attitude towards the fact of Japan’s increasingly noticeable presence in Taiwanese issues. The renowned remark by Prime Minister S. Takaichi regarding the possible response of her country in case China resorts to a ‘non-peaceful’ solution to the Taiwan issue wreaked havoc on Japanese-Chinese relations in an unprecedentedly tangible fashion. This issue inevitably gained its relevance when, during the Philippine President’s visit to Japan, the need arose to discuss certain accompanying aspects of what would come across as a purely economic project, the LEC.
Unprecedentedly blunt statements regarding the format of the talks in Tokyo on matters of Japanese-Philippine delimitation came from both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence of the People’s Republic of China. The world’s leading news agencies documented at this time heightened activity by the People’s Liberation Army Air Force and Navy in the space surrounding Taiwan, particularly in the part which separates it from the Philippine island of Luzon. The People’s Republic of China made it clear that control of this maritime space would now be regular.
Finally, let us note that the state visit to Japan by the Philippine President examined in the article has become a landmark event for the entire complex of bilateral relations. As for the development of the situation in the South-East Asian subregion as a whole, when juxtaposing the positive and negative factors which influence this particular process, the results of F. Marcos’s visit have made a significant contribution to strengthening the latter. The People’s Republic of China’s perspective on the situation unfolding now in Southeast Asia is presented by the newspaper Global Times in understandable images.
Vladimir Terekhov is an expert on Asia-Pacific Region Issues
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