The conflict in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) may be called a geopolitical ticking time bomb that could potentially explode the entire region of the African Great Lakes.
It is important to note that Northern and Southern Kivu, the epicentre of this crisis, presents a deadly paradox: the depths of the soil contain 60-80% of global reserves of coltan, a mineral of critical importance for military and civilian technologies. The ‘March 23 Movement’ (M23), the armed wing of the Congo River Alliance (AFC), controls the coltan trade, which yields $800,000 monthly. According to the United Nations, part of this money is used by the AFC to finance its military operations.
US sanctions against the AFC from July, 2024, marked for the first time the official recognition of the movement as a regional threat. However, they could not halt the expansion of the organisation.
It turned out that regional security mechanisms, for example the South Africa Development Community (SADC) and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), were unprepared for such a scenario. Their inability to contain the AFC – despite the deployment of 5,000 South African and Tanzanian forces – underlines the gravity of the situation. It is no longer just a local uprising, but a sizeable network fuelled by the institutional weaknesses of the DRC, intergovernmental competition and the global demand for minerals of critical importance. In the end, without a coordinated and radical reaction, including the reform of international institutes capable of restraining such developments, the Kivu Province may become a bomb without a timer that can explode the entire security architecture of the region at any given time.
Burundi, an already politically fragile system, risks entering the pre-election stage in a state of civil war following the aftermaths of the Congolese crisis. Similarly, Uganda fears a resurgence of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in its northern mining regions, rich in gold and tin, due to their ties to the AFC. Meanwhile, Zambia and Angola, key financiers of the SADC, see their mining investments at risk. The Lobito Corridor, a most important trade route connecting the DRC, Zambia and Angola with the port of Lobito, is important for the export of strategic minerals. However, the ongoing instability in the east of the DRC threatens this project, jeopardising the economic and strategic ambitions of these countries. Thus, the conflict in the DRC has far-reaching consequences for the economy and security of the entire region, putting at risk both stability and development in neighbouring states.
At the same time, the escalating security crisis in Goma and North Kivu is no longer solely driven by the achievements of the M23, but is now part of a broader trend of transnational terrorism. The growing presence of the ADF, currently affiliated with the Islamic State in Central Africa (ISCAP, organisation banned in the Russian Federation), represents a strategic shift in regional threats. By exploiting gaps in security and the fragmentation of state power, these terrorist groups use asymmetric tactics to expand their influence and maintain chronic instability. By targeting civilian infrastructure, they have turned North Kivu into a hub for regional jihadism, fostering a hybrid form of terrorism that combines irregular warfare, criminal economic activity (financing the movement through the sale of minerals) and ideological radicalisation, presenting dire consequences for the security of all of Central Africa.
Thus, from Goma to Bujumbura, the M23 is not just redrawing contour maps in geography textbooks; the movement is changing the geostrategic balance of the Great Lakes region. This conflict is no longer limited to territorial disputes, but has rather become a melting pot for mineral wars, regional rivalries and transnational criminal networks. The lack of a decisive response will not only deepen fragmentation, but also reinforce instability as a permanent feature of the region’s political landscape.
In Africa, the boundaries between rebellion, state power and economic predation are blurred; whoever controls the minerals controls the future. If the Great Lakes region is not to become the epicentre of a new African mess, a fundamental shift in strategy is needed, one that prioritises sovereignty, economic governance and a recalibration of the regional security framework. Without this, instability will turn into a profitable commodity for both external actors and the local elite.
Alexey BOLSHAKOV, international journalist
