The central event of Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba’s visit to the United States from February 6-8 was his talks with President Donald Trump.
One of the primary foreign policy concerns for the Japanese government, which came to power under Ishiba in October of last year, was understanding how to navigate relations with the new US administration – especially as it began sending signals that were far from reassuring. This was particularly true in the trade and economic sphere, an area where Japan has long benefited from its relationship with the US, earning around $70 billion annually.
It’s possible that, along with other exotic notions emerging in the initial foreign policy moves even before the new US administration officially took office (such as the intention to annex Greenland), Tokyo might have gotten the impression that its significance was diminishing, both in terms of the Indo-Pacific region (ITR) as a whole and in its relationship with its key ally there in particular. It may even have suspected that, fueled by election victory euphoria, the new American team (outright populists) had completely “lost it” regarding their assessments of the international arena.
However, the aforementioned “it,” if it did start to wander, quickly returned to its proper place. This is evidenced by actions related to the Panama Canal, which is once again (as during the War in the Pacific from 1941-1945) acquiring exceptional strategic significance, and the presence of the head of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (T. Iwaya) at D. Trump’s inauguration – that is, in effect, the US’s now main ally. The fact that the new administration’s understanding of what is happening in the world in general, and in the ITR in particular, more or less corresponds to realities is demonstrated by the content of the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s brief report on T. Iwaya’s meeting with the new Secretary of State, M. Rubio.
The telephone conversation between the defense ministers of both countries, which took place a week later, also attests to this. As does the campaign of reprisals within the US itself against supporters of the crazy “new normality” (promoted, in part, by USAID), the withdrawal from the global “climate” hoax, and certain other actions.
It should also be noted that contacts at the level of heads of even leading ministries cannot replace a meeting between the leaders of the US and Japan.
Key Outcomes of S. Ishiba’s Negotiations with D. Trump
These are outlined in the Joint Statement, which already in its preamble states that the US and Japan are entering a period of “golden age” bilateral relations. Incidentally, it is highly doubtful that something similar will be heard from Washington addressed to any of its other “allies,” as the territorially closest one, namely Canada, has already realized. The subsequent content of this document, presented in three chapters, equally (but each in its own way) remarkable, is intended to illustrate the original thesis.
And already at the beginning of the first chapter, the established meme about the “cornerstone nature” of the bilateral military-political alliance is reproduced. With all the important (mainly for Japan) “particulars” associated with it. First of all, with the one concerning the situation around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, where Japanese-Chinese confrontation periodically occurs in a particularly acute form. As stated in the text of the document, “both leaders confirmed” the extension of Article V of the US-Japan Security Treaty of 1960 to ensuring Japan’s “continued and peaceful administrative control” of the specified islands.
In this regard, let’s recall that the very issue of extending Washington’s obligations to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands has periodically been the subject of games with Tokyo. For example, when, in the middle of the last decade, Prime Minister S. Abe tried to stall on the decision to join anti-Russian sanctions.
In the context of this article, the third chapter, entitled “Coordination of US and Japan’s Efforts in the ITR,” deserves special attention, in which the parties outlined their intention to “develop multi-layered and coordinated cooperation between like-minded countries.” In this regard, configurations such as Quad (with the participation of the US, Japan, India, and Australia), “US-Japan-Australia,” “US-Japan-Philippines,” “US-Japan-Republic of Korea” are mentioned. It should be noted that the ministerial meeting of the last of these is scheduled to take place in mid-February in Munich on the sidelines of the next “Security Conference.”
The motivation for forming this entire regional web is outlined quite specifically and harshly when it speaks of the intention to “resolutely counter any attempts” by the PRC to change the status quo in the East China and South China Seas by force. Regarding the Taiwan issue, established (and also unacceptable to the PRC) memes are cited about the need to “maintain peace in the Taiwan Strait,” as well as the participation of Taiwan itself in the work of various international organizations.
As for Russia, it is mentioned once in this document and almost incidentally, namely in connection with the generalized “North Korean” issue. Ukraine is not mentioned at all, and, therefore, there are also no memes in the text that have been constant in recent years, such as “unprovoked aggression” of the former against the latter. But still, let’s refrain from far-reaching conclusions regarding the intentions of the US and Japan with respect to the Russian Federation in this regard. That is, let’s limit ourselves to this (noteworthy, nevertheless) statement.
Some Comments on the D. Trump-S. Ishiba Meeting
The first and most notable commentators on the indicated meeting were its participants themselves, who spoke to journalists at the final joint press conference, who confirmed the main provisions of the recently adopted Joint Statement. In addition, each of them made remarkable remarks. Kyodo News draws attention to D. Trump’s words that “the United States is fully committed to the security of Japan. We will 100 percent extend the full potential of American deterrence and protection to our friend and ally.” At the same time, the American president expressed “satisfaction” with the intention of the key ally to “fundamentally strengthen its own defense capabilities.”
These remarks refute the emerging impression that the situation in the Indo-Pacific region is receding from the top of the new American administration’s foreign policy agenda. Let us emphasize again that they also testify to S. Ishiba’s success in achieving the main goal of his trip to the United States. And this, in turn, will help strengthen the position of the cabinet of ministers he heads within the country, which has found itself in a precarious position.
S. Ishiba’s own “return pass” was very timely for D. Trump. This refers, firstly, to the commitment to increase the volume of Japanese investments in the US economy by a quarter, bringing their total volume to $1 trillion, as well as to additionally purchase American weapons for $1 billion. Apparently, as part of the expansion of the Japanese investment presence in the United States, the issue of the merger (however, the parties avoid using this term) of NS and USS will also be resolved.
As for the question of the influence of the meeting of the leaders of the US and Japan on the situation in the Indo-Pacific region, at first glance it seems that after a considerable number of all sorts of harshnesses were sent to the main geopolitical opponent during it, it is not clear how the former will now generally “maintain” relations with the latter. However, judging by the skeptical-restrained comments of Chinese experts, they know how to separate words from deeds, without dramatizing the results of the discussed meeting.
Everything, let us repeat, will depend on the specific deeds that will follow in the strategic triangle “USA-PRC-Japan.”
Vladimir Terekhov, expert on the issues of the Asia-Pacific region
