When assessing the development of the situation in the Indo-Pacific region, several events that occurred during the transition of power in the United States deserve commentary. Of particular interest are those events observed within the key regional strategic triangle of “U.S.-China-Japan”.
Initial Exchanges Between China and the New U.S. Leadership
This process of “mining” was most evident in the U.S.-China relationship, where China is considered the main geopolitical opponent. For example, we can point to two arms shipment agreements signed by Joe Biden at the end of last year for Taiwan, new restrictions on Chinese companies’ access to cutting-edge technologies, renewed accusations of “Chinese cyber threats”, and the blocking of the TikTok Internet service. Outgoing U.S. Ambassador to China Nicholas Burns admitted that he spent 80% of his working time fighting with the host country rather than building relations with it.
In this regard, noteworthy are the steps taken toward China by Donald Trump even before officially assuming office as president. The first person he spoke with by phone was China’s leader, Xi Jinping. The shutdown of TikTok was also halted and ultimately canceled.
Additionally, attention was drawn to the ceasefire agreement in Myanmar reached between the country’s military leadership and its opponents, brokered by China, just before Trump’s inauguration. It is worth noting that Myanmar is one of the Southeast Asian nations where the global U.S.-China competition for influence is most intense.
Overall, it is difficult to agree with the frequent assertion that Trump was “anti-China” from the outset. Although such trends were observed during his first presidency, he was clearly not their initiator. In this regard, one can confidently point to then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo as the driving force. Trump himself considers one of his key achievements to be the signing of the so-called “Phase 1 Agreement” with Beijing, aimed at addressing the enormous trade imbalance with China that was unfavorable for the United States.
A notable development was the invitation of Chinese Vice Premier Han Zheng to the inauguration ceremony of the new U.S. president. Just a day before the inauguration, Han Zheng held talks with (future) Vice President J.D. Vance. Han Zheng also met with representatives of American businesses, expressing hope that his interlocutors would “continue to invest and deepen their roots in China” and help foster “stable, healthy, and sustainable development of Sino-American relations”.
However, it is clear that the new U.S. president cannot ignore the fundamental factor of mutual competition between the world’s two leading powers on the international stage. In this context, frequent speculations about the potential revival of the G2 configuration from 15 years ago – featuring the U.S. and China working together to solve global problems – should, for now, be regarded as little more than wishful thinking.
The Japanese Foreign Minister Invited to Trump’s Inauguration
Special attention should be given to developments in the relationship between the United States and its key regional ally, Japan, a partnership that has lasted for three-quarters of a century. In this context, the invitation of Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Kono to Donald Trump’s inauguration was highly noteworthy. This is particularly significant given the absence of representatives from key European allies on the guest list, with the exception of Italy’s ideologically aligned Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni.
By extending this invitation, the new U.S. president highlighted, first, the region where the United States’ primary interests lie, and second, his intent to address the sense of uncertainty felt by its key ally due to the change of administration in Washington. Moreover, Taro Kono’s visit was not only ceremonial but also included substantial business discussions.
First, alongside his counterparts from India and Australia, Taro Kono became one of the first foreign ministers to meet with Marco Rubio immediately after his official confirmation as the new U.S. Secretary of State. The fact that these four foreign ministers – representing Japan, India, Australia, and the United States – were “in the same place at the same time” was not merely coincidental or ceremonial. These countries form the Quad, a grouping with an increasingly pronounced presence in the Indo-Pacific region, originally established with an anti-China orientation.
Reportedly, during their discussions with Marco Rubio, the Japanese, Indian, and Australian foreign ministers focused on specific initiatives planned within the Quad framework for 2025. A notable commentary on this meeting, which outlines the history of the Quad’s formation and its (potential) expansion of objectives, is available here.
Also noteworthy was Taro Kono’s meeting with Richard Armitage, a former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State (2001–2005) and one of the architects of Washington’s Indo-Pacific policy. Although Armitage no longer holds any government positions, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs highlighted three key points from the meeting. Of particular interest is the second point, which mentions an “exchange of views” on the functioning of several regional frameworks involving the United States and Japan, including the aforementioned Quad.
During this visit, it appears that Taro Kono was also preparing for a February visit to the U.S. by Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba. This would mark the first direct meeting between Ishiba and Donald Trump, something that (for various reasons) had not yet occurred.
Ongoing Formation of Japan-China Communication Channels
Meanwhile, the process of establishing a stable communication system between Japan and China has continued to develop. The most notable recent event in this process was Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Kono’s visit to Beijing at the end of December. This was followed by a January 13–15 trip to China by a delegation from Japan’s ruling coalition – the first such visit since 2018. Led by the general secretaries of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Komeito, the delegation held meetings with representatives of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Chinese government.
During a one-hour meeting with Chinese Premier Li Qiang, LDP General Secretary Hiroshi Moriyama delivered a letter from Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba addressed to Chinese President Xi Jinping. In response, Li Qiang expressed hope that his Japanese counterpart would visit China “at a convenient time”. Notably, the two prime ministers had already met in October of last year in Vientiane, Laos, on the sidelines of an ASEAN regional event. During the recent meeting, both sides expressed a mutual desire to deepen bilateral relations through expanded interpersonal exchanges (including among high-ranking officials) and the development of economic cooperation.
Interestingly, after the delegation’s return to Japan, it was reported that LDP General Secretary Hiroshi Moriyama might take on the role of head of Japan’s parliamentary friendship association with China.
In conclusion, it can be said that each “corner” of the strategic triangle – U.S., China, and Japan – whose dynamics significantly influence the overall situation in the Indo-Pacific region, continues to maintain room for maneuvering in its relationships with the other two “corners”.
Vladimir Terekhov, expert on the issues of the Asia-Pacific region