The nature of the recent foreign policy activity of one of Asia’s leading powers, modern-day Japan, has been noticeably influenced by the increasing uncertainty on the global stage.
“Transitional State” in the US: The Primary Source of Uncertainty
As a result, Japan’s new government — being the primary ally of the United States — finds itself in considerable confusion over how to act on the international stage. Furthermore, there is reason to believe that this period of uncertainty is unlikely to end immediately following the swearing-in of the newly elected US President, Donald Trump, on January 20th of the following year. The incoming administration will require some time to grasp, in sufficient detail, what is actually happening both domestically and globally. This understanding is a necessary precondition for setting priorities and planning concrete actions.
In this context, two signals in the emerging communication framework between Japan’s government, led by Shigeru Ishiba, and Donald Trump’s transitional team have proven significant. The first signal was the cancellation of a meeting between them, which had been planned ahead of Shigeru Ishiba’s visit to Latin America for certain international events. This meeting was supposed to take place during the Japanese Prime Minister’s subsequent trip to the United States.
The second signal came in early December when Donald Trump made yet another statement opposing the proposed acquisition of the American US Steel Co. by Japan’s Nippon Steel Co. for over $14 billion — a deal that seemed to be nearing its final stages. Moreover, as in the capitals of other current US allies, Tokyo has greeted with considerable apprehension the next American president’s intention to continue efforts toward “restoring fairness” in trade with them by raising tariffs on imported goods.
Within the framework of Donald Trump’s key concept of focusing on addressing his own country’s problems, a trend toward reducing the scope of US involvement in various international disputes appears quite plausible (although Barack Obama had already spoken about relinquishing the role of “world policeman” a decade ago). Naturally, this increases the level of political and strategic uncertainty faced by American allies, including Japan. In this light, it is doubtful that Shigeru Ishiba could have gained anything beneficial from his half-hour meeting on December 10th with outgoing US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin.
China as a Focus of Shigeru Ishiba’s Foreign Policy
The uncertainty surrounding the positioning of Japan’s key ally on the global stage is inevitably reflected in Tokyo’s strategy for managing its relations with China. How far can Japan afford to go in addressing its issues with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) amidst growing uncertainties?
For its part, Beijing is also grappling with ambiguity about how its relations with Washington will evolve under the new American administration. For example, in light of continued “tariff” threats, what can China expect in the realm of bilateral trade with the US, from which the PRC earns around $400 billion annually? Will the approach from Donald Trump’s first term, aimed at resolving trade issues through the pursuit of compromise agreements, be resumed? Or will the emphasis once again shift to the “tariff war” methods initiated by that same first Trump administration? For now, Beijing is speculating on whether the final phase of Joe Biden’s administration is in any way tied to the future policy course of its successors.
Thus, both leading Asian players — the PRC and Japan — are tentatively feeling their way towards each other while simultaneously observing how the transfer of power unfolds across the Pacific. It is also worth noting that both Beijing and Tokyo face domestic environments in which 90% of their populations hold varying degrees of animosity toward the other.
Nonetheless, both sides are taking concrete steps to reduce negativity, both in terms of mutual perceptions “on a societal level” and across various aspects of intergovernmental relations. The first of these efforts includes the recent 20th “Beijing-Tokyo Forum” held in early December in Japan’s capital, involving representatives from various civil society organisations — this time with a notable emphasis on youth groups. Another significant initiative during the same period was the abolition of visa requirements for Chinese tourists travelling to Japan, a move that follows Beijing’s similar decision taken two weeks earlier.
As for trade and economic relations, the primary component of Japan-China relations, these issues are being discussed during successive visits to the PRC by various Japanese business groups. Political relations, on the other hand, are set to be a focus of negotiations during the upcoming visit to Beijing by Japan’s new Foreign Minister, Takeaki Iwai, scheduled for 25 December this year.
The Issue of Growing Chaos in South Korea
A significant factor contributing to the uncertainty in Japan’s foreign policy landscape is the increasing domestic instability in neighbouring South Korea. This chaos raises doubts about the progress towards normalising bilateral relations, a process that had appeared to gain traction following the rise to power in May 2022 of the Yoon Suk-yeol administration. Normalised relations, in turn, are a prerequisite for the realisation of Washington’s longstanding plans to establish a trilateral alliance in Northeast Asia, primarily aimed at countering China.
Once again, however, Japan-South Korea relations, as well as the aforementioned strategic plans, are under threat of collapse. A visit by Shigeru Ishiba to South Korea, initially scheduled for January next year, has been at least postponed. Meanwhile, the question, “How are things going with the South Koreans?” seems to have become central during Lloyd Austin’s recent visit to Tokyo. It is unlikely that Donald Trump’s transitional team tasked him with discussing the future development of Japan-US relations — that is a matter they will handle themselves. However, addressing the unfolding situation in South Korea may well have been within his remit.
Efforts to weather yet another South Korean political storm are evident in initiatives being pursued both through diplomatic channels and at the parliamentary level by Japan and South Korea.
Activities in Southeast Asia
If there is one area without ambiguity, it is Japan’s steadfast focus on Southeast Asia and the Pacific region. This trajectory, part of a broader strategy of expansion on the Asian continent, became apparent almost immediately after Japan ended its self-imposed isolation in the latter half of the 19th century. Since then, it has remained a constant in the foreign policies of every Japanese emperor and government without exception. This trend reemerged within a decade of Japan’s defeat in World War II and is today pursued in partnership with its former adversary and current key ally, the United States. Japan’s primary partner in Southeast Asia, alongside the United States, is the Philippines. However, other nations in the region are also receiving heightened attention from both Tokyo and Washington, acting either independently or in tandem. Among recent notable developments, the signing on 8 July of the Japan-Philippines Reciprocal Access Agreement stands out, granting military forces from one nation access to the other’s territory. A similar agreement has been in effect between Japan and Australia since January 2022.
Finally, notable attention was drawn to a week-long goodwill visit by Crown Prince Akishino and his wife to Turkey in early December. This significant event warrants separate commentary, both in the context of Japan’s increased engagement in the broader Middle East region and in the development of its relations with the United Kingdom. The latter trend is also being advanced with the active involvement of the Imperial House.
Vladimir Terekhov, expert on the issues of the Asia-Pacific region
