Japan’s new government, which has been in a “transitional” status since October 1 and was approved by the lower house of parliament on November 11 with significant reservations, has had a number of noteworthy events in the foreign policy arena.
The “Chinese” component in the foreign policy activity of Shigeru Ishiba’s government
A month later, the “Chinese component” in Shigeru Ishiba’s foreign policy activity continued during his trip to Latin America with the declared purpose of participating in the APEC and G20 Summits held there. On the margins of the first of these meetings, held in Lima, Peru, on November 15, Shigeru Ishiba met with Chinese leader Xi Jinping. A Xinhua news agency report on the talks quoted a similar remark by the Chinese leader on the state of bilateral relations, which he described as being “at a critical stage of improvement and development.” Comments in the Japanese media were similarly restrained and positive.
That “restrained and positive” approach was confirmed by certain subsequent public events. In particular, it is worth noting the meeting between the two countries’ defense ministers on November 21 in Laos on the occasion of a regular ASEAN forum. Similar words were uttered during the bilateral talks. This fact itself looks remarkable in view of the fact that in Laos the Chinese refused to hold a similar meeting with US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. The latter expressed “regret” at the refusal. China, in turn, referred to increased US military activity in the region in general and, in particular, to the trilateral meeting between the defense ministers of Australia, the US and Japan held earlier in Darwin. That meeting resulted in the adoption of a joint statement, which leaves no doubt about the intentions of all three participants in the event.
Another development also met with a predictable reaction from China: the news that on November 20, for the first time, Japan hosted a meeting of security service delegates from the members of the Five Eyes alliance, a group consisting of five English-speaking countries.
However, there are some negative aspects of Japan’s current relations with China, including Shigeru Ishiba’s statement about an “Asian version of NATO” which he made during his election campaign, but which has since disappeared from his subsequent public rhetoric. Also on the negative side of the slate was a rejoinder by the de facto Japanese ambassador to Taiwan, who stressed that the island was “very, very important” to Tokyo (Significantly, he used the word “island”, not “country”, and that, these days, is in itself a significant development). It is therefore too early to be overly optimistic about the positive trends in the new Japanese government’s China policy.
Nevertheless, it is impossible not to note that these positive trends, in addition to political and public declarations, also include a number of concrete initiatives. For example, Beijing is reported to have lifted an embargo on imports of Japanese seafood, imposed under the pretext of public health concerns after Japan began to discharge “purified” water into the sea from the damaged reactor at the Fukushima nuclear power plant. Previously, Japan had exported two thirds of its seafood to China. In November this year, Japan was included in the list of countries whose citizens can travel to China for short-term trips (up to a month and primarily for tourism purposes) without visas. This visa-free regime is officially described as an “experiment” and so far has been introduced for one year.
Other activities of Shigeru Ishiba in Peru and Brazil
Among other bilateral meetings held by Shigeru Ishiba on the margins of the APEC and G20 Summits, his talks with the President of the Republic of Korea, the Prime Minister of Vietnam, the President of Indonesia, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and, of course, the presidents of the host countries deserve special attention. All of these leaders represent countries and regions where Japan’s foreign policy presence is increasing and manifesting itself in a particularly visible (and iconic) way.
It is noteworthy, however, that at the last minute, immediately before his trip to Latin America, Shigeru Ishiba canceled a meeting (which appears to have been arranged in advance) with US President-elect Donald Trump. The meeting was to be held on US soil and was almost certainly canceled on the latter’s initiative. One can make various conjectures on this matter, the most plausible of which is that Donald Trump is unwilling to get himself dirty in the mud that has been spread about in abundance by the current administration, mainly inside the country, but also, in its final two months, with particular fervor in the foreign policy arena as well. As for Donald Trump’s meeting with the prime minister of a key US ally in Asia, it will surely take place, but after the inauguration ceremony (or perhaps even during it).
Among the meetings referred to above, let us briefly mention Shigeru Ishiba’s meetings with South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol and UK Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer. Regarding the former, the “development of relations between Japan and South Korea, and their incorporation into the Washington-led process of forming a triple alliance between all three countries” has become something of a meme that is continually repeated by global media. In general, this trend was publicly confirmed during the above meeting and it cannot be denied that it is founded on concrete facts. Moreover, the existence of this trend is confirmed by the increasingly frequent trilateral military exercises held by the three countries in question.
But much less attention is paid to the continuing serious and diverse difficulties in relations between South Korea and Japan, which at any moment could nullify the entire trend above. As has happened many times in the last two or three decades. For example, there is the notorious topic of “history” that is tailored to suit the speaker and rolled out whenever convenient by the opposing factions in South Korea, mainly for purposes connected with their internal political struggle, and which periodically obstructs the development of bilateral relations. After the above-mentioned meeting the topic was again raised, and clearly not by the South Korean President.
As for the meeting between Shigeru Ishiba and Keir Starmer, it fits into the ongoing general process of developing relations between Japan and Britain in a range of different areas, including, increasingly, in the field of defense. This process has become increasingly evident ever since the 2016 visit to Tokyo by then UK Prime Minister Theresa May. One specific new contribution to this process was the agreement to establish a new “2+2 Format” for meetings between the UK Foreign Secretary and the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the UK Minister of Trade and Industry and Japanese Minister of Trade. A similar “format” already exists for the heads of the two countries’ Foreign and Defense Ministries.
Finally, the new Japanese Prime Minister’s trip to Latin America is significant in itself, as it once again testifies to the growing importance in Tokyo’s foreign policy of moves aimed at gaining a favorable position in the Global South in general. It should be recalled that only six months ago the last Japanese Prime Minister, Fumio Kishida visited both Peru and Brazil.
The results of Shigeru Ishiba’s trip to South America show that Japan, like all other former colonial powers, has good reason to hope for a successful outcome in its struggle for influence in the countries of the Global South. Moreover, the recent “history” of the former colonial powers is unlikely to be a significant factor today.
Vladimir Terekhov, expert on issues of the Asia-Pacific region
