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Elections in Somaliland: outcome and possible implications. Part 2

Ivan Kopytsev, November 30, 2024

The victory in Somaliland’s presidential election of the leader of the country’s largest opposition party creates a vast space to explore possible changes in Hargeisa’s foreign and domestic policies.

Somaliland President Abdurahman Muhammad Abdullahi

So, almost a week after the presidential elections in the territory of unrecognised Somaliland, the Electoral Commission confirmed numerous rumours about the defeat of the incumbent head of state Musa Bihi Abdi and the victory of the leader of the largest opposition party Abdurahman Mohammed Abdullahi, who earlier in the 2000s managed to work as the chairman of the local parliament. With 64 per cent and 35 per cent of the vote respectively, the new and the outgoing head of state demonstrated, on the one hand, the absence of a more or less influential “third force” in the country and, on the other hand, once again emphasised the ability of Somaliland society to resolve even sensitive issues in a non-conflictual and constitutional manner. Having examined the internal and external political context before and during the elections in the previous part of this article, we now turn to assessing the results and analysing possible changes.
It is to be assumed that the new government of Abdurahman Mohammed Abdullahi will maintain the foreign policy course of the previous authorities

What are the reasons for the opposition’s success? 

The victory of the representative of the opposition forces undoubtedly indicates the disappointment of part of the electorate with the policy of Musa Bihi, who has held the presidency since 2017 (two years longer than the prescribed term). In particular, it may refer to the loss of control over the eastern parts of the country as a result of internal contradictions. In this sense, the Waddani party led by Irro, the alias by which Abdurahman Mohammed Abdullahi is known in Somaliland, had an important competitive advantage. The fact is that during the election campaign, Waddani worked closely with the Alliance for Equality and Development (KAAH), a civil society organisation with youth support, including in Hargeisa-controlled eastern parts of the country. In other words, the coalition formed around the figure of the new president is a more attractive and effective force in the context of the upcoming Somaliland reintegration attempt.

Abdullahi: a new vector in foreign policy or preserving the same old orientations?

As noted in the first part of this article, in 2024, Somaliland found itself at the centre of a developing confrontation over Ethiopia’s desire for direct access to the sea. This conflict, though not yet in a military phase, has involved virtually all the more or less significant actors in the region, including Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Somalia and Somaliland itself. It seems that the two key motives that prompted Hargeisa to get involved in such a “venture” were: firstly, the emergence of a real opportunity to gain international recognition from one of its neighbours and thus set a long-awaited precedent, and secondly, the UAE’s significant investment in Berbera’s port infrastructure as part of the logistical side of the Ethiopia-Somaliland deal. In other words, the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding with Ethiopia in January 2024 was largely driven by objective preconditions reflecting the national interests of the unrecognised state. Although this step was met with some opposition from the ruling elite from the outset, it is to be expected that the new government of Abdurahman Mohammed Abdullahi will maintain the foreign policy course of the previous authorities: obtaining recognition of Somaliland’s independence remains a priority.

Thus, it is most likely that the coming to power in Somaliland of a new president and a new – formerly opposition – ruling party will lead to changes in Somaliland’s domestic politics, primarily in terms of finding ways to reconcile and reintegrate the eastern parts of the country. However, Hargeisa’s foreign policy is unlikely to change more or less significantly. In fact, the Memorandum of Understanding with Ethiopia is currently of a non-alternative nature: there are no similar proposals from other actors in the region, because the “pro-Somali” coalition represented by Egypt, Eritrea, Djibouti and Somalia opposes the existence of Somaliland as an independent political unit, and therefore even high-risk cooperation with Ethiopia remains a priority.

 

Ivan Kopytsev, political scientist, junior research fellow at the Centre for the Study of North Africa and the Horn of Africa at the Institute of African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences; research intern at the Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at the Institute of International Studies of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

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