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The Great Game in the Horn of Africa continues. Part 4: The Ethiopia-Somalia conflict from the perspective of other external parties

Viktor Goncharov, October 27, 2024

As for Britain, the United States’ closest ally, it has taken a more pragmatic approach in its relations with Ethiopia in the present case.

Ethiopian-Somali conflict

On August 21 this year, during a visit to Addis Ababa, British Minister for International Development Anneliese Dodds, had a meeting with Ethiopian Foreign Minister Taye Atske Selassie, during which she expressed London’s support for peaceful inclusive dialogue in Ethiopia and the wider region, and discussed prospects for economic cooperation between the two countries. And visit was not just a spontaneous visit.
Cairo is taking steps to strengthen its influence in the Horn of Africa

It followed what the Cabinet Press Office described as a “warm and wide-ranging” telephone conversation between British Foreign Secretary David Lammy and his Ethiopian counterpart, Taye Atske Selassie.

Significantly, two weeks earlier, the British firm Zaha Hadid Architects (ZHA) and Beirut-based Dar Al Handasah won a consultancy contract to design Africa’s largest new airport for Ethiopian Airlines, which will be located 40 kilometers from the Ethiopian capital. The construction cost is estimated at $6 billion for the first phase alone. It will serve up to 60 million passengers annually and in future its capacity can be gradually increased to 100 million passengers.

China, while it does not usually intervene openly in disputes between African states, has spoken out concerning the conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia, in both of which countries it has interests, although more in the former than in the latter. China stressed the importance of complying with international law, saying it “supports the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somalia and calls on all parties to engage in dialog and cooperation to ensure peace and stability in the region to avoid external aggression.”

But nevertheless, China has not just stay aside. On September 6 this year, on the sidelines of the Forum on China Africa Cooperation, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Chinese President Xi Jinping signed a currency “swap” agreement, aimed at expanding financial and economic cooperation by trading in the two countries’ national currencies, the birr and the yuan. China also provided Ethiopia with a one-time aid payment of 400 million yuan, equivalent to about $56 million.

Ethiopia’s main ally continues to be the UAE.

Their cooperation is based on 17 agreements concluded following the official visit of UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan to Addis Ababa on August 18-19, 2023, to deepen cooperation in areas such as agriculture, finance and investment, the chemicals, pharmaceutical, aluminum and food industries, and the fight againstterrorism.

Sheikh Shakhboot Nahyan Al Nahyan, UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. said the results of the talks were a testament to the strengthening of the “special relationship” between the two states. Many experts, however, consider that as a result of the UAE President’s visit to Ethiopia, that relationship has in effect been upgraded to a strategic partnership.

In support of Addis Ababa’s position in the Ankara-brokered talks with Mogadishu that began on July 1, the UAE Central Bank and the National Bank of Ethiopia entered into a “currency swap” agreement in mid-July that will allow the latter to enter into up to $817 million of transactions in local currencies.

However, when assessing the UAE’s policy in this region, the Canadian Geopolitical Monitor emphasizes that it should be assumed that it is maintaining close ties not only with Ethiopia, but also with Somaliland and Somalia, giving preference to Somaliland, not least because a Dubai-based company has invested $442 million in developing the latter’s port of Berbera, which is located at the most strategically important point on the coast of the Gulf of Aden, at the entrance to the Red Sea.

Some light into the steps that the UAE is taking to reduce tensions in the region is shed by the admission of TPLF leader Debretsion Gebremichael, in an interview with Voice of America, that six months ago talks were held in Dubai between the head of the current interim administration in Tigray, Getachew Reda, and Eritrean leaders, with the aim of achieving peace between the two sides. These talks, he said, continued and have yielded generally positive results.

Saudi Arabia has also been openly supportive of Ethiopia at this difficult time for the latter, announcing in August this year the establishment of a Saudi-Ethiopian Business Council to boost economic ties between the two countries in the period 2024-2028. It will focus on deepening cooperation in areas such as agriculture, mining, the petrochemicals and food industries, as well as tourism, real estate and construction.

The formation of this joint Business Council with Ethiopia (which is, as Middle East economic information newsletter Al Bawaba notes, one of the continent’s major economies, with a GDP of $205 billion in 2022) can be explained by the fact that Ethiopia represents a convenient springboard for developing ties not only with countries in the Horn of Africa but also with the economies of Central Africa.

Eritrea. Against the backdrop of rising tensions between Somalia and both Egypt and Ethiopia, Cairo is taking steps to strengthen its influence in the Horn of Africa. To this end, on September 14 this year, during a visit to Eritrea, Egyptian intelligence chief Abbas Kamel and Foreign Minister Badr Abdel Aty conveyed a message from Abdel Fattah El-Sisi to President Isaias Afwerki and, according to the London-based Arabic newspaper Asharq Al-Awsat, agreed with him to intensify joint efforts to de-escalate tensions in Sudan and to support “state institutions and preserve the unity and sovereignty of Somalia.”

And here the Egyptian representatives found a willing audience. The fact is that Eritrea, which made a significant contribution to the defeat of TPLF forces in the 2020-2022 war in Tigray, but was not invited by Abiy Ahmed to participate in the peace agreement in Pretoria, believes that its interests (it claims part of the territory of northern Tigray) were not taken into account in the signing of the agreement. As a result, Eritrea has now become the main base of the Amharic rebel organization FANO. FANO militants receive military training and arms and equipment from foreign sponsors here.

Djibouti. Taking advantage of Ethiopia’s predicament, Djibouti’s leadership, in order not to lose the approximately $1.5 billion a year in revenue that it receives from Addis Ababa’s lease of its commercial port of Tadjoura, has offered to enter into an agreement on the shared use of this port in the event of a positive resolution of the Ethiopia-Somalia conflict. Tadjoura, built in 2017 at a cost of $60 million, is 100 kilometers from the Ethiopian border, and gives access to the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea coasts.

As Africa Confidential notes, this would allow Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed to save “face” if he is forced to renege on the memorandum with Somaliland. But Addis Ababa has yet to respond to the September 4 proposal made by Djibouti’s Foreign Minister, Mahamoud Ali Youssouf.

The escalation of rhetoric on both sides following the second round of talks led to the failure to hold a third meeting in Ankara, scheduled for September 17. According to Voice of America, citing Somali government circles, the reason for this is (allegedly) that there was insufficient time to comprehensively work through all the issues, as the parties were attending the UN General Assembly session that opened in New York on September 13.

But experts from the Egyptian news portal Ahram Online believe that the postponement was due to the deployment of Egyptian troops in Somalia. But in any case, Turkey Today claims that the Somalia-Ethiopia dialog continues to enjoy strong support from Turkey, especially from President Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Fidan.

On September 19, Hakan Fidan clarified the situation. In an interview with Anadolu Agency, he said in order to ease tensions between the two sides, Ankara had decided before the next round of talks to hold them in the form of separate meetings with each side in order to bring their positions closer together. Moreover, noting the convergence of views on certain issues during previous meetings, he expressed hope that an agreement would be reached.

Turkey’s interests first and foremost

Ankara’s willingness to continue negotiations can be explained by the fact that Ankara sees opportunities for major new infrastructure contracts following the IMF’s decision to grant Ethiopia a deferral of its foreign debt repayment obligations – a decision which will lead to an inflow of foreign investment and economic growth.

It should be borne in mind that the contracting industry is a leading ding sector in the Turkish economy. According to a statement made by President Erdoğan on September 18 this year to the Turkish Contractors Association, Turkey is the second country in the world after China in terms of the number of contracting companies and the eighth in terms of the amount of revenue they receive from foreign contracts. In 2023, such contracts totaled $28 billion.

Given Ankara’s experience in relations with other African countries, it can be expected that it will not cease its mediation efforts and will do what it can to maximize the economic benefits and political dividends (in the form of support for its foreign policy initiatives on certain international issues) that it receives from its clients in recognition of its services.

In a statement quoted by the Turkish publication The Pinnacle Gazette, Hakan Fidan, referring to Ankara’s mediation role, explicitly emphasizes that “Our goal is to address existing concerns and resolve issues beneficially [for all parties]”.

In general, as of today, expert circles remain cautiously optimistic about Turkey’s mediation, which depends not only on the willingness of the two rival parties to reach reconciliation, but also largely on the position of the numerous foreign players on whose support they rely.

According to Tunç Demirtaş, a Turkish expert at the SETA Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research, such is the seriousness of the disagreement between Ethiopia and Somalia that Turkey’s mediation efforts could take on a protracted character, as the conflict goes beyond bilateral relations and affects the interests of all countries in the Red Sea basin -Djibouti, Egypt, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Eritrea. As quoted by Abu Dhabi-based news outlet The National, he admits that “No one has a magic wand. Miracles can’t be achieved overnight”.

 

Viktor Goncharov, African expert, PhD in Economics, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook

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