On July 8, 2024, ahead of his visit to the US, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol gave an interview to Reuters, which caused some tension in the Russian expert community. Mr. Yoon said that the future of relations between the Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation will depend entirely on Moscow’s actions in relation to military cooperation with North Korea.
The South Korean leader also said that Seoul’s decision on arms deliveries to Ukraine will depend on how the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty recently signed by Pyongyang and Moscow is implemented.
Such statements from the South Korean president provoked an immediate reaction from Moscow, although it was not President Vladimir Putin himself who responded, but his press secretary Dmitry Peskov. As he put it, “we are in favor of building good relations with all states in the region—both with the DPRK and South Korea,” but now “we have a partner in Pyongyang and another country, South Korea, that has joined the anti-Russian sanctions… But how can we build good relations [with countries] that take a hostile stance toward us?”
All this has raised suspicions that the South Korean leadership may still cross Moscow’s red line in response to pressure from the West. Representatives of the US and NATO have been seeking to influence Seoul for a long time, and their arguments can be divided into the following groups:
South Korea positions itself as a responsible global power and a staunch ally of the US. This position needs to be backed up by responsible action.
North Korea has already helped Russia and is doing so in violation of the UN Security Council sanctions, and South Korea has the right to do the same, especially since, if desired, a concrete justifications for doing so is available in the form of the conditions Yoon Suk-yeol put forward in the spring of 2023.
South Korea is an active exporter of arms, including to such countries as Romania and Poland. If South Korean military hardware were to be used successfully against Russian hardware this might have an effect on its sales.
Seoul’s plans to provide Kiev with a medium- to long-term aid package
On April 5, 2024, participating in a meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Brussels, South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yeol pledged to continue supporting Ukraine. According to him, Seoul plans to provide Kiev with a package of medium- and long-term aid worth $2.3 billion dollars. In addition, $12m dollars will be allocated for the rehabilitation of wounded Ukrainian troops through the NATO fund for assistance to Ukraine. Afterwards, responding to a question from the Yonhap News Agency, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba said that now the time has come for South Korea to supply lethal weapons to Ukraine. In particular, he emphasized the relevance of transferring missiles for Patriot systems.
Almost simultaneously, the Korea Times published an article by Troy Stangarone, Senior Director and Fellow at the Korea Economic Institute, in which he stated that “as the war is at a critical stage and Ukraine faces an artillery shortage, it is important to find creative solutions to provide Ukraine with additional artillery shells.” In particular, he proposes that South Korea could provide 105mm howitzer shells, which South Korea itself has little need for, and new 155mm shells with increased range (which would allow these weapons to be tested in real combat conditions and attract orders from other countries). South Korea could also grant Ukraine a license for the production of 155mm artillery shells and provide raw materials, or even set up joint ventures in this area.
The author adds that “aiding Ukraine would not directly stop Russia providing new technology to North Korea, but it would deepen South Korea’s ties with NATO, … mitigate long-term Russia-North Korea ties and lessen the chances of China taking similar action against Taiwan.”
NATO openly urges South Korea to help in not letting Russia win its war against the West
On June 28, 2024, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said that NATO would welcome any serious support from South Korea to Ukraine in the fight against Russia, noting that such assistance from South Korea should not be viewed on the same footing as North Korea’s suspected delivery of munitions to Russia, given the illegal nature of Russia’s invasion. Jens Stoltenberg further urged the world to not let Russia win this war because it will send the wrong message to other authoritarian countries that “they can get what they want if they use military force in violation of international law.”
On the same day South Korean Prime Minister Han Duck-soo indicated that the government would consider adjusting its assistance to Ukraine depending on the level of military cooperation between Russia and North Korea. Something similar has already been said by National Security Advisor Chang Ho-jin, but now it has been repeated by a senior figure who is authorized to speak on behalf of the state.
On July 9, a senior NATO official noted that “anything that South Korea can provide to help strengthen Ukraine’s defense capabilities will be warmly welcomed… Ultimately, we all have an interest in ensuring that Russia does not achieve a victory here, and I think that the outcome of this conflict has strategic implications in Europe, and it has strategic implications in Asia.”
However, a number of experts (including Lim Eul-chul, a professor of North Korean studies, and Cho Han-bom, a senior analyst at the Korea Institute of National Unification) said that Yoon Suk-yeol is unlikely to announce the provision of lethal weapons to Ukraine: Seoul is still very cautious about actions that could lead to a breakdown in ties with Moscow and escalate tensions on the Korean Peninsula. As Cho noted, “Although Seoul and Moscow have been exchanging hostile rhetoric, both sides are treading carefully not to cross the ‘red line’ that could sever ties and escalate military threats.”
Nevertheless, Yoon Suk-yeol’s trip to the NATO summit was seen as a very troubling sign, as Seoul could use this platform to make an official announcement of a change of policy on the Ukrainian issue. Although Mr. Yoon repeatedly condemned the rapprochement between Moscow and Pyongyang and their alleged military and technical cooperation during the trip, he did not utter the fateful words.
Nevertheless, Yoon Suk-yeol announced that he would continue to provide Ukraine with assistance and support in the areas of security and humanitarian and reconstruction projects. South Korea has announced that its contribution to the NATO-Ukraine Trust Fund will double to $24 million. It has also stated that it will block and neutralize illegal military and economic cooperation between the Russian Federation and North Korea through its alliance with the United States, its cooperation within the US-Japan-South Korea trilateral framework, and its close cooperation with NATO members, as well as receiving information from NATO on the use of North Korean weapons.
It would seem that we can, as on previous occasions, breathe a sigh of relief and remember how in April 2023, before another visit to America, Mr. Yoon also gave an interview to Reuters, in which he pointed out that South Korea may start supplying weapons to Ukraine “if a situation arises that the international community cannot tolerate, such as large-scale attacks on civilians … or serious violations of the laws of war.” In Russia, this phrase also caused a stir and suggested to many that South Korea would change its policy, but that has not happened.
It should also be noted that the South Korean government would need parliamentary approval to start reconsidering the issue of supplying lethal weaponry to Ukraine. And South Korea’s National Assembly is now controlled by the Democrats, who, despite their “European Left” and pro-Ukrainian position in general, may choose not to approve such a decision for purely factional reasons.
However, when it comes to the long term, the outlook is fairly pretty pessimistic. Mr. Yoon has made quite a few promises of cooperation with NATO and support for Ukraine, and, unofficially, this could possibly include the indirect supply of arms—which, from the perspective of the hawks in the Russian government, would be much the same as supplying them directly. Some Korea experts have already admitted that there have been secret shipments of arms.
For the present author, this means that the level of mutual distrust will build up and sooner or later come to a head. Moscow’s tone toward Seoul, as we noted in our previous article, is already beginning to change. And while it is not certain that by the end of 2024, under the pressure of circumstances, Yoon Suk-yeol will be forced to decide to supply arms to Kiev, and that as a result relations between South Korea and Russia will collapse, the likelihood of this happening is above 50%.
Konstantin Asmolov, Candidate of Historical Sciences, Leading research fellow at the Center for Korean Studies, part of the China and Modern Asia Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”
