International transport corridors (ITCs) are gaining independent geo-economic importance, where the transit of goods and passengers guarantees a constant source of profit, security and growth. The question lies in the routes and the combination of interests of project participants.
What is attractive about the Zangezur transport and communications corridor?
The topic of the Zangezur corridor was put on the broad public agenda by Azerbaijan following the results of the Second Karabakh War of 2020-2023. Referring to paragraph 9 of the trilateral online statement dated November 9, 2020, Baku believes that Yerevan should grant the right of an extraterritorial corridor through the Meghri part of Zangezur (the Armenian region of Syunik) for the unhindered passage of goods and passengers to the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic.
In reality, for Baku and Ankara the idea of the Zangezur corridor is an addition to the Middle Corridor project, providing transit of goods from China and Central Asian countries through the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan and Armenia to Turkey and Europe. The attractiveness of the Zangezur corridor is determined by its geography, i.e. being the shortest route with a length of 43-47 km, providing access via Armenia to Turkey and the EU, as well as to Central Asia and China. In addition, for Turkey and Azerbaijan, this route ensures the implementation of the Turan project, which seeks to link communication with the Turkic countries of the post-Soviet space.
The topic of Zangezur is nothing new for pan-Turkists; at the conclusion of the Batum Treaty between Turkey and Armenia on June 4, 1918, the head of the Turkish delegation, Vehip Pasha, noted to Armenian Foreign Minister Alexander Khatisian that the main contradiction between them on the topic of roads was the shortest exit of Turkey to Turan (including through Zangezur). However, following the results of the Turkish-Armenian War of 1920, Turkey failed to establish control over the Armenian Zangezur.
In the second half of the 1990s, the US, being one of the co-chair countries of the OSCE Minsk Group on the settlement of the Karabakh issue, tried to return to the topic of the Zangezur corridor through the Paul Goble Plan, carry out a territorial exchange between Armenia and Azerbaijan (the Meghri corridor to Azerbaijan in exchange for the inclusion of the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast with the Lachin corridor into Armenia) and lay oil and gas pipelines from Azerbaijan to Turkey and Europe through this corridor. Washington’s goal was to create a route bypassing Russia to export strategic raw materials from the Azeri sector of the Caspian Sea to the West, oust the Russian military, political and economic presence from Armenia and the Transcaucasian region as a whole and assert its monopoly.
However, this attempt by the US in 1999 resulted in failure and the shooting of the Armenian parliament, and two years later, negotiations in Key West between Robert Kocharian and Heydar Aliyev did not lead to the signing of the agreement sought out by the US. Nevertheless, in October, 1999, at the OSCE Istanbul Summit, the US implemented a route bypassing Russian for the transit of Azeri oil and gas through Georgia and Turkey to Europe and Russian military bases were withdrawn from the Transcaucasian republic.
Currently, the US is again showing interest in the Zangezur corridor. US Assistant Secretary of State James O’Brien recently stated that Washington needs a peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia to open the Zangezur corridor, which will become an important transit route for goods and resources from Central Asia through the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan and Armenia to Turkey and Europe, bypassing Russia and China. It is clear that there are no especially attractive products for the European consumer market in Central Asia today – except for strategic raw materials.
The US position is supported by its allies in Europe. However, Brussels is not in a hurry to invest in Azerbaijan for the development of infrastructure for the growth of gas production and its subsequent export to Europe. Obviously, the EU is interested in investing in new energy markets for gas production and transit south and east of Azerbaijan, i.e. Iran, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan.
China is interested in the Zangezur corridor as part of its Belt and Road Initiative to export its goods to the financially prosperous European market. Russia also supports the opening of the Zangezur corridor under the control of its border troops in the context of harsh sanctions from the collective West for the flow of goods to the countries of the global south.
Thus, the key supporters of the opening of the Zangezur corridor – alongside Azerbaijan – are the Caspian countries of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan), Turkey, China, Russia, the US, UK and EU. At the same time, the interests of these countries may clash (first of all between Russia and the West).
At the same time, Iran is the key opponent of the Zangezur corridor (and even with the right of extraterritoriality), as Tehran fears the implementation of the Turan project and the strengthening of Turkey, as well as the entry of NATO into Transcaucasia and Central Asia via Turkey. Moreover, Iran is not in a hurry to implement the North-South overland ITC, which would ensure Russian access to the Persian Gulf. For this reason Iran keeps delaying the construction of its sections of the railway route. That is why the Supreme leader of Iran, Rahbar Ali Khamenei, during a conversation with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, who arrived in Tehran to attend the inauguration of President Masoud Pezeshkian, reiterated that the opening of the Zangezur corridor is harmful for Armenia.
Yerevan’s ‘Crossroads of the World’ project, put forward by Pashinyan to satisfy all direct and potential stakeholders in the Zangezur corridor on the condition of Armenia’s right of sovereignty over this road being preserved, is so far only one of multiple options, but does not enjoy full support from external powers. The US is once again trying to establish its control over this potential route in order to oust Russia from Armenia and the region.
The idea of a ‘Zangezur gas hub’ in the prospects for a deepening of Iranian-Western relations
The US and Europe are traditionally interested in gaining access to the richest energy regions. Until 1979, Iran seemed to be one of such key energy areas for Washington and London, however, after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the situation changed with the introduction of sanctions. The Obama administration attempted to ease the sanctions against Iran in 2015-2016 following negotiations with the administration of reformist president Hassan Rohani, but this subsequently failed under Donald Trump. In 2017, USA withdrew from these agreements and tightened regime against Iran.
However, the aggravation of relations between the Collective West and Russia after the start of the Special Military Operation and the subsequent economic sanctions caused significant damage to the energy interests of Europe, which is currently experiencing a shortage of gas supplies. The EU is striving to find a replacement for Russian gas, but is facing new geopolitical challenges and problems. One of the priorities of the gas market is Iran and the Turkic countries of Central Asia (i.e. Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan). In this regard, France is the shadow curator of negotiations with Iran.
The recent early presidential elections in Iran and the unexpected success of reformist Masoud Pezeshkian in a certain sense presupposes the restoration of Iranian-European and Iranian-US relations in terms of easing sanctions and finding compromises. Pezeshkian has already declared a similar agenda for his foreign policy. At the same time, the appointment of Iranian Vice President Mohammad Zarif, the former Iranian foreign minister during Rohani’s rule, indicates Tehran’s serious intentions to pursue a peaceful agenda in relations with the West.
This is likely why Israel, led by Netanyahu, is trying to provoke an escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through daring sabotage and terrorist actions and to prevent Iran from pursuing this peaceful agenda with the West. But what will Iran offer Europe if some compromises are reached on the export of Iranian gas to the European market?
Once again, the Zangezur corridor may become the subject of new initiatives. The ITC assumes not only a cluster of automobile, aviation and railway communications, but also energy transit (a network of oil and gas pipelines). As is known, after the sabotage of the Russian Nord Stream 1 and 2 gas pipelines, in the autumn of 2022 Moscow offered Turkey a gas hub in Eastern Thrace, an electronic gas trading platform and the corresponding fuel storage infrastructure.
Almost two years have passed since then, however, and although Turkey publicly supports this project, the issue remains open. On the one hand, Turkey is under external pressure from the US and Europe, and on the other hand, Ankara is putting forth a number of new unfavourable conditions for Moscow (and this is not so much low prices or even joint trade, but rather obtaining access to Turkmen and Kazakh gas through a new network of gas pipelines along the bottom of the Caspian Sea to Turkey).
In 2023, Iran, for its part, put forth a similar proposal to create a gas hub on the shores of the Persian Gulf for the subsequent sale of gas to the countries of the Global South. Russia has expressed interest in this project and has signed important agreements with Iran through Gazprom (including on LNG and the construction of a new gas pipeline along the bottom of the Caspian Sea).
At the same time, in the case of thawing of Iranian-Western relations, it is possible that Tehran, which is currently opposed to the Zangezur corridor, may become its active supporter and propose a project for a gas hub in the Armenian Zangezur (Meghri). Within the frame of such plans the gas hub will accommodate gas from Iran, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Russia (with the appropriate external investment). Naturally, in such a case, control over the Zangezur corridor is important in terms of ensuring security, which may become the subject of a separate Armenian-Russian agreement outside the framework of the failed trilateral online statement of November 9, 2020.
Alexander Svarants, Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”
