With the support of the United Kingdom, Turkey is actively developing a revanchist policy within the framework of the doctrines of non-pan-Turanism and neo-Ottomanism, which is not being met with opposition from the US and EU. At the same time, Ankara is trying to take advantage of anti-Russian pressure from the West and Moscow’s preoccupation with the Ukrainian crisis.
Past British patronage of Turkey and Turkish tactics of confrontation and partnership with Russia at the turn of the 20th century.
Turkey has historically demonstrated a commitment to ally with Great Britain against Russia. The collapse of the USSR was perceived in Ankara as a favourable moment in history for the resurrection of the geopolitical strategies of neo-pan-Turanism and neo-Ottomanism, encompassing parts of the post-Soviet and post-Ottoman space.
The Turkish political leadership realised that for more than two centuries (19th and 20th centuries) of military and political confrontation with the strengthening of the Russian state, Turkey suffered defeats from the Russian army and navy. It was only thanks to the entry of British diplomacy into the ‘Big Game’ (for example the Berlin Congress of 1878, the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923 and the Potsdam Treaty of 1945) that Turkey managed to minimise Russian success in terms of territorial losses and geopolitical acquisitions.
In the 1990s, Turkey supported anti-Russian forces and indirectly participated in local conflicts in Transcaucasia and the Northern Caucasus on the side of Azerbaijan, Abkhazia, Georgia and Chechen separatists to block Russian control in the Southern Caucasus and form (with the support of the Anglo-Saxons) routes of energy communications for the export of oil and gas from Azerbaijan to Europe bypassing Russia. In October, 1999, supported by the decisions of the OSCE Istanbul summit on the fate of oil and gas pipelines from Baku via Georgia and Turkey to Europe, as well as the withdrawal of Russian military bases from Georgia itself, this policy bore fruit.
Since 2004, Ankara, with the assistance of London, has changed its tactics in relations with Russia from military confrontation to regional and strategic partnership to ‘lull the attention’ of Moscow with the aim of moving into strategically important regions (North Africa, Balkans, Middle East, Caucasus, Central Asia). The results of such flexible diplomacy have been Turkey’s numerous acquisitions in the field of economics (tourism, construction, energy, transit, re-export), security (the deal with the S-400 Typhoon air defence system, military-technical cooperation on equipping combat aviation systems, information partnership) and geopolitics (Libya, Syria, Nagorno-Karabakh, Northern Cyprus, Azerbaijan and the Turkic republics of Central Asia).
Meeting no resistance from Russia, Turkey was able to enter Libya to satisfy its energy ambitions, create a 30km security zone in the Kurdish-populated northern regions of Syria, form a strong economic and military-political tandem with Azerbaijan and militarily establish control over Nagorno-Karabakh, establish the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS) and begin its systematic entry into the Turkic Central Asia, as well as initiating a project to annex the occupied part of Northern Cyprus.
Northern Cyprus and Russia’s new subjects – double standards in the geopolitical games of Turkey and the UK
As is known, July 20 marked the 50th anniversary of the start of the Turkish Navy’s operation codenamed ‘Attila’ to occupy Northern Cyprus. This Turkish aggression was made possible by the tacit consent of the US, which feared the reunification of Cyprus with Greece, given that the Cypriot President, Archbishop Makarios, was then planning on strategic cooperation with the USSR. As a result, Turkey occupied 37% of the island’s territory. For many years negotiations have failed to settle the Cyprus issue and in 1983 Turkish Cypriots proclaimed the formation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Turkey was the only country that recognised the independence of TRNC.
Recep Erdogan visited TRNC on July 20 and made a number of statements in favour of the independence of this entity and voiced guarantees of Turkish enforcement of security of this part of the island. In his speech, R. Erdogan justified the 1974 military operation to enter Northern Cyprus and allegedly free the Turkish Cypriots from Greek threats of ethnic cleansing and physical extermination. The head of the Turkish Defence Ministry, Yasar Guler, made similar statements around the same time.
Ankara considers the recognition of the two communities (Greek and Turkish) of the island and the independence of TRNC to be the main conditions for the resumption of negotiations on Cyprus. Meanwhile, Turkish Cypriots rejected the federal structure of Cyprus with the participation of two communities and torpedoed negotiations in Switzerland with a proposal to create a confederation.
After the military success of the Turkish-Azeri tandem in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020 and 2023, as well as the early withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from the Karabakh conflict zone, Turkey began to use its influence over Azerbaijan and involve Baku in the process of international recognition of TRNC. The head of TRNC, Ersin Tatar, and other representatives of the entity began periodically attending various public forums in Azerbaijan with the participation of President I. Aliyev. In addition, under pressure from Turkey, TRNC was accepted as an observer state in the OTS.
By the use of force that allowed it to achieve military success in Karabakh, Azerbaijan today already allows for some form of recognition of the independence of TRNC, in contrast to UN resolutions and Greece’s position on Cyprus. Today Baku is not afraid of the similar recognition of the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, since it no longer exists neither de jure nor de facto, the Armenian population having been totally deported. In addition, Aliyev has to respond to the military and political support of Erdogan with the ‘other side of the coin’.
However, Ankara and Baku are in no hurry to recognise Russia’s legitimate justifications for protecting the rights of the Russian and Russian-speaking population of Crimea and Donbass in the Ukrainian conflict, nor are they going to recognise the legitimacy of the Crimean referendum on reunification with the Russian Federation. They do, however, recognise the territorial integrity of Ukraine within its March, 2014, borders, and in some cases even provide military, technical and humanitarian assistance to the Kiev regime.
Additionally, Turkish interest in Northern Cyprus is determined not only by ethnic reasons, but also by the desire to gain access to the island’s energy resources (including billions of tonnes of oil and gas reserves). This is why on July 21, President Erdogan allowed for the possibility of creating a naval and air force base in TRNC in response to similar initiatives from Greece.
Northern Cyprus eyes integration with Turkey as an autonomy
Ankara is well aware that the US and EU will not recognise any form of TRNC independence. It is no coincidence that Greece and Cyprus receive military assistance from the US and France in this connection. Thus, Turkey, through Turkish Cypriots, is initiating new forms of settlement of the Cyprus issue (namely the integration of Northern Cyprus as an autonomy into Turkey).
In an interview to Turkish newspaper Aydinlik, TRNC Minister of Transport, Erhan Arikli, said: “The TRNC must exist, even if it is not recognised. If we run out of options for existence, we will find an alternative. The TRNC will then be like the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan, dependent on Turkey in foreign policy and security issues. In internal affairs, we will remain fully independent. I hope we will raise this issue”. He also expressed that a naval base, as well as an air base, must immediately be provided to Turkey.
Cyprus has long been in the shadow of London
Behind Turkish activities in Cyprus we once again see the shadow of the UK, which has military bases (in Akrotiri and Dhekelia) and intelligence facilities (including the technical centre of the government communications headquarters). London is certainly as interested in the natural resources and geography of the island of Cyprus as Washington and other European capitals. One of the patrons of Turkey’s interests in Northern Cyprus is the former head of the Conservative Party of Great Britain, Iain Duncan Smith, who, together with labourist Jack Straw and other influential British politicians, is lobbying for the opening of direct flights from TRNC and strengthening the UK’s strategic foothold n in the Eastern Mediterranean to prevent Russia from entering the region.
At the same time, Turkey’s promotion of its neo-Ottoman aspirations in Cyprus and neo-pan-Turanist ambitions in the post-Soviet South (in Transcaucasia and Central Asia) provides the UK with new financial, resource and geopolitical acquisitions in Eurasia. That is why Boris Johnson did not allow the cessation of hostilities in the Special Military Operation in the spring of 2022 following the Istanbul negotiations, in order to exhaust Russia and reduce resistance to Turkish moves in other regions. Such a policy is continued by the new cabinet of Labour’s Keir Starmer, who benefit from the aggravation of economic and political relations between Russia and the EU, which creates a chance for the UK and Turkey strengthening their positions in the East.
However, such a move to the East may cause a negative reaction from both Russia and other key players, including Iran and China.
Alexander Svarants – Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”
