Against the background of the intensification of Ethiopian foreign policy, which has highlighted the issue of obtaining direct access to the sea, the unrecognised state of Somaliland, which had previously remained on the periphery of geopolitics, suddenly found itself in the centre of the unfolding confrontation. In such circumstances, any news on the political, economic or military state of the Horn of Africa region is interesting for understanding the future dynamics of the Ethiopian-Somali conflict. It is within the framework of such logic that the author refers to the recent report on the dispatch of a contingent of soldiers from Somaliland to Ethiopia, seeking to determine the goals of such a step.
A brief background
In recent months, there has been an unequivocal increase in inter-country tensions in the Horn of Africa, most acutely manifested in Ethiopian-Somali relations. These two states have traditionally vied for influence in areas on both sides of the nearly 1,500km-long border. This time, however, unlike the events of the Ogaden War of 1977-1978, the two states’ interests did not clash over a territorial dispute, i.e. the ownership of vast areas inhabited by Somalians in the Ethiopian state of Ogaden.
Thus, while largely remaining a vivid embodiment of the geopolitical ambitions of Addis Ababa and Mogadishu, current contradictions are directly related to the status of Somaliland, an autonomous region in north-western Somalia that declared independence in 1991 against the background of the ongoing civil war, though it is not internationally recognised. On January 1, 2024, a principled agreement with the Somaliland Government, providing Ethiopia with direct access to the Red Sea and the construction of a naval base was reached. Thus, Addis Ababa inevitably found itself on the verge of direct conflict with Mogadishu; perhaps escalation not only become possible because of Somalia’s dire internal situation and the complete unpreparedness of the country’s armed forces for a clash with a neighbour.
Nevertheless, as expected, the parties embarked on a ‘war of narratives’, drawing other regional and external players to their sides – the government of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (Somalia) was particularly successful in this, achieving the support of Egypt, as well as others. Considering the situation’s rapid dynamics and turbulence, at first there was a logical assumption that the solution to existing contradictions would be found in the near future, or else the world would witness a new round of escalation in Somali-Ethiopian relations. However, contrary to such expectations, after exchanging bellicose statements and stating the legitimacy of their claims and interests, the ‘two and a half’ parties to the conflict (Ethiopia, Somaliland and Somalia) refused – or failed – to take steps that could radically change the status quo. In addition to reports on a first round of essentially inconclusive negotiations between Addis Ababa and Mogadishu on July 1 in Ankara, which showed the ability of the parties to sit down at the negotiating table while maintaining a steady unwillingness to change starting positions, only one notable piece of news has recently surfaced.
Somali soldiers abroad: a bitter experience
According to some sources, the government of Somaliland has sent a number of units of its security forces to Ethiopia to carry out training and increase the overall level of combat capability. At first glance, an unknowing observer may get the impression that such a development is devoid of political background and only indicates the natural development of contacts between Addis Ababa and Hargeisa against the background of rapprochement, supported by an unrealised ‘Memorandum of Understanding’. However, by considering the situation in more detail, one comes across a similar plot from 2018-2022. Then, amid the rapid rapprochement of Ethiopia and Somalia with Eritrea (the latter has remained the ‘black sheep’ for most of its neighbours since the late 1990s), many experts talked about forming a trilateral alliance. Somali President, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, better known as Farmaajo, sent 5,000 Somali soldiers to train in Eritrean army field camps – the Eritrean army is perhaps the biggest in the region in terms of men.
There are at least two explanations for this decision. Firstly, the dispatch of military personnel is an ordinary aspect of military-technical cooperation, It is, nonetheless, questionable given the number of units; de facto, about a quarter of the Somali army was suddenly abroad, while the country continued the difficult struggle against extremist groups. The second explanation suggests that there is another non-public purpose for the deployment of Somali soldiers to Eritrea. According to a number of reports, Somalis were involved in fighting in Tigray State. Perhaps this was the price of Mogadishu joining the alliance with Asmara and Addis Ababa. Subsequently, either due to the changing internal political situation in Somalia itself, including the coming to power of a new government and protests from civil society, or as a result of the contradictions that arose during the fighting, Somalia began to increasingly demand the return of its soldiers after a two-year stay in Eritrea. At the same time, although after a prolonged wait, Eritrean authorities fulfilled Mogadishu’s demands, which at times seemed more like a powerless request. Not everyone was able to return home.
Somaliland: repeating Mogadishu’s mistake?
Understanding the nature and main objectives of military contacts between Ethiopia and Somaliland is difficult given extremely limited information about the political system and army of the latter. Since the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding, which involved Somaliland transferring a section of the coast to Ethiopia for temporary use, including the right to build a naval base, in exchange for recognition of the self-proclaimed state, two pieces of news related to the armed forces of Somaliland have appeared.
Firstly, almost immediately after the official announcement of the signing of the Memorandum, the defence minister of the self-proclaimed state, Abdikani Mohamed Ateye, voluntarily resigned, expressing his disagreement with the decision of Somaliland’s president. Although this move was not accompanied by public speeches from the military and security forces, it clearly indicated the lack of consensus amongst political elites.
The second piece of news related to the Somaliland army was the dispatch of soldiers to Ethiopia for training, a scenario that largely echoes the events discussed earlier. At the same time, the departure ceremony of such a significant contingent was organised at the highest level: the country’s defence minister addressed the soldiers with a parting word.
So, what is the actual purpose of sending Somaliland soldiers to Ethiopia? Of course, after the signing of the Memorandum, Addis Ababa became a de facto ally of Hargeisa in the region, and the development of military cooperation with (probably) the most combat-ready army in the Horn of Africa is of practical interest to the armed forces of Somaliland. On the other hand, the need for retraining military personnel hardly implies sending a contingent so numerous that it makes up a significant proportion of total Somaliland military personnel. Thus, explaining the true motives for such a step, one should take into account the practice dating back to Antiquity: in order to guarantee the inviolability of the alliance and their commitment to the agreements reached, ancient rulers sent their relatives and/or representatives of the highest nobility as honorary hostages. In this sense, the training of Somaliland military units on Ethiopian soil is likely an attempt to kill two birds with one stone, i.e. increasing the combat capability of the armed forces and confirming their own promises, thus, in fact, employing the ancient practice of honorary hostages.
Ivan Kopytsev – political scientist, junior researcher at the Centre for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Institute for International Studies, MGIMO, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, especially for online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”
