Abdulkadir Selvi, a Turkish scholar and one of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s “mouthpieces” in the Hürriyet Daily News, believes Vladimir Putin will visit Turkey in the last week of August this year. The following are among the major items on the agenda of the Russian-Turkish high-level summit talks:
– Russia’s return to the Black Sea Grain Initiative and the grain corridor;
– trade relations between our countries;
– The Zangezur corridor and Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Armenia relations;
– the Syrian issue.
We have previously stated in our publications that Erdoğan wants to re-establish the grain deal because he does not want to lose financial and international benefits.
The restoration of Russia’s interests was repeatedly noted publicly and clearly before and after the Russian government withdrew from the Grain Deal, or rather, suspended its participation in the Istanbul agreements of 2022. The terms of the grain deal return to the interests of Russia: the lifting of sanctions on the export of our agricultural products and fertilizers; the connection of the Russian Agricultural Bank to SWIFT; permission to import spare parts for agricultural machinery; and the repair of the main ammonia pipeline Togliatti-Odessa. The terms of Russia’s interest have been brought to light by the Russian Foreign Ministry, the Russian presidential spokesman, the assistant to the President of Russia for Foreign Policy, and even Russian President Vladimir Putin in a telephone conversation with Erdoğan.
However, Turkey would like to remind Russia about the passage of Russian warships via the Turkish Straits to Syria, thus demonstrating Turkey’s superiority. The Turkish Straits are also necessary for Russian diplomacy to prioritize maritime connections with African countries. Ankara offers Moscow passage of Russian grain through its territory to impoverished African nations as well as the processing of grain into flour at Turkish flour mills, obviously at a cost.
Finally, during his discussions with Putin, Erdoğan brings up the proposal of retired US Navy Admiral James Stavridis having a NATO naval convoy that includes the Turkish Navy escort Ukrainian grain. However, Ankara has so far refused to support this initiative of the representative of its main ally and hopes for “the political wisdom of our friend Putin.” And what should Russia do now?
Of course, trade relations between Russia and Turkey tend to grow and broaden the scope of trade transactions. Not only Russian gas exports, nuclear power plant construction, and tourism. Ankara is hoping for the implementation of the “Gas Hub” project proposed to the Turks at the initiative of President Putin himself. Military-technical cooperation in the field of hi-tech, especially in the fields of combat aviation, air defense, and space, is not excluded. An important area of trade cooperation is the “parallel transit” of European products through Turkey to Russia, as well as financial services.
Following Armenia’s military defeat in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020, the Zangezur Corridor has been the object of special attention. Turkey increased its pressure on the regional situation in Transcaucasia in order to obtain the shortest spatial connection between Azerbaijan and the rest of the Turkic countries of Central Asia via the Nakhchivan enclave and Armenian Meghri. So far, Erdoğan has defined this communication as a vital commercial corridor of significance to key Eurasian countries such as Turkey, Russia, and China. In reality, it is a “bridge” that connects Turkey to the so-called Great Turan. With it, Turkey will materialize a new energy project called TANAP-2 gas development project or Nabucco pipeline, which will provide access to Turkmenistan’s gas resources while bypassing Russia.
Armenians and Karabakh residents may believe in God, but not in political idols. The topic of the Zangezur Corridor, in particular, is more likely to be raised in the meetings between Putin and Erdoğan, regardless of the interests and objectives of the Armenian side. In doing so, each side will be guided by their own interests. And here we see more dividends for Turkey than Russia without appealing to the Personal Friendship of Leaders. Power, not personal preferences, should govern heads of state.
And, once again, there is obvious pressure on Moscow’s position. Moscow will soon lose its geopolitical presence in Nagorno-Karabakh with the implementation of the Zangezur Corridor because Armenian Karabakh has been forfeited to Turkey and Azerbaijan, and Ankara and Baku do not intend to maintain a Russian military-political presence in their respective areas of responsibility and territories. With the loss of Armenian Karabakh, Armenia will become dependent on the United States and Turkey. This will mean Armenia’s withdrawal from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the cessation of Russia’s military presence in Transcaucasia, including the withdrawal of the 102nd military base from Gyumri and Russian border guards.
Furthermore, Russia’s concession of the Zangezur Corridor to Turkey and Azerbaijan will badly damage Moscow’s relations with Tehran since the Persians do not want Turkey and NATO strengthening its northern border. However, it is the struggle for Armenian Zangezur that has resulted in the absolute blockade and reservation of Armenian Karabakh, where the presence of the Russian peacekeeping contingent (RMC) is losing relevance due to the Turkish-Azerbaijani tandem’s pressure.
However, if Ankara and Baku rely on force to establish their will in the region, there is a risk that peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan would be lost, and the prospect of a new regional conflict will become a reality. This is evident from Iran’s position. And Armenia has yet to move from words in talks with Azerbaijan to signing agreements to give up its rights to Karabakh.
In such a case, how will Russia get peaceful passage through Zangezur to Turkey? Rather, such diplomacy could result in the North-South approach being blocked, both in the direction of Iran and Turkey.
Finally, the Syrian issue. Turkey has a reputation for acting diplomatically yet delaying the process without much prospect for definite solutions. Erdoğan endorsed the Russian plan to engage in vigorous negotiations with the Syrian side at the level of the foreign ministry, defense ministry, and foreign intelligence organizations, especially before his May election. However, Ankara openly states its goal to stay in the Syrian Arab Republic’s northern regions, justifying its occupation strategy with a fictitious Kurdish threat. The Kazakh government, presumably with support from Ankara, imposed restrictions on the Astana platform of talks between Russia, Turkey, Iran, and Syria. In other words, Erdoğan can promise in words to his Russian counterpart peace in Syria, but without withdrawing his troops or ending military support for pro-Turkish militant formations like The Sultan Murad Division and others. Additionally, Turkey’s stance in the Syrian situation is blatantly at odds with Iran’s strategy, which has stated at the level of the Foreign Ministry that Turkish troops must be withdrawn from the SAR’s held territory
It is clear from this analysis that Putin’s meeting with Erdoğan cannot result in ground-breaking solutions; otherwise, Russia’s standing in the Middle East and South Caucasus will suffer significantly. Moscow might merely use the Turkish strategy of putting off decisions by making “big promises.”
Aleksandr SVARANTS, PhD in political science, professor, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook.”
